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Abstract 
 
The main objective of this PhD thesis is to examine and analyse if Western 
factions have managed archaeological sites in Iraq in an Orientalist manner over 
the course of time. From the ninetieth century, European and American 
archaeologists have explored Mesopotamian ruins seeking verification of Biblical 
and Classical stories that are associated with the roots of Western civilization. For 
more than a century, scholars collected and analysed artefacts without local 
consultation, and what emerged was a narrative that was controlled and 
dominated by the West. Colonial occupation of Iraq before and after World War 
One allowed for continued Western influence and oversight of Iraqi sites. Yet by 
the time foreigners finally relinquished control over to the Iraqis, and participated 
in a more balanced academic relationship, the country was embroiled in domestic 
and international conflict and imposed sanctions. Archaeological sites and the 
Iraqi cultural heritage community suffered as a result, with the added issue of 
almost full disengagement with their international peers.  
When coalition military forces entered Iraq in March 2003, the only plan set in-
place appeared to be winning a war, with minimal consideration given to other 
operations. The failure to have an established strategy led to the occupation of the 
archaeological sites of Ur, Babylon and Kish, which revisited the earlier notions 
of colonial control over land and peoples. These three sites are represented as case 
studies in this thesis in order to explore notions of Orientalism, specifically issues 
of power and control. This thesis aims to determine if the history of colonialism 
influenced the epistemology of the coalition military forces who occupied 
archaeological sites, and thus shaped their interactions with the local heritage 
community. Through the use of semi-structured interviews with coalition war 
veterans and Iraqi cultural heritage personnel, this thesis strives to answer the 
question: ‘Was the construction of coalition military bases on Iraqi 
archaeological sites driven by Orientalist biases during the Iraq War?’ 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Aims of the Research  
The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship dynamics that existed between 
members of the US and Coalition military forces (henceforth referred to as the 
coalition or coalition forces), Iraqi cultural heritage professionals, and 
archaeological sites, during the 2003 Iraq War. Interest in this topic began with 
the start of the conflict, as I watched General Vincent Brooks on television news 
channels each morning, where he delivered daily press briefings to the media. As 
he reported on the war efforts, additional information soon began circulating that 
coalition forces destroyed the ancient city of Babylon, one of the more well-
known archaeological sites located in Iraq, by constructing an army base on top of 
the ruins. Yet, accounts of damages were vague, and the story was overshadowed 
by the other atrocities taking place throughout the country. However, as the war 
progressed, 10 other sites were also reportedly used for military purposes, with 
each having suffered varying degrees of damage (Bahrani 2003b; McDonald 
2003; Stone 2003; Wright et al. 2003).  
The reasons behind the military occupation of ruins and the effects such actions 
had on the local archaeological community were not topics covered by the 
networks who provided the majority of the war reports, namely Fox News, CNN 
and MSNBC. At the time, it seemed inappropriate to give airtime to stories about 
inanimate objects being damaged when so many human lives were being lost on a 
daily basis. However, the manner in which the Western coalition behaved towards 
another country’s cultural property was troubling. They exhibited the actions of 
occupiers, and as Mathew Thurlow has stated ‘In the past, the looting and 
destruction of cultural property has been the signal of conquest and the death of 
empires’ (Thurlow 2005, p. 86). This was most evident when troops were strongly 
criticised for failing to protect the Iraq Museum from looters, to which Donald 
Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defence infamously responded ‘stuff happens’ 
(Rumsfeld in Loughlin 2003).  
How did such an indifferent attitude translate to the Iraqis? Did the troops who 
were on the ground feel the same way? Were the army bases located on Babylon 
and the other sites viewed in a similarly dismissive fashion? How did living on 
those sites reflect on the troops, and did it impact their relations with the local 
population? It was not possible to address these questions immediately, but in 
2013, a qualitative study was initiated to further explore the issues surrounding 
the occupation of archaeological ruins, and how it affected cross-cultural 
relationships, which are laid out in this thesis. However, it is first necessary to 
provide the background that demonstrates how this body of work developed.   
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How the Research Evolved  
Starting in January 2005, I was afforded the opportunity to work in Iraq, mainly 
due to my background as an archaeologist and police evidence custodian.  
Initially the work was with a team of specialists who were excavating the mass 
graves from Saddam Hussein’s Al-Anfal Campaign. Then in November 2006, I 
moved to the US Embassy in Baghdad, where I served as their cultural heritage 
representative and liaison until January 2013. In addition to creating, 
implementing, and managing cultural heritage programs, I was also charged with 
cultivating professional working relationships between the Americans and Iraqis 
who worked in those fields. During my 8 years in-country, I visited 17 of the 18 
provinces, which included numerous archaeological sites, and interacted directly 
with members of the coalition and Iraqi cultural heritage specialists. Because I 
was required to travel with a security contingent while performing my duties, 
which were mainly US military units; I was able to witness interactions between 
the soldiers and Iraqis.   
The fact that the country was occupied by a foreign military power could not be 
overlooked, which contributed to a fluid and often-volatile environment. While 
hostilities existed from the belligerents on both sides, as the dynamics of the 
conflict changed over the course of the war, the synergy between the American 
soldiers and non-combatant Iraqis became more amicable. While this was 
especially evident in the camaraderie displayed with the Iraqi Army units, it was 
also seen when the soldiers engaged with the local population. There were many 
hands raised in friendly greeting as the US convoys passed through towns, which 
were returned with equal enthusiasm as witnessed in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. This is 
not illustrated to exonerate the coalition’s presence, which was a result of an 
invasion, rather to highlight that attempts were made at rapport building.  
	
Figure 1.1: Children waving to a passing US military convoy. 
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Figure 1.2: An Iraqi man raising his hand in greeting to passing US soldiers. 
Endeavours at forming positive and productive relations came to fruition in late 
2007, when a Lieutenant Colonel with a Cavalry Division expressed interest in 
assisting staff at the Iraq Museum with refurbishments of the building as part of a 
civic engagement project. A meeting took place between the officers in the 
division and the museum caretakers, which signalled that the military was willing 
to participate in communal relations as it related to cultural heritage practices. 
This point was made all the more relevant to me when I was in the hallway of the 
Republican Palace in Baghdad with the Colonel, and General Brooks, the man 
who had delivered all those early morning news briefings years ago, was walking 
towards us in the opposite direction. The General stopped to speak with us, and 
when he was advised about the proposed museum project, he praised the idea and 
welcomed the opportunity for soldiers to be involved in a community oriented 
project based around cultural heritage.      
It was then that I realised that while a war still ensued around us, it was unlike 
any other that had taken place before. A civilian archaeologist, working with an 
army officer and speaking with one of the most important military leaders in the 
coalition about a museum project, demonstrated to me that while obvious 
mistakes were made in the past, positive engagements with the Iraqi cultural 
heritage community were possible. This opinion was further solidified when I 
first set foot on Babylon and expected to see the desolation that had been widely 
reported. As I surveyed the area, I could see points of damage, but not the 
narrative of wholesale destruction that had been presented to the public. Using the 
site for a military camp was unforgivable, with some of the greatest damage 
inflicted on the unexcavated areas of the site, such as trenches that were dug for 
plumbing and electrical cabling as seen in Figure 1.3. Yet an unbiased account of 
what had transpired was not widely circulated and attested to the fact that the 
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ancient city was still intact, not razed to the ground as seen in Figure 1.4. If 
reports about the physical space were inaccurate, I wondered what other 
information was poorly documented or missing altogether.   
	
Figure 1.3: Trenches dug by members of the coalition are visible throughout unexcavated areas of 
Babylon. 
	
Figure 1.4: The ruins of the Principle Palace in front of the reconstructed walls of the Southern 
Palace. 
With the exception of the example of the museum meeting, I did not know if 
cooperation existed between the Americans and the Iraqis at the archaeological 
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sites. Yet what followed was five years of attempted projects and collaborations, 
which resulted in both failures and successes. The most challenging moments 
came from some civilian and military personnel who commonly voiced the 
opinion that working with the Iraqis was ‘too hard’ and ‘not the right time’. This 
resulted in individuals trying to implement projects without Iraqi consultation. For 
example, one team of American archaeologists proposed a site-visit in order to 
create a survey map of Babylon. However, they only accounted for their 
organization’s participation; they did not include the local specialists, nor ask for 
approval from the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage (SBAH), the 
government entity in charge of antiquities.  
On another occasion, an American contractor was in the process of traveling to 
the ruins of Kish to catalogue pottery sherds that had reportedly been found on the 
site. However, she did not coordinate her intentions with the SBAH and therefore 
did not have their permission to embark on any kind of project. One more 
example that stands out clearly was when several cultural heritage experts, who 
were all from Western countries, expressed their desire to remove the wall reliefs 
from Nineveh for shipment to a conservation centre in the US. This was being 
discussed without Iraqi representation. As a result, a large percentage of my time 
was spent trying to intercept such poorly conceived plans that were attempted by 
members of the coalition, on both the civilian or military sides, as well as non-
affiliated academics. It often appeared that the perspective of some Westerners 
was that they had freedom to act upon their own authority and implement projects 
without local consent, mainly due to the chaos caused by the war. My job was to 
steer them towards being inclusive of the Iraqis. Yet, I did not realise at the time 
that I was essentially attempting to prevent Orientalist biases. That is what 
Edward Said described as ‘a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and 
having authority over the Orient’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 3).  
While the majority of the projects were proposed with good intentions, and could 
have been beneficial to the sites, the exclusion of the Iraqis was problematic. In 
addition, there were also noted incidents of people seeking to capitalise on the 
war-time story to tell their friends and colleagues back home; in essence, the 
quintessential ‘bragging rights’ about their adventures in Iraq. One glaring 
example of this was when the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) hired a tourism consultant to advise them on the potential 
of helping the local government refurbish Babylon into a more attractive holiday 
destination. The consultant’s published report concluded that working with the 
Iraqis was too difficult, and cited one of the lessons learned as ‘Robert’s Rules to 
Herding Cats: Iraqi discussions often times explode into heated and time-
consuming tangents. Iraqis have big ideas yet limited experience in execution’ 
(Heather 2010, p. 36). The last page of the document displayed a collage of 
photographs from what is known as the Hash House Harriers, a social event 
revolving around alcohol. The images show personnel consuming drinks, with 
one that could be construed as simulating an erotic interlude. The 
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unprofessionalism, in addition to the insensitivity towards the local cultural 
norms, was just one of the concerns that signalled that both civilian and military 
personnel were being deployed to Iraq without being properly educated in 
understanding cross-cultural relationships at heritage sites.  
Another less extreme example was a US based organization that offered museum 
curatorial classes to SBAH personnel at their DC based institution. These initially 
included instruction in the most effective ways to engage with museum 
volunteers. However, this is not a standard of practice in Iraq as all museum 
personnel must be a government employee, therefore volunteerism is not 
practiced. Fortunately, once the organization was informed about this, they 
willingly replaced it with a collections conservation class, which the Iraqis fully 
embraced. The unfamiliarity with the local cultural practices was another 
indication that staff from Western institutions were generally unaware of the 
realities in Iraq, as programs were based on an American audience. On the other 
hand, it also demonstrated that collaboration was finally welcomed on all sides.     
In addition to the engagements proposed by US civilian institutions, the military 
troops serving in Iraq were also receptive to embracing new concepts. I witnessed 
this often when they served as my security contingent as I met with SBAH 
specialists at archaeological sites. The soldiers showed a willingness to initiate 
conversations with the Iraqis, and were interested in learning about the history of 
the ruins. The war environment had changed over the years, and actions of the 
past that may have been previously viewed as suspicious slowly began to produce 
positive results. However, I was only privy to a small percentage of interactions. 
It would be naïve to believe that every contact was constructive, and there were 
still issues with the coalition taking the lead on Iraqi projects, in addition to the 
continued occupation. However, the changes in attitudes were encouraging.         
Some examples of this were seen when members of the military assisted with 
funding several missions in support of cultural heritage venues. These were done 
through either the military’s Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) 
or the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), which were civil-military units 
based in the provinces. Both were tasked with assisting the local administrations 
with capacity building in the realms of governance, security, and reconstruction. 
They were however surrounded by their own controversies including complaints 
of inadequate pre-deployment training for personnel, implications of running 
clandestine psychological operations (PSYOP), and having undue influence on 
the local population (Duggan 2012; Martins 2005; Perito 2007).  
Despite some concerns, several cultural heritage projects were initiated and 
completed. These included contracting with local companies who subsequently 
worked with SBAH staff to refurbish the aforementioned Iraq Museum, as well as 
provide upgrades to the museums at Babylon and Agar Quf, a Kassite Era site 
dated to the fourteenth century BC, located just outside the city limits of Baghdad. 
When executed correctly, the assistance resulted in opportunities for military 
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personnel to coordinate with the Iraqis. For example, dialogue between the Agar 
Quf curator and a US army unit began because of their willingness to reach out as 
part of a CERP initiative, as demonstrated in Figure 1.5.      
	
Figure 1.5: American soldiers discuss museum refurbishments with the Agar Quf curator. 
Other archaeological sites such as Ur, Al Ukhaidir Fort, Nimrud, Uruk, Kish, and 
the ruins of the late sixth century Saint Elijah’s Monastery, also benefited from 
the CERP and PRT programs. Needed improvements were made to the tourist 
infrastructures at each of those sites when soldiers recognised the importance of 
partnering with the local cultural heritage experts. However, the percentage of 
Iraqi participation in the decision-making processes to all of the projects is 
unknown. While positive cross-cultural engagements were an indication of 
improvement in the relations, the fact remained that military bases were erected 
on and near archaeological sites, some of which remained occupied until the 
complete withdrawal of US forces in 2011.            
While both positive and negative examples of cooperation existed, I could only 
base those opinions on personal observations. I had worked closely with members 
of the coalition and the Iraqi cultural heritage community, but I did not know how 
they perceived the occupation of sites nor their attitudes towards cross-cultural 
contacts. Therefore, I wanted to explore not just the story about the extent of 
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damages at Babylon and other sites, but how such actions affected relationships. 
Because thousands of troops had been deployed to Iraq for more than 9 years, 
there were untold accounts of interactions with the local population, from both 
sides. I intended to determine if any of them had been documented, and if so, in 
what manner. Being able to understand other points of view was important in 
order to avoid any of my own biases. In order to fully explore this topic, the next 
course of action was to conduct a study that incorporated the viewpoints of those 
individuals, and analyse the results in a doctoral thesis.  
How the Research was Conducted 
This thesis has been organized to assist the reader with first understanding the 
historical relationships between Western factions, Iraqi archaeological ruins and 
the local communities, which is explained in Chapter 2. Archival research was 
conducted as part of this thesis, highlighting the manner in which Western 
archaeologists had dominated the ancient sites, the local workforce and the 
knowledge that the excavations produced, which was driven by an Orientalist 
discourse. This was demonstrated through examples of how the sites were often 
viewed as Western property, mainly due to their Biblical context. Because of this, 
mass quantities of artefacts were shipped to museums and private institutions 
located across Europe and America which generated greater interest in the region.  
In addition, the history of war in Mesopotamia, which included foreign military 
occupation, also highlighted how issues of power and control were prevalent 
across the country, from World War I (WWI) through World War II (WWII), and 
into the 2003 invasion. Therefore, Orientalism was embraced as the best theory in 
which to conduct this study. In addition, the Orientalist ideologies which 
underpinned the coalition occupation of cultural heritage sites were discussed by 
Benjamin Isakhan and Zanib Bahrani (Bahrani 2006a, 2010; Isakhan 2008, 
2015b). However, the relationship between coalition forces and local heritage 
professionals – and the extent to which they reveal the Orientalist framework of 
the broader war – had not been fully explored.    
A review of current literature related to the Iraq war and its effect on 
archaeological sites is discussed in Chapter 3. The looting that decimated many of 
the sites as soon as the war started tended to be a popular subject with scholars 
and practitioners alike. While discussions also focused on military bases that were 
constructed on ancient ruins such as Babylon, opinion was divided on whether or 
not coalition presence provided protection from would-be looters, or subjected the 
ruins to further damages. In the early years of the war, it was difficult for any 
non-coalition personnel to gain entry onto the sites that were established as 
military camps, therefore information about their condition is minimal. Other 
topics covered within the literature review include debate on adherence to 
international and Iraqi cultural heritage laws, as well as pre-deployment training 
for coalition personnel.  
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Even though a few primary accounts from soldiers exist, the majority did not 
include in-depth discussions in regards to relations with the Iraqis. This resulted 
in limited available data about an element of the war that needed to be addressed. 
Having personally witnessed interactions, I knew there were many untold stories 
from the serving troops and the local population, yet they were not represented in 
the available literature. Examining the extent to which these relationships had 
been conducted in an Orientalist fashion had not been undertaken, especially in a 
systematic approach, which proved to be the research gap.     
The Research Question 
The manner in which the research was conducted is outlined in Chapter 4. The 
methodological approach was based on collecting the viewpoints of Iraq war 
veterans and civilian personnel, and Iraqi cultural heritage specialists. Individual 
interviews were conducted utilizing a series of prearranged open-ended questions, 
in a semi-structured setting. An emphasis was placed on assuring the participants 
that their information would remain entirely confidential. This allowed them to 
express themselves freely and objectively, as I was seeking honest and 
uninhibited opinions. Because I had approached military personnel on the 
coalition side, and government personnel on the Iraqi side, it was necessary to 
have safeguards in place to assure them that their stories would be handled with 
the utmost care.    
Unquestionably, this is a sensitive topic for both the Iraqis and members of the 
coalition, and when the research was proposed it was unknown how many 
individuals would be prepared to participate. Asking anyone who has witnessed 
the horrors of warfare to discuss their experiences must be conducted with the 
utmost delicacy. In addition, military personnel can be seen as notoriously 
unapproachable by academics, yet I had a privileged advantage since I had built 
rapport with many of the men and women in the armed forces. They were 
therefore willing to participate in the research. Similarly, the Iraqis have been 
viewed as being cautious in their interactions with Westerners after years of 
conflict and sanctions. Yet because I had successful past working relations with 
many of them, they were also willing to engage in the research. My experience 
and pool of contacts therefore enabled me to gain insights that may have been 
unobtainable by others. I found that people from both groups wanted to tell their 
stories and were glad to have someone document their encounters. However, the 
current conflict in Iraq negatively affected my ability to speak with Iraqis, 
therefore their sample size is low. Although the final number of participants did 
not reach the anticipated sum, each interview was a valuable addition to a topic 
that had not been previously recorded. 
The conversations were recorded, transcribed and analysed with the key topics in 
mind: (1) assessing relationships between coalition personnel and Iraqi cultural 
heritage specialists; (2) gauging the impact of military installations on and near 
archaeological sites; (3) exploring personal perceptions towards sites and the 
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population; and (4) understanding pre-deployment training requirements within 
the military doctrine. These assisted in answering the research question: ‘Was the 
construction of coalition military bases on Iraqi archaeological sites driven by 
Orientalist biases during the Iraq War?’   
The Case Studies  
Although there are more than 12,500 documented archaeological sites in Iraq, the 
data collected from archival research and the interviews determined that focus 
would be on only three of those: Ur, Babylon, and Kish, each located in the 
southern region of the country as seen in Figure 1.6. These sites therefore serve as 
the case studies presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Each chapter begins with a brief 
historical overview of the ancient site, and lists some of the legendary figures and 
significant features associated with each one. The explorers and archaeologists 
who excavated the sites are discussed next, using primary accounts of their 
observations and interactions with the local population. This sets an 
understanding of the background to the Western-Eastern relations as they existed 
between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The manner in which WWI and 
WWII affected each site is also considered, which includes memoirs from British 
troops who served in Mesopotamia. Although foreign visitors to the country were 
rare starting in the 1980s, the few publications that discuss Iraq are also 
mentioned in the chapters, some of which provided information about the 
conflicts between then and the 1991 Gulf War.     
The discussions then centre on the 2003 war in Iraq, which includes information 
about the physical damages recorded at each site. However, the main emphasis is 
on relating the experiences of the coalition forces who were interviewed for the 
thesis. It was more important to convey human thoughts and ideas about the 
places than it was to repeat the list of damages that have already been widely 
published about the sites. Therefore, participants are quoted throughout each case 
study, with the dialogue written verbatim. As such, some of the language could be 
considered abrasive. It was necessary to keep their exact wording in order to fully 
understand the attitudes of troops who served in Iraq. Although the interactions 
related to the three sites remained the focus throughout the thesis, personnel who 
visited other ruins are also incorporated within the case studies.  
The interview participants provided details about their personal experiences, 
which included their viewpoints on using archaeological sites as military camps, 
the cross-cultural interactions they had with Iraqis, especially archaeologists, 
cultural heritage projects they participated in, and the pre-deployment training 
they received from the military. Civilians who worked with the coalition are also 
included, as well as the few Iraqis who granted interviews. Each chapter 
incorporates the above information and determines if notions of Orientalism were 
manifested during the war. The last chapter delivers the final discussion and 
conclusion, which answers the research question, provides recommendations to 
military planners on what they can do differently, why it matters, and avenues for 
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future research. An emphasis is placed on the need to provide more robust 
cultural heritage awareness training by including an understanding of the 
correlation between Orientalism and archaeological sites.       
	
Figure 1.6: Map of Iraq with Babylon, Kish and Ur outlined in red  
(Image credit Dabrowska 2002, p. 122).  
 
Why the Research is Important 
Given the current security challenges in the Middle East, conflict in this region is 
likely to continue into the foreseeable future. Therefore, highlighting the need to 
form positive relations in such an environment is necessary and highly relevant. 
Proactive interactions with non-combatants can result in diminished 
misunderstandings and present opportunities for cooperation. However, if a 
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foreign military does not recognise why this is essential then they will not 
embrace it, and as a result, will not be fully prepared for all inevitable 
possibilities. This was demonstrated in Iraq with the occupation of heritage sites. 
Raising awareness about the ramifications of placing a base on places such as 
Babylon had been addressed, but a comprehensive study about the human toll had 
not.       
Understanding how and why relations were or were not formed is a crucial 
contribution to avoiding the mistakes of the 2003 war in the future. Benefits from 
this awareness would first and foremost affect how militaries engage with 
populations in the foreign counties where they are deployed. While the training 
doctrine has in many cases incorporated instruction on adhering to laws that serve 
to protect cultural property, the focus tends to revolve around avoiding physical 
damages to sites. While this awareness is important in maintaining the scientific 
and historical integrity of any such place, understanding the human factor is often 
missing.     
In addition, other government and non-government organizations that engage in 
foreign cultural heritage projects could also gain a more robust awareness of how 
and when their actions are a benefit to themselves, rather than to the local 
population. Having a set of established protocols that ensure robust and proactive 
cooperation presents opportunities to build on reciprocal relationships. While 
nobody should be under the illusion that a conflict environment is likely to 
generate close friendships, having cultural understanding is one important step 
towards better engagement with non-combatants, and ultimately winning the 
hearts and the minds of the people. The final discussion chapter therefore sets out 
some ambitious recommendations concerning lessons learned from the mistakes 
of the past, and the ways in which foreign forces can work with local heritage 
experts to protect and preserve a given country’s most sacred and most valuable 
heritage sites.   
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Chapter 2: Iraqi Archaeological Sites and Orientalism   
	
Introduction 
This chapter explores the ideologies that have been displayed by Westerners 
towards Eastern cultures following Edward Said’s concepts of Orientalism (Said 
2003 [1978]). More specifically, it focuses on issues of control and power over 
archaeological sites in Mesopotamia during times of war and peace. The first 
section examines published accounts written by explorers and scholars in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and their interactions with ancient ruins 
and the local populations. It looks at the manner in which the Orient was 
presented to Western audiences, which influenced notions of superiority and 
entitlement to the lands via Biblical connections.  
The published works from archaeologists and British troops who operated in Iraq 
before, during, and after the colonial occupation are discussed in order to provide 
the context necessary to understand the long history of Western domination in the 
region. Of great significance was the exclusion of Iraqis in decision-making 
processes during archaeological excavations. While they were employed as 
labourers, they were not afforded a voice to determine the fate of sites or 
antiquities. Rather, vast quantities of material were shipped to European and 
American institutions, and the Iraqis were portrayed as ignorant savages who 
needed the West to properly guide them.  
The years of domestic and international wars, as well as the imposed sanctions, 
are briefly outlined to understand that just as the Iraqis had slowly gained an 
authoritative voice in archaeological matters, they were hampered by conflict and 
isolation. The last section of this chapter provides a brief look at the 2003 war in 
Iraq, and how archaeological sites were occupied by coalition troops. This once 
again highlighted the power and control of Western powers over the country and 
the ruins, which revisited the past British occupation.       
Orientalism 
Said’s Orientalism was chosen as the conceptual framework for this thesis in 
order to examine discourses of power and control exerted by the West in its 
efforts to subjugate and control the East (Said 2003 [1978], p. 40). More 
specifically, this thesis will apply what Said referred to as the four ‘principle 
dogmas of Orientalism’ which he articulated as: (1) the perceived differences 
between the superior West and the inferior East; (2) the Western interpretation of 
the Orient is preferable to the realities of the East; (3) the Orient is unable to 
define itself and must therefore rely on the ‘objective’ West to do it for them; and 
(4) that the East is something to be feared and controlled by the West (Said 2003 
[1978], p. 300-1).        
This research project demonstrates how these same four ‘principle dogmas’ were 
brought to bear on the history and people of Iraq by both the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Western scholars, bureaucrats and archaeologists living in 
Mesopotamia, and coalition forces who invaded the country in 2003. Both of 
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these groups expressed viewpoints and demonstrated through actions and deeds 
specific attitudes towards archaeological sites in the region and local cultural 
heritage caretakers that were similar to the criticisms Said voiced about ‘the West 
dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’ (Said 2003 
[1978], p. 3).  
Said’s theory provided the most appropriate framework through which to analyse 
and interpret the empirical data that was collected and to determine if Orientalist 
biases motivated coalition troops to occupy archaeological sites. This conceptual 
framework also illuminated the nature and texture of the misunderstandings and 
misconceptions between past and present scholars, diplomats and soldiers, and the 
archaeological sites and local communities they came into contact with. Said’s 
work allowed for a systematic investigation into the relationships that existed 
between these diverse groups, uncovering the complex array of ideologies that 
underpinned the ways in which the one group (Westerners) interacted and 
constructed the other (Iraqis).        
In addition, Said’s framework was determined to be the appropriate approach for 
this thesis because Orientalism ‘proposes intellectual ways for handling the 
methodological problems that history has brought forward’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 
110). Within this context, examining how the Western archaeologists of the past 
were viewed as the champions of the ancient ruins was similar to attitudes of 
modern soldiers who also saw themselves as the saviours of the past. As Patrick 
Porter has argued in Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes, 
American soldiers were deployed to Iraq with misguided notions of being the 
heroic warriors who would overcome the treachery and evil tactics of the Eastern 
armies who do not fight fair. Specifically, troops were trained and instructed to 
‘see the classic ethnography of the proud and violent Arab’ and the only way to 
deal with them was with equal measures of violence because ‘all they understand 
is force’ (Porter 2009 p. 57).  
While Porter’s work examines relations and misconceptions between combatants, 
his insights are relevant in that the Western fighting forces tended to view all non-
Westerners similarly, that they were all predisposed to war and required 
subjugation (Porter 2009 p. 31). The thoughts and perceptions of the interview 
participants were therefore examined by Said’s ‘principle dogmas of 
Orientalism’, specifically the fourth, which states that the Orient is to be 
‘controlled by pacification, research and development, or outright occupation’ 
(Said 2003 [1978], p. 301).  
It is important to note that concepts of ethnocentrism could have also been 
relevant to this study. According to William Graham Sumner, who is considered 
to have coined the term in 1906, ethnocentrism is the view in which ‘one’s own 
group is the centre of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with 
reference to it. Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself 
superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on the outsider’ 
(Sumner 1906, p. 13). Additionally, Robert LeVine stated ‘In current usage, it 
means culturally biased judgment, i.e., applying the frame of reference provided 
20	
	
by one’s culture to an object, action, person, or group of a different culture’ 
(LeVine 2015 p. 166). Orientalism was used because the research topic is 
specifically about Western military personnel who have been deployed to the 
Middle East, and the notions of Orientalism proved to be the best fit. However, it 
is also imperative that ethnocentrism be considered as a valid concept of study for 
further global deployments outside the Middle East.  
In order to appreciate the breadth of this study, it is necessary to understand the 
background of European and American interest in Mesopotamian ruins. Western 
travellers had visited the region for centuries, with the majority of interest from 
the seventeenth century stemming from the efforts to find evidence to support the 
existence of the various civilizations found in the Bible. This was when the 
discipline of archaeology was still in its infancy. It was a decidedly Western 
endeavour that was carried out by antiquarians, private collectors, and scholars 
(Renfrew 2006). The term ‘Orientalist’ initially described those individuals who 
studied the Orient, those who dedicated themselves to ‘the study of languages, 
literature, religions, thought, arts and social life of the East in order to make them 
available to the West, even in order to protect them from occidental cultural 
arrogance in the age of imperialism’ (MacKenzie 1995, p. xii).  
These individuals generally did not aim to belittle Eastern cultures (Lockman 
2010). Yet much of their work was situated within a problematic set of received 
wisdoms about the region and the backward nature of the people. Their work 
therefore extended into misunderstandings and misrepresentations in the West. 
Apart from the significance of its connection to the Orient via Biblical heritage, 
contemporary Europeans felt affinity with the era of Classical Greece and Rome, 
which were perceived to hold similar ideologies such as the Western values of 
freedom, law, rationality, science, progress, intellectual curiosity, and political 
equality (Lockman 2010, p. 58).  
This fundamental belief can be traced back to the advent of European 
colonization in the fifteenth century and the quest to find the beginnings of ‘their’ 
ancestor’s achievements, which defined what it was to be civilized (Blaut 1993; 
Ferguson 2012). However, many of the values identified as Western-inspired such 
as legislation, science and industry, in actuality originated in ancient 
Mesopotamian cultures (Bertman 2003; Isakhan 2012; Roux 1992). Despite 
evidence of civilizations in the Eastern world initiating such practices, scholars 
tended to credit cultural advancements to a Greco-Roman ancestry, which was 
perceived to support the thesis that the ‘West’ had a unique proclivity for social, 
intellectual and political advancement.    
The Occidental viewpoint of past and present cultures in the East were 
manipulated to demonstrate notions of superiority, mainly through oral histories, 
art, and literature. According to Said, Western interpretations were largely shaped 
by scholars and artists who often depicted the East via romanticised versions of 
reality (Said 2003 [1978], p. 154). For example, Verdi’s opera Aida was set in 
Egypt but the narrative included scenes of European imperial domination over the 
East (Said 1993). Other examples include Jean-Léone Gêrôme’s paintings, which 
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depict scenes of Eastern harems, and literary texts such as William Beckford’s 
Vathek and Sir Richard Burton’s translated work of One Thousand and One 
Nights, all of which provide a rich imagery of despotic Oriental rulers who 
subjugate women. All these subjects were characterizations of the exotic and 
extravagant Eastern culture that conveyed a message of depravity and immorality 
that were accepted in Europe as authentic representations. Thus, a popular 
understanding of the East was of an exotic and unfamiliar land and culture that 
was immersed in an archaic lifestyle (Little 2002; Lockman 2010; MacKenzie 
1995). 
In addition to these artistic interpretations, Western cultures were largely familiar 
with Biblical representations of the Eastern world. For example, Rembrandt 
painted scenes such as Daniel interpreting the ‘writing on the wall’ in the telling 
of the tale of the last Babylonian king in Belshazzar’s Feast. Other artwork from 
individuals such as William Blake, Benjamin West and John Martin represented 
scenes with theological themes. Artists such as Martin contributed to illustrating 
backdrops for theatrical performances that depicted scenes such as the Israeli 
Exodus from Egypt (MacKenzie 1995, p. 192). However, the stories, which took 
place in the East, were painted from a Western perspective, such as incorporating 
European architecture into the paintings (Bernhardsson 2005; MacKenzie 1995). 
One relevant example is Magnus Bernhardsson’s discussion of a streetscape 
depicting the ancient city of Babylon, which closely resembled the city of London 
(Bernhardsson 2005, p. 28). Conventional understanding of the East was of 
distant cultures that were only familiar due to the association with Biblical tales 
that provided strong connections for Westerners.  
Western Archaeologists in Mesopotamia  
Western interest in the ancient cultures that occupied the region known as 
Mesopotamia dates back to explorers such as Benjamin of Tudela in the twelfth 
century, and Pietro della Valle four centuries later. These travellers collected 
artefacts from the ruins of Ur, Babylon, and other sites. They returned to the West 
with objects that were inscribed with unfamiliar markings and images, which 
generated scholarly interest in their origins. Travel to Baghdad and its 
surrounding provinces increased. By the seventeenth century, British institutions 
such as the East India Company (EIC) who dominated trade in the region were 
fully entrenched in Mesopotamia. As commerce flourished well into the early 
nineteenth century there was a noticeable presence of merchants, tradesmen, 
diplomats, and amateur archaeologists throughout Mesopotamia (Clark 2008; 
Hess 1965; Matthews 2003).  
The artefacts and ancient ruins that were unearthed by travellers and explorers 
were on display in private and national collections in Europe and America. This 
incited further public and academic interest, often from individuals with a 
background in theology. Thus, archaeologists began to fully explore the East 
seeking verification of Biblical and Classical stories that were associated with the 
roots of Western civilization in Mesopotamia (Bernhardsson 2005; Goode 2007; 
Matthews 2003; Ooghe 2007). Some of the first archaeologists to enter 
Mesopotamia were motivated by the possibility of locating empirical evidence 
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that would verify the names of people and cities in the Bible. As Benjamin Porter 
stated ‘Near Eastern archaeology often played a role in European and North 
American imperial and colonialist enterprises in the region, in part due to Western 
fascination with the land of the Bible’ (Porter 2010, p. 51). While these notions 
are fully explored in the following chapters, a few examples need to be 
highlighted here.   
Artefacts from ancient cities named in Biblical texts, such as Nineveh, Ur, 
Babylon, and Khorsabad, were heralded as proof that the Bible was an accurate 
depiction of the past. Because the Scriptural stories about these places were 
closely aligned with the ideologies of the majority of the Western world, the sites 
were considered the domain of archaeologists and researchers (Fenollós 2011; 
George 2005; Vlaardingerbroek 2004; Woolley 1930). The idea that the West 
‘owned’ the history of the East can be seen in the excavation at Nineveh. Austin 
Henry Layard’s research concluded that a direct line of ascension could be 
established from the ancient Assyrians to modern Nestorians, thus establishing its 
Christian roots, which he linked to the cultures in Great Britain. His views were 
so popular that he was considered a national hero for proving the Bible was 
factual. This was evident when his book, Nineveh and Its Remains, became a best 
seller in 1849 (Guralnick 2002; Malley 1996, 2004). In addition, collections from 
these sites were showcased in museums in a competitive attempt to attract the 
highest visitation numbers, as noted by British Egyptologist Joseph Bonomi:    
Our friends the French are proud of the sculptures obtained by Paul Botta, 
and now in the Louvre; but we may fairly and successfully challenge 
comparison with them, by pointing to the British Museum. No one can 
visit that establishment without feeling the importance and interest of our 
Assyrian acquisitions. The winged bulls and lions, which now grace the 
halls of our British Museum attract the notice of visitors, and by their size, 
their antiquity and their strange story, induce those who might otherwise 
pass on to other objects, to stop and inquire for the companion antiques, 
which once seen, cannot easily be forgotten. (Bonomi 1857, p. 250).  
Large-scale excavations across the region also unearthed substantial quantities of 
cuneiform tablets that were shipped to the West. The British Museum acquired 
20,000 tablets from Nineveh between 1846 and 1856, and a total of 31,000 tablets 
excavated from the ancient city of Nippur were transported to the University of 
Pennsylvania between 1889 and 1900 (Gadd 1953; Malley 2004; Ousterhout 
2010). Archaeologists capitalised on linking the histories associated with the 
tablets to their modern world in order to legitimize their work. The Nineveh 
tablets were translated into the now well-known Epic of Gilgamesh, a series of 
ancient stories analogous to those found in the Old Testament. Biblical scholars 
and journalists took this opportunity to justify Western-led archaeological 
expeditions into Mesopotamia (Bernhardsson 2005).  
By the time WWI was underway, Western-led excavations had taken place across 
Iraq for more than a century including major digs at Babylon, Nineveh, and Uruk, 
during which time the majority of artefacts were sent to the West (Fagan 1979; 
Leick 2002; Matthews 2003). C.H. Richardson’s 1915 article, The Abuse of 
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Biblical Archaeology, provided one of the first critiques of archaeologists 
working in Mesopotamia who were trying to prove that the Bible was a historical 
accounting of past events. Although the term ‘Orientalism’ was not used in his 
work, the fact that he acknowledged the manipulation of information used to 
validate Western ideology should be noted. Richardson wrote that ‘archaeological 
facts have been so garbled that they have been made to prove what they want to 
prove as true’ (Richardson 1915, p. 100). This included changing the names and 
dates of reigns of Mesopotamian kings in order to prove Biblical stories as factual 
(Richardson 1915). Almost 50 years later, and 10 years before Edward Said’s 
Orientalism, J.J. Finkelstein addressed the issue more fully, and cautioned 
scholars against thinking that ideas about the past were universally held. He said:  
In our approach towards any aspect of non-Western civilization we 
commonly expose ourselves to the hazard of applying Western categories 
to phenomena completely alien to us. In large measure this is unavoidable, 
and even necessary; we must convert these phenomena, or translate them, 
as it were, into our own conceptual language if we are to gain any 
understanding of them. But we must always be aware of the fact that we 
are doing so. (Finkelstein 1963, p. 461).    
Finkelstein was describing an ideology that was later branded as ‘Orientalism’ by 
Said. In Finkelstein’s later work, The West and the Bible, he examined the long 
history of interaction between Biblical scholarship and the study of Mesopotamia, 
stating:   
The truth remains that even the most disinterested or impartial 
investigations in this area have been adversely affected by a limitation of 
perspective common alike not just to biblical scholars and Assyriologists, 
but to their audiences as well; all of them are, ultimately, Westerners 
addressing other Westerners. (Finkelstein 1974, p. 592). 
However, it was not just the interpretation of the ruins that were approached in a 
decidedly Eurocentric manner. One of the other significant problems with these 
early excavations and the wholesale removal of artefacts was that they were 
conducted without local consultation. While the region was under Ottoman rule, 
antiquities laws, which should have kept artefacts in the country were either 
ignored or circumvented by archaeologists. This resulted in foreign museums 
amassing their vast Mesopotamian collections (Bohrer 1998; Goode 2007; 
Ousterhout 2010). As noted by James Goode ‘Western archaeologists rarely 
incorporated local people into the story of a site, taking them for granted as 
foremen, labourers, cooks and domestics’ (Goode 2007, p. 5).  
Iraqi archaeologists during the time were a rarity; the only documented 
Assyriologist was Hormuzd Rassam, a Chaldean Christian who initially worked 
with Layard at Nineveh and Nimrud. He also travelled to Babylon as well as other 
sites throughout Mesopotamia in the nineteenth century. However, he was the 
exception, and in addition, he spent much of his time in England under the 
sponsorship of Layard, eventually became a British citizen and was employed by 
the British Museum (Lloyd 1955, Rassam 1897, Reade 1993). Non-Westernized 
Iraqis continued to serve in the capacity of labourers, and while it is unknown if 
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the archaeologists had thought to provide other sponsorships for the Iraqis who 
worked for them, it would have been a progressive and proactive endeavour. 
Rather, their travel logs and journals are filled with what we can now see as 
Orientalist rhetoric.    
An excerpt taken from the diary of William Loftus read ‘The tract of country 
between the important cities of Baghdad and Basra is thinly inhabited by a rude 
and almost savage race of nomad Arabs, who are continually at war with each 
other and with the Turkish authorities’ (Loftus 1856, p. 131). Another remarked 
that not much could be seen from his steamer ship on the Tigris River except for 
an occasional ‘villainously dirty Arab leading a gaping camel or a dirty pink 
tumble-down native shack and their shiftless population’ (Hall 1930b, p. 11). A 
scholar with the University of Pennsylvania who explored the region commented 
on the condition of unexcavated ruins. He said that ‘Ignorant peasants draw their 
primitive ploughs over the ruined palaces of Nineveh and Khorsabad’ (Hilprecht 
1903, p. 4). He further stated that he had ‘visited the filthy reed huts of the fickle 
and unreliable Arefj tribes’ (Hilprecht 1903, p. 140). More famously, in his 
reflections on the Arab Revolt, T.E. Lawrence stated ‘Arabs can be swung on an 
idea as on a cord; for the unpledged allegiance of their minds made them obedient 
servants’ (Lawrence 1926, p. 41). These types of comments and descriptions 
about the ancient ruins and the local inhabitants were published well into the mid-
twentieth century. 
Western Control   
Foreigners retained their hold on the wealth of cultural material and knowledge 
gained through their control of the East. This was an Orientalist approach in 
which Westerners saw it as their job to ‘piece together the unruly and non-history 
of the Orient into an orderly chronology’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 151). This type of 
attitude was prevalent from individuals such as Percy Cox, a British military 
officer who served in Mesopotamia during and after WWI and became High 
Commissioner of Iraq under the British Mandate. Although Cox did not leave 
behind a diary or personal letters, his words have been preserved in telegrams and 
military correspondences. He wished to establish a permanent British presence in 
the region, and stated:  
We have nothing to fear from the population of Baghdad and there is good 
reason to hope that once we are in control over Baghdad and the river and 
telegraph to Basra, the tribes of the Euphrates valley will accept our 
regime automatically. (Cox in Townsend 2010, p. 74).  
Other expressions of similar ideologies were the attitudes of some British 
subjects, such as world traveller, archaeologist, and British stateswoman Gertrude 
Bell. During the early years of WWI she was optimistic about the newly formed 
country of Iraq and its placement under British administration, writing ‘We shall, 
I trust, make it a centre of Arab civilization and prosperity’ (Bell in Burgoyne 
1961, p. 56). She admonished the Ottoman Empire for failing to recognise tribal 
jurisdictions, but without recognising the irony of the British who also divided the 
region to their own beneficial uses (Bell 1917; Simon & Tejirian 2005). In 1938, 
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civil engineer George Buchanan, wrote ‘It was taken for granted that 
Mesopotamia would become a British possession, or, at the least, a British 
Protectorate. There did not seem to be any alternative; it was what we had always 
done in days gone by’ (Buchanan 1938, p. 261). Cox echoed such thoughts and 
viewpoints in a telegram that read:  
Here in Iraq there is no sign of the slightest ambition of the kind among 
the people, who expect and seem to be quite ready to accept our 
administration. It is highly inexpedient and unnecessary to put into the 
heads of the backward people of the country what seems to us the 
visionary and premature notions of the creation of an Arab state, notions 
which will only tend to make endless difficulties for Great Britain. (Cox in 
Townsend 2010, p. 40).        
By presenting the occupation as a great benefit to the Iraqi people, one of Bell and 
Cox’s contemporaries wrote: 
I seriously recommend that now, before anything is altered, an accurate 
illustrated description of the place to be published in English, French, and 
Arabic so that they may not forget the pit from whence they were dug, so 
that future tar-bushed elastic-sided booted patriots may not claim for 
themselves before all the world, the exclusive credit for cleanliness, 
health, water, electricity and hundredfold budget. Let the motto of 
Mesopotamia be Non Nobis, Domine or Lest We Forget. (Storrs 1937, p. 
234).  
The attitudes expressed by some of the British subjects, specifically members of 
the military, followed the accepted norms of how other cultures were viewed 
during times of war. Colonel CE Callwell’s book, Small Wars, outlined tactics to 
employ before, during and after skirmishes and battles in Africa, South and 
Central Asia, and Oceania. He regularly referred to the local populations as 
savages, uncivilized, or semi-civilized races. For example, he noted that ‘All 
Orientals have an inborn love of trickery and deception, the Red Indians have 
won an evil notoriety by their duplicity and craftiness’ (Callwell 1906 p. 227). 
While it is unknown if British subjects were influenced by Callwells’s work, his 
views were often expressed by soldiers and government officials, as demonstrated 
above.     
While Iraqi perspectives were rarely published, a compilation of childhood 
memoirs gathered over a period of several years provided the insights of a young 
Iraqi male who recalled the events of the war as:   
The fall of Baghdad into the hands of the British was a great catastrophe 
for me, for I thought the world of Islam was overcome and that at last we 
had fallen as victim into the hands of a non-Muslim power. I used to 
watch the march of the British troops into Kadhimai with tears flowing 
down my cheeks. (Jamali 2002, p. 14).   
WWI was also responsible for the legacy of close partnerships between British 
troops and the men and women who excavated the ancient sites (Malley 2004; 
Richter 2008). Oriental scholars were valued for their intimate knowledge of Arab 
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cultures, lands and language, as well as their access to regional maps and their 
ability to move freely about the country. They were therefore utilized as 
intelligence advisors and covert operatives by the government. Bell, Charles 
Leonard Woolley, and T.E. Lawrence all worked as spies under the tutelage of 
D.G. Hogarth, an expert in Near Eastern archaeology and a Lieutenant 
Commander in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (Richter 2008). While these 
individuals may have assisted their country with the best of intentions, espionage 
activities perpetrated by archaeologists have ever since raised questions about 
proper stewardship and professionalism. This in turn has set a precedent of 
mistrust and suspicion from Iraqis towards Western interests in archaeological 
sites in their country (Mourad 2007; Richter 2008).  
The type of behaviour displayed by these early scholars was what George 
Nicholas & Julie Hollowell called the ‘scientific colonialism’ of monopolizing 
information while driven by an Orientalist viewpoint (Nicholas & Hollowell 
2010, p. 60). The Western perspective of the East was based on misconceived 
ideologies of European rights to the past, which were carried out via unsanctioned 
excavations, imperialistic rule and espionage in order to further their control over 
the region. According to Said, individuals such as those described above were 
‘posted to the Orient as agents of the empire’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 224). Said’s 
argument that Western domination has been promoted by notions of superiority 
over the East is also relevant to describing the actions of these individuals. 
Specifically when he stated that both imperialism and colonialism ‘are supported 
and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include 
notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination’ (Said 
1993, p. 9).   
Although excavations were halted during the war, artefacts were still shipped out 
of the country to the British Museum and the Victoria & Albert Museum, either as 
war trophies or for so-called safekeeping. These actions were reportedly 
conducted with the assistance of British military units who served in 
Mesopotamia (Bernhardsson 2005, p. 75-9). However, not all artefacts left the 
country. While based at Samarra in 1917, British troops found artefacts that had 
been packed for shipment, but were left behind by German excavators. As was 
reported by Commander Hogarth, the boxes were collected from Samarra and 
sent south for shipment across the ocean, and intended for museums in Great 
Britain. However, the cargo was seized and embargoed once it reached Basra, 
which he described as the ‘greatest pity’ (Hogarth et al. 1920, p. 124). However, 
he also noted that:  
When we occupied Samarra in 1917, General Cobbe mounted a guard as 
soon as he knew there was anything of archaeological interest, but before 
we arrived the Turks, presumably at the orders of the Germans, had 
thrown much of the excavated material into a cellar and set the place on 
fire. (Hogarth et al. 1920, p. 124). 
After WWI British government and military forces were firmly entrenched in 
Iraq. They attempted to convince the local population that they were in Iraq to 
help and support the Arabs, but in reality, British interest lay in securing oil 
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reserves for the Royal Navy and a land route towards India (Rothwell 1970). The 
British labelled themselves liberators, as noted in the Maude Declaration. On 11 
March 1917, after ‘The Fall of Baghdad’ Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Maude 
issued a proclamation to the people of Baghdad, which read:  
Our military operations have as their object the defeat of the enemy, and 
the driving of him from these territories. In order to complete this task, I 
am charged with absolute and supreme control of all regions in which 
British troops operate; but our armies do not come into your cities and 
lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators. (Maude 1917).  
Iraq remained under direct British control until the 1920 Iraqi Revolt. Great 
Britain fought to maintain authority over the country, and created a monarchy 
headed by Faisal I bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi. Bell and Lawrence were 
instrumental in his placement as King of Iraq, and ensured that they maintained 
control over his actions (Simon & Tejirian 2005; Townsend 2010). Bell served in 
the position of Honorary Director of Antiquities, and established the Iraq 
Antiquities Law No. 40 of 1926. The new edicts required that half of all artefacts 
collected during excavations had to stay in-country, while the other half belonged 
to the foreign excavators (Bernhardsson 2005; Lukitz 2008; Wallach 2005). 
While the laws did safeguard sites and objects, Bell’s unprecedented control and 
oversight of the excavated material placed decisions about Iraqi sites under the 
authority of a British subject.  
However, one of the changes made by the Iraqi government in 1920 was to gain 
administrative control of their country, including matters related to antiquities. 
The slow process of ratifying the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty began in 1922 and was 
completed in 1932 (Bernhardsson 2005; Simon & Tejirian 2005). Bell was upset 
that she was required to consult with an Iraqi Antiquities Minister on the removal 
of artefacts from the country when she saw only herself as having that right 
(Lukitz 2008, p. 188). However, Bell did champion Iraqi causes. As Max 
Mallowan noted in her obituary, she played ‘a leading role in the foundation of 
the Iraq Museum and in drafting the Antiquities Law, wisely conceived at that 
time, and especially generous if we consider that no Iraqi expertise was then 
available’ (Mallowan 1976, p. 82).   
Diminished Western Control  
Although Western archaeologists continued to serve in an advisory capacity, in 
1934 Syrian scholar Abu-Khaldum Sati’ al-Husri, was appointed Director of the 
Iraqi Department of Antiquities, the first non-Westerner to hold the post. He was 
a pan-Arabist who stressed the need for a shared history, and in 1936 changed the 
standing antiquities laws originally established by Bell. In al-Husri’s new law, 
foreign excavators were no longer permitted to export half of their finds, rather 
severe restrictions were imposed, which mandated that all artefacts remain in Iraq 
(Abdi 2008; Magee 2012). While the new law was still in draft form, it incited 
concern from archaeologists. Woolley, the director of large-scale operations at Ur 
since 1922 stated that ‘The attitude of the Iraqi government appeared at one time 
calculated to make archaeological work in the country impossible, and did 
seriously delay its start’ (Woolley 1934a, p. 355). Mallowan, who was excavating 
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in Northern Iraq at the time, was advised that he would not be allowed to 
transport artefacts to London. George Hill, the director at the British Museum, 
protested this decision and stated that the manner in which the Iraqis behaved 
towards foreign archaeologists would be regarded as ‘a test of whether Iraq is 
really a modern and progressive state’ (Hill in Goode 2007, p. 204). Despite 
Western protests, the laws were enacted, at which time R. Campbell Thompson, 
the British military captain who surveyed southern Mesopotamia, wrote:   
These new laws, so different from their generous predecessors, were not 
only ungrateful to the memory of Miss Gertrude Bell, who was the prime 
mover in everything relating to the national collections in Iraq, but also 
unscientific in their claims on any fresh discoveries. (Thompson 1937, p. 
723).  
The ‘generous predecessors’ Thompson referred to were subjects of the British 
Empire, whose domination over Mesopotamian archaeology was acutely 
entrenched until the new law was enacted. Bernhardsson posed that a common 
misconception among the Western archaeologists was believing that the local 
population did not identify with the pre-Islamic sites, as they were jahilliya, 
referring to the state of ignorance in pre-Islamic Arabia (Bernhardsson 2005, p. 
30). The view that the East was unaware of its own history and the West was 
uniquely qualified to fill the void was quintessentially Eurocentric, and followed 
Said’s third ‘principle dogma of Orientalism’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 300). 
Thompson’s comment followed the Orientalist pattern of the West’s perception of 
saving the East and controlling the production of knowledge. Due to the 
restrictions several foreign organizations moved their work to Syria, which was 
still under French Mandate, while others were able to adjust to the new guidelines 
(Malley 2004; Mourad 2007; Said 2003 [1978]).  
British archaeologist Seton Lloyd, the last Western advisor assigned to the Iraqi 
Ministry, accepted the change and noted that Westerners would ‘for the first time 
be able to benefit from the collaboration of their locally-born colleagues’ (Lloyd 
1955, p. 238). Under orders from al-Husri, excavations were to expand beyond 
Mesopotamian ruins and embrace the early Islamic periods. He ordered that 
emphasis was to be placed on ‘those aspects of Islamic archaeology which in the 
past have understandably received less attention from Western scholars’ (Sati' al-
Husri in Goode 2007, p. 224). As a result, the first excavations conducted under 
Iraqi leadership took place in the Wasit Governorate, at the ruins of an a city 
attributed to the Umayyad Dynasty, one of the Arab Caliphates established after 
the death of Muhammed (Lloyd 1955, p. 236).  
In addition to some Western archaeologist’s disgruntlement over the new laws, 
others expressed concern over the loss of overall governmental control. In her 
book Beyond Euphrates, Freya Stark reflected on her travels between 1928 and 
1933, and noted that she was concerned about Iraq’s newly gained independence 
because: 
We cannot risk a bad government in Iraq, interfering with several vital 
interests of ours - oil, and the Indian route and such - if we could keep 
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these safe, it seems to me that the Iraqis might enjoy their bad governing if 
they wish without doing us any harm. (Stark 1951, p. 125).  
Placing importance on European interests continued the Western manipulation of 
Eastern educational, business, political, and military matters. As Said asserted 
‘The Orientalist sees himself as accomplishing the union of Orient and Occident, 
but mainly by reasserting the technological, political, and cultural supremacy of 
the West’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 246). Iraq was not a fully sovereign country at 
that time, as Great Britain remained as mandatory power with military bases still 
located in Basra, Mosul and at Habbaniya in the Anbar Province (Jasse 1991; 
Silverfarb & Khadduri 1986; Sluglett 1976).  
In the lead-up to WWII, large-scale foreign excavations across Iraq were 
terminated, yet the Iraqi Department of Antiquities remained active (Delougaz 
1938; Gibson 1972a; Longrigg 1953). In addition, several Western archaeologists 
such as Max Freiherr von Oppenheim and Nelson Glueck remained in the region 
and served as advisors to the Allies and the Axis powers (Richter 2008). This 
continued the legacy of Western knowledge acquired via archaeological 
expeditions in order to support the espionage activities of the greatest colonial 
powers at the time. The looting and destruction of cultural property during the 
war prompted US President Franklin D. Roosevelt to establish the American 
Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in 
War Areas. This led to the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (MFAA) 
program, which was strongly supported by General Dwight D. Eisenhower. He 
issued an allied general order that forbade the looting and destruction of cultural 
sites, as well as a placing a ban on occupying cultural property for military 
purposes (Merryman 1986; Nicholas 1995). 
Woolley was also once again involved with the military, and served as an advisor 
in the MFAA program. His role’s focus was to protect monuments from 
unnecessary damage or misuse (Nicholas 1995; Spirydowicz 2010). However, 
military forces on all sides occupied historic buildings and private residences. As 
one Iraqi woman recalled when Allied forces appropriated all the houses in the 
Karradat Marriam neighbourhood in Baghdad ‘Our house was one they took, and 
they didn’t give it back until the end of 1947. They paid rent, but didn’t ask 
whether people wanted them there or not, they just took the houses’ (Bezirgan 
2002, p. 95). The MFAA program and the commission were both brought to a 
close in 1946, but work continued under the United States Department of State 
(DoS) (Edsel 2009; NARA 2007).  
British presence in the country began to decline after the war, and more 
importantly, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948 was signed. This resulted in British 
military troops completely withdrawing from Iraq, with the last base in 
Habbaniya vacated on 2 May 1955 (Jasse 1991, p. 140). At that time the Iraqis 
were also more fully in control of their antiquities. Since 1944 Iraqi politician 
Naji al-Asil served as the antiquities director, and launched the journal Sumer, 
which published articles in Arabic and English highlighting the work of Iraqi 
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archaeologists (Abdi 2008). However, while Iraqi scholars were in the lead of 
excavations, overall operations continued to be influenced by Western powers. 
Mallowan’s report on the 1952 season at Nimrud credited the contributions of 
Iraqi archaeologists, but acknowledged that several Western organizations funded 
the excavations including the University of Oxford, Cambridge University, and 
the British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (Mallowan 1953). Sustaining 
Western control over the sites continued what Said described as the hermeneutical 
relationship that had existed between the Orientalist and Orient, where the 
Western expert served as decision-maker (Said 2003 [1978], p. 222).   
Western Travellers  
Western travellers also explored the region throughout the mid to late 1900s, and 
often provided archetypal Orientalist descriptions of their visits. Freya Stark for 
example reflecting on her visit to the Iraq Museum by remarking ‘I was surprised 
to see quite a number of Arabs in turbans and flowing abiyah’s, and women with 
infants wandering around the museum’ (Stark 1951, p. 95). Although her travels 
took place years prior, her book was published in 1951, which demonstrated the 
continued attitude of a Westerner’s view of the East. Expressing surprise at 
realising that Iraqis would appreciate antiquities highlighted what Said labelled as 
‘latent Orientalism’ which is represented via unconscious Orientalist thoughts and 
behaviours (Said 2003 [1978], p. 206). However, other travellers recognised the 
hazards of holding onto idealised notions of the East. In 1953 two British 
expatriates who lived in Baghdad described the city as hot, dusty and muddy, and 
the locals unwelcoming. They said ‘The Englishman who arrives in Baghdad, as 
it were a political virgin, finds to his shock that Iraq is not a romantic Arabian 
land, and that T.E. Lawrence is not a popular idol but rather regarded coldly as a 
British spy’ (Stewart & Haylock 1956, p. 72). They further noted that the Iraqis 
‘are well aware of their cultural heritage and proud of it, but they are more 
interested in their present political problems, their love affairs, their friends, and 
all the rather leisurely activities that make up their social lives’ (Stewart & 
Haylock 1956, p. 90).  
Political relations between Iraq and Western nations took a decidedly negative 
turn due to unrest in the country, which started with the 1958 Iraqi Revolution, 
followed closely by the crumbling of the Baghdad Pact (Ashton 1993; Polk 2005; 
Yaphe 2006). However, visitors continued to travel to the region expecting to see 
the exotic and romanticized version of the East. British travellers ‘approached 
Baghdad with images of Caliphs and genii’s filling their thoughts’ (Canton 2011, 
p. 133). A 1977 photographic essay which showcased images of traditional versus 
modern Baghdad elicited surprise from the artist because ‘modern Iraq is nothing 
like the tales from the Arabian Nights stories, the buses, Mercedes Benz taxis, 
Japanese trucks, and the colourful domes of the mosques that rise next to modern 
buildings’ (Nakamura 1978, p. 44). Another visitor in 1978 who expected to 
immerse himself in the idealised East was disappointed to find that ‘Baghdad is 
not a city of stately majesty, it is a water colour, not an oil painting’ (Young in 
Canton 2011, p. 133).   
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Notwithstanding the disappointment, Westerners continued to visit and work in 
the country. While postcolonial archaeology had yet to be fully embraced during 
that time, research and infrastructure was under local control throughout the 
region (Altekamp 2009; Meskell 1998; Porter 2010). International teams of 
archaeologists from Western universities and museums worked conjointly with 
the Iraqi Antiquities Department, whose staff managed the operations (Abdi 2008; 
Ball & Black 1987; Killick & Roaf 1983; Postgate 1972). Iraqi control of 
archaeological sites was a complete inversion from earlier Western domination. 
While international organizations continued to conduct joint research projects, the 
majority was ‘done by the Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage 
either on its own or in co-operation with foreign expeditions’ (Killick & Roaf 
1983, p. 199). However, some scholars voiced their frustrations over this. The 
renowned Assyriologist, Thorkild Jacobsen, wrote in the Forward to Heartland of 
the Cities of ‘the wearisome, constant difficulties of obtaining permission to work 
owing to shifting political orientations and military considerations’ (Jacobsen in 
Adams 1981, p. xiii).  
Archaeological work continued during the Iran-Iraq War, when excavations and 
reconstructions at archaeological sites were funded by the Ba’athist Regime (Abdi 
2008; Anderson & Stansfield 2004; Isakhan 2011). However, the political issues 
generated by the war caused concern for Western scholars who were uncertain as 
to their longevity in Iraq. In a critique of archaeological surveys conducted over 
the war years, Charles Redman stated that future work would only be possible if 
they ‘fully engaged with the local scholars’ (Redman 1982, p. 382). Such a 
comment made at a time when foreign archaeologists should have been working 
conjointly with the Iraqis, was testament to Said’s notion that Orientalism did not 
end with decolonisation (Said 1993, p. 282). Further, Edmond Burke correctly 
noted that ‘nineteenth century colonial powers shaped the atmosphere of 
Orientalism in the Middle East for future encounters’ (Burke 1998, p. 504).  
Iraqi scholars did not forget the issue of the past colonial domination. As the war 
continued foreign travellers were restricted from moving freely about the country, 
yet two National Geographic journalists were able to visit the Iraq Museum. They 
met with Antiquities Chief, Dr Muayyad Damerji, who expressed concern over 
the large number of reproductions in the museum. Damerjii said ‘Our treasures 
were delivered to Europe, but we are trying to bring them back’ (Muayyad 
Damerjii in Ellis & McCurry 1985, p. 92). During this time, artefacts were no 
longer transported to foreign institutions, and archaeological work mainly focused 
on rescue or salvage digs (Wilkinson & Matthews 1989). Westerners did however 
continue to produce scholarly work, mainly related to research on Mesopotamian 
artefacts already in museums such as the Ashmolean at Oxford, and the Horniman 
in London (Koshurnikov & Yoffee 1986; Møller 1986). By 1990 the presence of 
foreign excavations in Iraq had slowly declined due to political tensions and the 
start of the Gulf War (McDonald & Simpson 1999; Nashef 1992).   
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The Iraq Wars and Beyond 
After a pause in Western-led conflict in the region, the 1991 Gulf War once more 
created a setting to test the epistemological notions of an invading force towards 
Iraq’s heritage sites. While troops did not occupy archaeological ruins, military 
action reportedly caused damage to several sites. For example, artillery fire 
damaged the façade of the ziggurat at Ur, and the ruins of Hatra, Samarra, Nimrud 
and the Ctesiphon Arch were reported to have suffered fissure damages due to 
nearby combat operations (Forsyth 2004; Miller 2005; Schipper 2005; Stone & 
Zimansky 1992; Zettler 1991). The United Nations (UN) Sanctions against Iraq 
that followed negatively affected the economy, and the healthcare and educational 
systems. The imposed embargoes on trade created an inability to effectively 
manage infrastructure requirements for a large population (Alnasrawi 2001; von 
Sponeck 2006). As noted by Abbas Alnasrawi ‘The centrepiece of the sanctions 
system was UNSC Resolution 661. This resolution, and the subsequent sanctions 
resolutions, created a set of conditions which virtually cut Iraq off from the world 
economy’ (Alnasrawi 2001, p. 208).  
The manner in which the cultural heritage community operated was changed as 
well. They were unable to attend international conferences, access current 
research forums for conservation methods, or engage in cross-cultural exchanges 
(Forsyth 2004; Wilke 2008). In addition, incidents of site looting drastically rose 
due to reduced security caused by lack of funds to pay guards at archaeological 
sites (Forsyth 2004, p. 80). This demonstrated that although the Occidents, or 
representatives of the West, were not physically in Iraq, their authoritative 
influence negatively affected the population and ancient ruins. The war revisited 
the Orientalist biases of power and control, which according to Said was 
‘ultimately an imperial war against the Iraqi people, an effort to break and kill 
them as part of an effort to break and kill Saddam Hussein’ (Said 1993, p. 301).  
As a result, archaeological sites began to deteriorate due to the Iraqis inability to 
stop environmental erosion, or properly apply conservation measures to the ruins. 
In addition, all American sponsored excavations ceased to operate in the country 
and only a few European universities continued sporadic digs. Consequently, 
communication and professional cooperation between Iraqi and international 
organizations were fragmented and eventually fully terminated (Forsyth 2004; 
McDonald & Simpson 1999; Russell 2001). However, the absence of Western 
institutions could have been viewed as advantageous in that Iraqi sites were no 
longer represented by a predominantly Orientalist voice, as Iraqi academics were 
more widely published than they had been in the past (Ahmad & Grayson 1999; 
Al-'Adami 1997; Al-Mutawalli 1999; Al-Salihi 1998). Despite the lack of 
disparate group interactions, Western heritage experts retained interest in the 
region and weighed in on the protection of sites during the build up to the 2003 
Iraq war. The president of the Archaeological Institute of America (AIA), 
appealed to all governments to avoid damaging cultural heritage sites, and to 
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respect and observe the terms of the 1954 Hague Convention (Rose 2002; Wilkie 
2003).  
Prior to the invasion, numerous pre-conflict meetings were organized by US 
Government personnel in order to forecast the potential consequences of invading 
Iraq. The DoS formed several working groups to produce a document called the 
Future of Iraq Project. Experts were tasked with analysing and providing 
suggestions of how to plan for post-conflict situations after the projected removal 
of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and produce their findings in a comprehensive 
report (Davis 2014; Miller 2005; Rathmell 2005). The project included numerous 
topic-specific sections, including a working group dedicated to providing 
recommendations of how to preserve and protect cultural heritage sites. While 
cultural heritage preservation seemed to be a concern the DoS was addressing, 
that specific working group was removed from the project. This was one of the 
first indications that attention to cultural heritage preservation and protection was 
seriously undervalued by head governmental personnel.  
A reason was not cited for removing the group, the document simply listed 
cultural heritage as a ‘working group that did not meet’ (DoS 2005, p. 35). 
Colonel Jeffery Clark, writing for the US Army War College, provided one 
possible explanation for the neglect in utilizing the document, which was the 
rivalry that developed between DoS and United States Department of Defense 
(DoD) personnel. The main perpetrator, and the man holding the highest level of 
office within the DoD, was US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who 
advised lead personnel not to ‘waste their time reading the report’ (Clark 2005, p. 
7).   
When coalition military forces entered Iraq on 20 March 2003, their only plan 
appeared to be winning a war with minimal consideration given to post-conflict 
operations (Allawi 2007; Ballard 2010; Keegan 2005). One of the areas that was 
inadequately deliberated was deciding where to house troops. By April 2003, 
coalition military bases and outposts were constructed on and near several 
archaeological sites, including Babylon, Kish, Ur, Hatra and Samarra, as well as 
other sites in the Dhi Qar, Kirkuk and Ninewa Provinces (Isakhan 2015b; 
Siebrandt 2015; Stone & Bajjaly 2008).  
In addition to the appropriation of archaeologically sensitive areas, the Karradat 
Marriam neighbourhood in Baghdad, which British troops had occupied during 
WWII, housed structures that were spared destruction during the Shock and Awe 
campaign. Several Western Embassies, including the American Embassy, were 
established within the palaces and former Saddam Hussein housing complexes 
(Chandrasekaran 2010; Isakhan 2011, 2013). As discussed by Isakhan, this could 
have been a sign that the US planned to use them as bases of power and control 
(Isakhan 2013, p. 232). The occupied area was renamed the Green Zone, 
encircled by concrete security walls, and housed coalition military and civilian 
personnel, mainly in Saddam’s seized palaces. As one army major described ‘it 
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was almost like being at Walt Disney’s version of Arabian Nights’ (Bachar in 
Ricks 2006, p. 206). The general who commanded the coalition land forces who 
marched into Baghdad stated that he had orders to secure presidential palaces and 
look for weapons of mass destruction, but was not provided with specific orders 
to safeguard cultural, educational, or health care facilities (McKiernan in Lawler 
2003a, p. 582).   
The occupation of cultural property by a foreign power has potential to create 
suspicions of wilful damages in order to destroy the ‘other’ culture (Van der 
Auwera 2010). Because of the history of Orientalism in Iraq, the occupation of 
historic sites sent a message of oppression, which hindered the coalition’s ability 
to form positive relationships with the local community. The Vice Minister for 
Tourism and Antiquities of Iraq described the importance and sense of pride 
shared by Iraqis in relation to the country’s ruins. He said that Iraqis consider 
themselves descendants of the ancient Mesopotamian cultures, which started to 
take place in the 1920s when Iraq was ‘born in the aftermath of cultural, political 
and social degradation, during a period of successive foreign occupations’ 
(Rasheed 2015, p. 5). Further, Bahrani said the occupation of sites was ‘a display 
of force that uses the sign of history and its control as a statement of victory’ 
(Bahrani 2006a, p. 244).  
After the start of the 2003 Iraq war, Said reflected ‘Twenty-five years after 
Orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism 
ever ended or whether it has continued in the Orient since Napoleon’s entry into 
Egypt two centuries ago’ (Said 2004, p. 873). Said noted the attitude of ‘other’ 
during the invasion, stating that ‘Without a well-organized sense that these people 
over there were not like us and didn’t appreciate our values, the very core of 
traditional Orientalist dogma, there would have been no war’ (Said 2004, p. 872). 
Isakhan reflected on Said’s Orientalism in relation to the war and stated that ‘the 
unquestioned tendency to view the people of the Orient as deficient and inferior 
others served the colonial agenda in continuing to dominate and control sections 
of the East’ (Isakhan 2008, p. 1). Further, he pointed out that the Bush 
Administration was misguided in their understanding of the Muslim World, and 
were driven by notions of Orientalism (Isakhan 2008). Overall, the invasion and 
occupation followed a history of US and United Kingdom (UK) intervention in 
Iraq for economic, political and military purposes. 
Just as General Maude declared that the British did not intend to occupy Iraq after 
WWI, a similar statement was made to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
on 11 February 2003. Marc Grossman, the Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, proclaimed ‘We will demonstrate to the Iraqi people and the world that 
the United States wants to liberate Iraq, not to occupy Iraq or control Iraqis or 
their economic resources’ (Grossman in Allawi 2007, p. 96). However, the 
opposite happened. Iraq was occupied, and remained so for almost a decade. 
Despite the occupation, Iraqi archaeologists were not opposed to partnering with 
the coalition powers in the early days of the war. According to Andrew Lawler:  
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Iraqi officials say the door is open to mutually beneficial cooperation. 
Muayyad Damerji, former State Board chief and now a Ministry of 
Culture adviser, urged archaeologists gathered last month in London [July 
2003] to reopen their Baghdad institutes and hinted that they might be able 
to resume excavations as early as next spring. Donny George, research 
director, added that he hopes a streamlined bureaucracy will make it easier 
for outside scientists to gain the necessary approvals. (Lawler 2003b, p. 
585).  
While it was important not to revisit the ideologies of the past and reimpose 
Western domination on Iraqi sites, it was also imperative to establish positive 
cross-cultural networks. A report compiled at the Strategic Studies Institute at the 
US Army War College clearly outlined the four phases of warfare. Phases I-III 
were: (I) deterrence and engagement; (II) seize the initiative; and (III) decisive 
operations, all relate to combat operations. The final Phase IV relates to post-
conflict operations, which the institute stressed needed to be planned ‘well before 
Phase III’ but in reality it was not (Fallows 2006, p. 88). Michael O’Hanlon 
criticizes the same lack of planning for Phase IV, and added that another issue 
that was not taken into consideration was the history of western colonialism in the 
region, and how an occupation of the country would be perceived by the locals 
(O’Hanlon 2004, p. 88).   
Attempts at mutual understanding were often pre-emptively damaged when 
military personnel were provided with material that promoted antiquated dogmas 
about the Arab culture. According to Laura Nader, in 2004 US Marines were 
given a book titled The Arab Mind written by Raphael Patai, an Israeli 
anthropologist who presented Arabs as not having the ability to reason, who were 
sexual deviants, cowardly, indecisive, lazy and conflict-prone (Nader 2012, p. 
38). Within the higher levels of the US government, the Bush Administration was 
guided by the works of Orientalists Bernard Lewis and Samuel P. Huntington, 
whose publications have perpetuated and legitimated the view of Muslims as 
barbaric, violent, and despotic (Isakhan 2008, p. 5). General knowledge about 
Iraq and Iraqis was taken from a colonial discourse, which produced an ‘artificial 
model’ of the country that the coalition administration continued to use during the 
course of the occupation (Al-Musawi 2006, p. 24).   
Part of that misinformed model led to the occupation of archaeological sites, 
which added to the historical imperialistic narrative that was witnessed by Iraqis 
over the course of several wars. British troops had occupied the ruins of Samarra 
during WWI, and 86 years later during the Iraq war, US army snipers used the 
same site for military purposes (Corn 2005). Historically, a military is a fighting 
force, not a peace keeping force. Therefore, one of the difficulties for the coalition 
was to act in a manner in which they were not trained. Military norms seek to 
separate soldiers from their adversaries, so the idea to start harmonious relations 
was not immediately visited (Keegan 2004; Porter 2009; Rubinstein 2010).  
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However, key coalition personnel did eventually realise that constructive contact 
with the local community was mutually beneficial during any exchange. This was 
especially true in relation to stopping violence in the Anbar Province, which had 
been the setting of intense fighting and high numbers of casualties since the start 
of the war. Even though positive cross-cultural relationships were not formed pre-
conflict, one successful campaign later in the war was the Sons of Iraq Program, 
which officially started in mid-2007 and was roughly modelled after the Iraqi 
movement called the Anbar Awakening. The program was a counterinsurgency 
tactic devised to rid al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) from the province through 
cooperation between coalition forces and the local Sunni population. Although 
previously fighting against each other, the coalition troops and Sunni leaders 
worked together as part of the Sons of Iraq Program to combat the common 
enemy of AQI (Al-Jabouri & Jensen 2010; Kagan 2007; Wilbanks & Karsh 
2010).   
The success of the program demonstrated that cross-cultural relationships, while 
tenuous, were feasible during war. The main reason for the success of the Sons of 
Iraq Program was that it was Iraqi initiated, with responsibilities shared equally 
between the Iraqis and the coalition forces. However, this same type of 
engagement with Iraqis responsible for archaeological sites was not in practice, 
nor was it considered even though troops were living on the sites.  
Sense of Place and Cultural Rights  
One of the other consequences of the war was the loss of cultural identity and 
sense of place, or place attachment, for the Iraqi heritage specialists. Bahrani said 
that the destruction of monuments and historical archives erases the historical 
landscape and thus, the memory of the people who identified with the landscape. 
Further, she admonished the greater academic community for maintaining their 
silence on the subject (Bahrani 2010, p. 68). Isakhan also discussed the loss of 
national identity and historical memory. He provided examples that the 
widespread escalation of ethno-sectarian violence as a result of the war was 
closely aligned with the destruction of heritage sites such as the Al Askari 
Mosque in Samarra and Ba’ath Party monuments located throughout Iraq, which 
damaged people’s memories and social cohesion (Isakhan 2011, 2013).   
Early publications in the study of human geography have long associated the 
importance of human experiences and cognitive connections to physical locations, 
which evoke emotions of how a place is valued and processed for its past, present 
and future (Proshansky, Fabian & Kaminoff 1983; Tuan 1979). Even with a 
globalised world of shared ideologies and views, sense of place and place 
attachment remain relevant in the twenty-first century (Lewicka 2011; Relph 
2008; Vanclay 2008). Sense of place is lasting in the human psyche. According to 
Frank Vanclay ‘place’ is a ‘space’ that is connected to meanings that are invested 
in a location, rather than attached to the physicality of the place (Vanclay 2008, p. 
3).   
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Similarly, place attachment is a bond between people and a specific place, 
influenced by emotions, incorporating concepts of sense of place, and ideological 
beliefs and behaviours in its discourse (Rollero & De Piccoli 2010). A sense of 
place has numerous influencing factors depending on individual or group 
experiences. These can include political, social, spiritual, and cultural memories 
allied with any specific setting or event. According to Robert Bevan ‘To lose all 
that is familiar, the destruction of one’s environment, can mean a disorientating 
exile from the memories they have invoked’ (Bevan 2006, p. 13). In the case of 
Iraq, sense of place and place attachment for Iraqi heritage specialists was 
violated when coalition troops occupied archaeological sites, damaging the 
memories of the people and the places.    
Closely aligned to this are cultural rights which do not have an official definition 
yet can be considered diplomatic means of communication and respect between, 
and for cultures, in order to promote interaction, cooperation, and conversation 
(Shaheed 2011; Ziegler 2007). However, human rights are recognised under 
international bills, and with them, cultural rights (Eide 2001). As the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights preamble reads:  
Recognising that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and 
want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone 
may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and 
political rights. (UN 1966).  
According to William Logan, heritage is ‘fundamental to cultural identity; it is 
those things that underpin our identity as communities, national, regional, local, 
even family’ (Logan 2007, p. 35). Because of the risks involved with travel, Iraqi 
cultural heritage specialists were unable to assess and record site conditions, or 
attempt to engage in any type of preservation or conservative measures. Iraqis 
were also directly barred from accessing some sites due to coalition occupation. 
Since they were unable to connect with and enjoy their sites, their sense of place 
and place attachment were interrupted, which was a violation of their cultural 
rights. Farida Shaheed investigated the degree to which the right to access and 
enjoy one’s own heritage is a part of international human rights. She concluded 
that a violation towards cultural property was a violation towards the cultural 
rights of humans (Shaheed 2011). However, this concept could not be explored 
due to the lack of Iraqi interviews, which is discussed in Chapter 4.   
The sites most impacted by the occupation were Ur, Babylon, and Kish, which are 
comprehensively discussed and analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Because the 
research question examines if the construction of military bases on historic sites 
was driven by Orientalist biases, the history of Orientalism perpetrated by 
nineteenth and twentieth century Western archaeologists and British military 
personnel and diplomats is also reviewed.   
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Discussion 
While cross-cultural contact can often be a positive result of a globalised world, 
Mesopotamian archaeology has a long interconnected history with an Orientalist 
ideology. Notions of superiority that were viewed as legitimate appropriations of 
the past were cultural norms for more than 200 years. This was seen in the strong 
Biblical narrative that led explorers and scholars to interpret data gathered from 
ancient cities in decidedly Western accountings. They encouraged an abiding 
belief system that the West was the preeminent and most civilized of nations, and 
the inventors of society’s greatest achievements in science, governance and 
industry. Therefore, the messages that were often projected to the world about the 
ancient Eastern cultures were decidedly Eurocentric.      
However, controlling the knowledge analysed from the ruins was only one of the 
results of Westerners coming into contact with what was then referred to as the 
Orient. The early scholars and explorers also projected an unflattering and 
primitive image of the local communities, who were thought to be unable to 
administer or analyse the sites themselves. Artefacts therefore had to be sent to 
Western museums, where they could be managed properly. Except for a few 
minority voices who highlighted this error in judgment, very few saw it as a 
negative result of the excavations. From the time archaeologists began their work 
when the region was Ottoman Iraq, they were not required to consult with local 
authorities. When the British obtained governorship after WWI, their power 
became stronger, and after the 1920 Iraqi Revolt, their influence remained. This 
continued the structure of Orientalism that Said described as ‘a body of theory 
and practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable 
material investment’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 6)     
When Iraqis eventually administered their own lands and cultural heritage sites, 
the foreign excavators expressed their anger and disbelief at the change in power. 
Yet by the 1970s attitudes changed and cooperative projects began to take place. 
Unfortunately, the long series of conflicts, starting with the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, 
through to the Gulf War and subsequent UN Sanctions, devastated the country, 
the population, and international cooperation at archaeology sites. Minimal cross-
cultural interaction occurred during this time, which resulted in isolation and only 
remote contact.   
Coalition personnel were deployed to Iraq in 2003 with some of the similar 
ideologies promoted by the early Orientalists. Some also saw themselves as the 
protagonists who would rescue the ruins. They arrived in Iraq with a limited 
understanding of the country or the culture, and were often guided by the 
Orientalist dogma that had been demonstrated by the men and women from the 
proceeding century. While some cross-cultural interactions resulted in amicable 
relations such as those demonstrated with the tribes in the Anbar Province, similar 
endeavours were not attempted with the heritage experts. The housing of troops 
on archaeological sites revisited the colonial occupation and served to continue 
the Western domination of the country.      
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Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that an Orientalist ideology has been associated with Iraqi 
archaeological sites since at least the nineteenth century, with Biblical interest as 
one of the main driving factors. The power and control over the region has been 
demonstrated by examining the published records of Western explorers, scholars 
and military personnel who lived in and visited the country through the twentieth 
century. In addition, the manner in which the East was portrayed by many of 
these individuals established that they promoted visions of an uncivilized people 
and land who were in need of Western administration. This was compounded by 
the evidence that decisions about archaeological ruins were dominated by the 
foreigners, which resulted in the large-scale removal of artefacts that were 
transported to museums in Europe and America. During this time, the local 
population was employed as labourers, but were not involved with any decisions 
related to the excavated material.  
The long-term control of Mesopotamia and her antiquities during times of war 
and peace exhibited an Orientalist pattern of the West’s perception of saving the 
East and controlling the production of knowledge. While Iraqis eventually 
attained governorship over their country and archaeological ruins, foreigners 
continued to work in and visit the country. However, their often conveyed sense 
of resentment and disappointment that they were no longer the decision-makers, 
demonstrated that Orientalism did not end with decolonisation. This was also 
evident during the course of war and sanctions, which created a forced 
environment of isolation and division.     
By the time the 2003 Iraq war began, the military troops who made up the 
coalition forces deployed into a country they were unfamiliar with were guided by 
Orientalist assumptions. Their misinformed model led to the occupation of 
archaeological sites and the idioms about being liberators rather than occupiers 
that was voiced in WWI, were repeated in 2003. This demonstrated that little had 
been learned from the past legacy of war. The information contained in this 
chapter has therefore provided the useful background necessary to understand the 
history of interest in Mesopotamian archaeological sites, and the associated issues 
of power and control. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review  
	
Introduction 
The primary aim of this thesis is to determine if the construction of military bases 
on archaeological sites was driven by Orientalist biases during the 2003 war in 
Iraq. This chapter therefore examines the literature related to the war, and issues 
of protecting cultural heritage venues to determine if the matter has been 
addressed. Numerous topics were covered by Iraqi and Western authors, which 
are explained in the following sections. The looting of the Iraq Museum and 
archaeological sites were the primary focus of many publications, with some 
authors providing conflicting opinions on whether military presence should be 
praised or criticised. In addition, the damages inflicted on ancient ruins was also a 
common topic discussed by academics, practitioners and members of the 
coalition. Several authors acknowledged that the occupation of sites conveyed a 
message of power and control, especially when Iraqi archaeologists were barred 
from entry. However, the extent to which this was couched within the Orientalist 
motivations of the colonial past did not incorporate into broader discussions.     
Similarly, authors expressed personal and professional opinions about whether 
foreign troops conformed to the legalities and obligations associated with 
international and domestic cultural heritage laws, including debate about what 
constituted binding responsibilities. They also broached the matter of cultural 
heritage awareness training for deploying troops, as well as establishing relations 
with the local heritage community. Several of these topics were discussed by 
personnel who served in Iraq during the war, and who were able to offer personal 
experiences. Additionally, information was provided on the steps military factions 
have taken in order to learn from their mistakes and seek and embrace more 
positive guidance. The material presented in this chapter has provided invaluable 
information about the consequences of the war, and how archaeological sites were 
affected. However, what this review found was the largest gap in the existing 
literature is dialogue that associates all these issues with notions of Orientalism.  
Antiquities Looting 
Topics related to cultural heritage and the Iraq war have gained worldwide 
recognition due to the scholars and practitioners who have raised the issue since 
the invasion. However, the tragic events associated with the looting of museums 
and archaeological sites generated the majority of attention. Some edited books 
were dedicated to the issue, such as Catastrophe!: The Looting and Destruction of 
Iraq’s Past, which highlighted the pillage of sites as one of the most significant 
problems antiquities faced during the war (Emberling & Hanson 2008). Coalition 
troops were heavily criticised for failing to stop the locals who broke into and 
looted the Iraq Museum, as well as leaving archaeological sites unguarded and 
vulnerable to thieves. John Russell, who served as an advisor to the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003/4, stated that such actions were viewed by 
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Iraqis as a sinister motive in order to control Iraq and destroy Iraqi identity 
(Russell 2008, p. 42).  
Other works such as Antiquities Under Siege: Cultural Heritage Protection after 
the Iraq War, was a forum for discussion on a variety of topics, but also mainly 
focused on the plight of plundered sites and museums (Rothfield 2008). For 
example, Matthew Bogdanos related his personal experiences in relation to the 
events that led to the failure of US troops to protect the museum from looters, 
which he stated was ‘inexcusable’ (Bogdanos 2008, p. 39). Other authors called 
for better coordination between military factions and the cultural heritage sector 
in order to mitigate damages and the loss of antiquities due to conflict and post-
conflict events (Burnham & Urice 2008). Concern over the fate of museum 
collections and unexcavated antiquities was also voiced by Benjamin Foster who 
proposed that ‘The cultural and historical consequences of the American invasion 
of Iraq will long outlast the political and economic ones’ (Foster 2003, p. 309).  
Other scholars such as Larry Rothfield were relieved that several sites, including 
Ur and Babylon, were ‘under US military protection’ during the early days of the 
war (Rothfield 2009, p. 128). This opinion was shared by others, such as Łukasz 
Olędzki, a Polish archaeologist who was embedded with troops at Babylon. While 
he admitted that establishing a base on the ruins was a mistake, he also said that 
‘the site was saved from generalised looting and devastation’ (Olędzki 2008, p. 
250). Additionally, a team assembled by the National Geographic Society who 
conducted assessments in May 2003, also credited the presence of US Marines at 
Babylon from deterring would-be looters. The report stated that ‘the presence of 
coalition troops on major sites is necessary in the short term to deter further 
looting’ (Wright et al. 2003, p. 4). While Matthew Thurlow criticised the 
occupation of Babylon, he also warned that it would be susceptible to looters once 
coalition forces vacated the property (Thurlow 2005, p. 181). Both the praise and 
criticism of troops stationed on archaeological ruins sent conflicting messages of 
concern from the cultural heritage community.            
Damages due to Military Operations 
Despite the inconsistent narrative, most scholars agreed that the occupation 
caused physical harm. Although Joris Kila mainly focused on policy issues and 
the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the war, he reported 
that ‘Babylon suffered from damage caused by heavy vehicles and the storage of 
containers. The most famous example involved military personnel who 
indiscriminately loaded huge bags with soil and used them as defensive 
enforcements for the camp’ (Kila 2008, p. 183). Elizabeth Stone provided a 
similar report, and added that bulldozers flattened large areas of the site in order 
to make parking lots. She stated that such actions ‘will remain one of the stains on 
the occupation of Iraq’ (Stone 2008a, p. 78). Eleanor Robson wrote that ‘Key 
ancient cities such as Babylon and Ur have been irreversibly degraded through 
misguided military occupation’ (Robson 2006, p. 416). 
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In addition, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) commissioned six separate scholars to provide detailed assessments 
and photographic documentation in their Report on Babylon: Current Condition. 
Damages from the military installation included ‘the use of heavy equipment 
which compacted the soil and may have destroyed antiquities below the surface’ 
(ICC 2009, p. 16). Vandalism was also noted in the report in the form of 
‘smashed bricks on nine of the bodies of the animals adorning Ishtar Gate’ (ICC 
2009, p. 19).    
Two Iraqi authors, Mariam Moussa and Abdulamir Hamdani, added to the body 
of growing literature, and systematically listed how Babylon and Ur were 
casualties of direct and indirect military actions (Al Hamdani 2008a; Moussa 
2008). Independently, John Curtis further berated that ‘military activities have 
damaged iconic sites such as Babylon and Ur’ (Curtis 2008, p. 210). According to 
a former SBAH Chairman ‘Under the eye of occupation forces, significant 
damage was inflicted to sites converted to military encampments, including 
Babylon, Kish, Ur and Samarra’ (Al-Hussainy 2010, p. 87). In 2008, a team 
composed of Western and Iraqi experts concluded that the ruins of at least three 
ancient cities, Lahm, Ubaid, and Ur, were subjected to coalition activity, 
specifically the construction of defensive positions (Curtis et al. 2008, p. 230). 
Furthermore, US Kirkuk Regional Air Base (KRAB) was constructed on an 
unexcavated 3,000 year old site. Radar equipment and fencing was erected on one 
of the mounds where the ancient city once stood, which resulted in ‘artefacts 
spilling out of the hillside’ (Pinckney 2010, p. 119).  
Benjamin Isakhan discussed the destruction of cultural heritage throughout Iraq, 
and argued that ‘the disregard for the key archaeological sites of ancient 
Mesopotamia, as well as classical Islamic mosques, reveal the US-led coalition’s 
disregard and disdain for the entire spectrum of Iraq’s cultural heritage’ (Isakhan 
2015b, p. 272). His Iraq Cultural Property Destruction (ICPD) database was 
developed in order to track different levels of damage to heritage venues across 
Iraq, including their value and significance to humanity (Isakhan 2015a, p. 17). 
Isakhan explained the difficulties he and his team encountered in attempting to 
gain accurate first-hand information due to limits of accessibility into the country. 
Data was gathered for analysis via existing literature, media reports, interviews, 
and field reports. Isakhan acknowledged that an:  
Important limitation of the research method that ought to be addressed is 
that of Eurocentrism. The author is sensitive to the fact that the typologies 
and scales utilised and adapted throughout this study have all been 
developed within a European or Western context and that this may lead to 
claims of Orientalism. (Isakhan 2015a, p. 15).      
Nevertheless, it was important to document site damages. As Gaetano Palumbo 
summarized fairly succinctly:   
43	
	
The use of historic and archaeological sites as military bases is an 
inexplicable action that has provoked international censure against the 
coalition forces; in the best case, it is seen as insensitive towards other 
nations cultural heritage, and in the most extreme interpretations, it is seen 
as intentional destruction. (Palumbo 2005, p. 228). 
The Occupation of Archaeological Sites 
However, the ability to assess site conditions proved challenging due to the 
volatile and dangerous security environment prevalent across the entire country. 
In addition, the inability of non-coalition personnel to enter venues that were 
established as military installations created further difficulties. Restrictions were 
implemented by coalition forces as a result of an incident in December 2004 when 
an Iraqi male gained access into a military dining facility in Mosul, and detonated 
a suicide bomb that resulted in numerous deaths (IntelCenter 2008, p. 234). 
Shortly thereafter, strict procedures for base admission were enacted, which 
included the need to possess US government credentials, specifically a Common 
Access Card (CAC), which allowed entry (The White House 2004). This meant 
that all the sites that were converted into bases were off-limits to Iraqi 
archaeologists, and all but three of the actual on-the-ground assessments 
mentioned above were completed by personnel who were employed, at some 
level, by the coalition. These factors conformed to suspicions that historic sites 
were purposefully seized in order to exhibit the military’s supremacy and control. 
It also ultimately contributed to the further deterioration of ruins.   
Laurie Rush discussed the US base stationed near Ur, and the decision to include 
the ancient site within the fenced perimeter. While she voiced the same argument 
as many others before her, that looters were unable to access the ruins due to the 
existence of the soldiers, she also acknowledged that Iraqis were faced with the 
same injunctions (Rush 2013). In the example of Babylon, the presence of the 
coalition ‘prevented the SBAH from maintaining their normal procedures of 
monitoring and repair’ (ICC 2009, p. 20). The site manager noted that ‘The use of 
the city as a military camp was a major affront towards this world-renowned 
archaeological site’ (Moussa 2008, p. 144). Yet she also specified that ‘we were 
unable to assess the full level of damage because of the commandeering of the 
site by coalition forces’ (Moussa 2008, p. 150). Similar disapproval was directed 
at coalition forces from the Ur manager, who argued that the presence of coalition 
troops within the archaeological footprint not only caused physical damages, but 
also sent a message of indifference about the cultural and educational importance 
of the site (Al Hamdani 2008a, p. 155).  
Bahrani, who worked with the coalition during the first year of the war, 
unsuccessfully lobbied for the removal of the base from Babylon. She proposed 
that it was deliberately chosen because it was ‘the legendary city associated with 
decadence, despotism, and evil in the Biblical Christian tradition’ (Bahrani 2006a, 
p. 241). She was of the opinion that officials at the Pentagon were behind the 
strategic placement of bases because ‘the idea that there was no pre-planning or 
high-level military decision-making in choosing these ancient sites as major camp 
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installations is difficult to believe’ (Bahrani 2010, p. 70). Similarly, Peter Stone 
deliberated whether or not military bases were constructed on ruins as a 
purposeful attempt to antagonise the local population (Stone 2012, p. 276). 
However, these matters are difficult to verify, especially when first-hand accounts 
of the decision-making processes that went into base placements are lacking in 
the published record, which this thesis discusses. Olędzki’s recollection differed 
from Bahrani’s. He briefly discussed cooperative efforts that were made towards 
working with Iraqi antiquities authorities, outlining ‘since December 2003, all 
construction projects on Babylon were in coordination with Iraqi heritage staff’ 
(Olędzki 2008, p. 255). However, the Iraqis were still not allowed onto the ruins 
without a coalition escort.    
The embedded Polish team further noted that the occupation was seen by some as 
‘the rhetoric of colonialism, which treated the monuments as the property of 
humanity, or more specifically and sinisterly, as the property of European 
civilisation’ (Olędzki 2008, p. 256). Separately, Tamima Orra Mourad equated 
the overall occupation of Iraq as one of the three periods of colonisation in 
Mesopotamia, the first two being the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate. 
Mourad stated that Westerners had occupied the region in order to ‘interfere, 
infiltrate or invade the Near East at different times’ (Mourad 2007, p. 155). She 
further stated that the ‘US benevolent empire has established military bases across 
the globe, not to dispatch them into conflict, but to intimidate the rest of the 
world’ (Mourad 2007, p. 163). The manner in which archaeological sites were 
appropriated and managed was reminiscent of the colonial occupation that was 
discussed in Chapter 2. Although four decades had passed since Westerners 
controlled the fate of ancient ruins, the 2003 war revisited the same ideologies.    
International and Domestic Cultural Heritage Laws  
Armed conflict and official guidance on cultural property protection have a 
history in the US dating back to the 1863 Lieber Code, which ‘was the first 
formal set of rules laid down by a state as to how both its own armies and that of 
its enemies should be treated’ (Forrest 2007, p. 184). Yet perhaps the most well 
know law resulted from the atrocities committed during WWII, the 1954 Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
(Drazewska 2015). Patty Gerstenblith provided pragmatic details about the 
Convention, and the legal responsibilities as it related to the US military 
occupation of foreign lands (Gerstenblith 2008, 2009, 2010). For example, she 
stated that although it had not been ratified at the time the Iraq war started ‘the 
policy of the United States was to view as binding those provisions of the Hague 
Convention that the United States regarded as part of customary international law’ 
(Gerstenblith 2010, p. 11). Gerstenblith highlighted the fact that military bases 
were built on or near archaeological sites, and drew reference to the ambiguity of 
the Convention, which calls for refraining from causing damage to cultural 
property except in cases of ‘military necessity’ a term however, yet to be 
universally defined (Gerstenblith 2010, p. 9).  
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Craig Forrest also discussed the debate associated with military necessity, but 
more specifically, the exception that allows a state party to act in a hostile manner 
against cultural property if it has been made into a military objective. He said 
such a caveat ‘acts to legitimize destructive actions and to privilege military 
considerations at the cost of humanitarian values’ (Forrest 2007, p. 219). Thurlow 
also discussed the issue as it pertained to sites and museums: 
The Second Protocol creates a strong presumption against the destruction 
of cultural property during armed conflicts by forbidding its destruction 
unless an attacking party establishes: (1) that the cultural property has 
been transformed into a military objective; and (2) there is no feasible 
alternative with similar military advantages. Aggressor nations must take 
all practicable precautions to prevent the destruction, and even incidental 
damage to cultural sites. (Thurlow 2005, p. 164).  
In the lead up to the war, other Western scholars such as Peter Stone engaged 
with UK forces, who as part of the coalition, were responsible for adhering to the 
terms in Article 6 of the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage, which reads in part:  
Whilst fully respecting the sovereignty of the States on whose territory the 
cultural and natural heritage mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 is situated, and 
without prejudice to property right provided by national legislation, the 
States Parties to this Convention recognise that such heritage constitutes a 
world heritage for whose protection it is the duty of the international 
community as a whole to co-operate. (UNESCO 1972). 
Stone said he and his colleagues ‘stressed the vulnerability of sites and museums 
immediately post-conflict, and stressed the coalition’s responsibilities under 
international conventions’ (Stone 2008b, p. 76). He later recalled of his exchange 
with the military that ‘there was clear acceptance amongst those with whom I was 
dealing directly that things could have been managed better and that they wanted 
to get it right next time’ (Stone 2008b, p. 80). Marion Forsyth also discussed the 
failure of international laws to protect cultural heritage during the war. She 
proposed that ‘The current established customary and codified international laws 
of war are not sufficient to protect cultural property in times of armed conflict’ 
(Forsyth 2004, p. 97).  
In Cultural Heritage Issues: The Legacy of Conquest, Colonization, and 
Commerce, Sabine von Schorlemer focused on military responsibilities towards 
the issues of preventing looting during war. However, she also recognised that the 
international laws were adhered to because sites were not targeted during the war, 
and that there did not appear to be ‘extensive collateral damage to cultural 
property’ (von Schorlemer 2009, p. 141). Yet within the same publication, Lyndel 
Prott observed that despite the laws ‘the rules to respect cultural property were not 
followed in the case of Babylon’ (Prott 2009, p. 260). Similarly, Amy Miller 
admonished troops for their failure to stop the looting of museums and sites, 
which she stated breached Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and its 
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laws of occupation (Miller 2005, p. 71). In his discussion on the practical 
execution of polices, Christopher Hoh suggested:  
Failing to protect cultural heritage can create a cognitive dissonance, 
undermining the strategic communication goals of the military. A case in 
point is the recent building in Iraq of coalition military bases on the sites 
of ancient Babylon and Ur. This action needlessly fuelled resentment and 
suspicion among the local population and beyond. (Hoh 2008, p. 198).   
Hoh continued to voice that ‘it does no good to profess respect for a country’s 
people and then appear powerless to protect the things they hold dear’ (Hoh 2008, 
p. 198). Although he was referencing the looting of the Iraq Museum, the same 
opinion could be applied to the occupation of archaeological sites. In addition, 
The National Historic Preservation Act, Section 402 requires that ‘federal 
undertakings outside of the United States take into account adverse effects on 
sites inscribed on the World Heritage List or on the foreign nation’s equivalent of 
the National Register for the purpose of avoiding or mitigating adverse effects’ 
(NHPA 1980). 
Iraqi antiquities laws which also call for the protection of movable and 
immovable cultural property have been in place since Gertrude Bell’s 1924 
regulations, which have since been revised to the most current 2002 amendment. 
Article 15 lists actions which are forbidden on and near archaeological sites, 
which include ‘trespassing, farming, erecting residential or any other kinds of 
buildings, or engaging in any operations that would result in changing the features 
on heritage sites’ (MOC 2002).  
Although the laws prohibit the occupation of archaeological ruins, according to 
Elizabeth Varner, because all military bases were considered American territory 
at the time of the occupation ‘the U.S. military will not apply Iraqi laws to US 
personnel under US jurisdiction’ (Varner 2011, p. 14). Irrespective of this issue, 
Mary Ellen O’Connell warned that ‘there is a moderate possibility that the United 
States and its coalition partners may one day pay actual damages or provide in-
kind reparations for failing to protect Iraqi cultural property’ (O'Connell 2004, p. 
355).    
Overall, the extent of published information has proven useful for understanding 
the legalities of cultural heritage protection during times of conflict. For example, 
at the start of war:  
Both the United States and Great Britain have signed the Convention, but 
neither country has ratified it. The Hague Convention's provisions apply in 
any armed conflict where two or more of the hostile countries are 
members of the Convention. Thus, as a technical matter, the Hague 
Convention did not govern the March 2003 US and British invasion of 
Iraq. (Forsyth 2004, p. 88).  
Nevertheless, by the time it was ratified by the US in 2009 and the Articles should 
have been followed, three sites in Iraq, Ur, the previously mentioned ruins in 
Kirkuk, and a site in Mosul were still under coalition control. While the troops 
47	
	
released Ur back to the Iraqis in 2009, the two other sites remained occupied until 
the complete withdrawal of US forces in December 2011. Therefore, the excuse 
of non-ratification was no longer valid after 2008. However, there is no mention 
of this in the published record. J. Holmes Armstead succinctly depicted the 
scenario when he stated ‘Given the low priority assigned to cultural property 
protection, it should come as no surprise that adequate measures to protect the 
numerous and diverse sites were not undertaken’ (Armstead 2008, p. 118).   
Cultural Heritage Awareness Training 
Soldiers were sent to Iraq with little to no training in cultural heritage awareness, 
which has been discussed by numerous authors. Some of the most useful accounts 
were presented by personnel who were deployed during different stages of the 
war. Sergeant Darrell Pinckney, who had an archaeological degree, related his 
experience of serving at the KRAB where pottery and artefacts were found 
throughout the base. He stated that US Army General Order 1A was adhered to by 
personnel. The order prohibits ‘removing, possessing, selling, defacing or 
destroying archaeological artefacts or national treasures’ (USCENTCOM 2000).  
Yet, he noted that neither protocols nor recommendations existed that could have 
provided useful advice on how to treat the artefacts and the site. Pinckney said 
there was a need to have ‘specific cultural resource management guidance for 
personnel’ (Pinckney 2010, p. 125). Likewise, Lieutenant Colonel Kila, also with 
a background in cultural heritage, served in the southern provinces. He noted how 
military operations caused varying degrees of damage, including using 
archaeologically rich soil to fill sandbags, the detonation of munitions near 
delicate ruins, and ground pollution caused by leaking military equipment and 
vehicles (Kila 2013, p. 37). He realised ‘it has become clear that there are not 
enough individuals who have knowledge of both cultural heritage and military 
operational planning’ (Kila 2013, p. 46).   
However, in addition to Pinckney and Kila, another example of the duel 
familiarity did exist. A platoon leader who was educated in historic preservation 
practices as part of his civilian career discussed how assistance was rendered to 
Iraqi staff at the site of Agar Quf near Baghdad. Funding was provided to 
implement infrastructure improvements at the ruins, which was a popular tourist 
attraction pre-2003. Although the soldiers involved in the project had not received 
heritage awareness training, they were cognisant of the importance to remain in 
the background and provide support to the Iraqis. They recalled that the military 
newspaper, Stars and Stripes, published a story about the assistance the team 
provided. Their commander, Captain David Uthlaut, was quoted as stating ‘we 
think it should be an Iraqi process to lead the project’ (Uthlaut in Roberts & 
Roberts 2013, p. 184). This demonstrated the awareness to fully involve the local 
heritage community was practiced. On the other hand, Cheryl White and Thomas 
Livoti described a site visit to the ruins of Nippur in January 2009. They noted 
that White:  
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Surveyed the ancient Sumerian site of Nippur with assigned military 
personnel. The survey was endorsed by the Lieutenant Commander 
because it was a line of effort passed down from US Army Corps 
Command level in Baghdad. The objective was to determine the potential 
for Nippur to be a tourist venue and contribute to the development of 
cultural industries. (White & Livoti 2013, p. 206).   
White and Livoti made no mention of Iraqi involvement or consultation, nor if 
engagement was attempted. While the survey was part of a larger 
counterinsurgency operation aimed at tracking artefact looting activity, it was 
curious that they stressed that protection efforts should be coordinated with the 
local stakeholders, yet they did not follow that practice themselves (White & 
Livoti 2013, p. 210).  
Soldiers were left to their own devices for the first few years of the war. The need 
to train troops was recognised by an Army Reservist who had a background in art 
conservation. Corine Wegener was in Baghdad in May 2003, and witnessed the 
damages at the Iraq Museum. She was surprised at the lack of mobilisation from 
international heritage organisations that could have sent experts to assist troops 
with conservation efforts. While the dangerous environment caused by the 
conflict was one factor that deterred on-the-ground assistance, the other was the 
absence of coordination between the DoD and cultural heritage institutions, which 
had not been in practice since the MFAA program was dissolved after WWII. 
Wegener’s first-hand experience led her to implement training guidelines for US 
Army Civil Affairs personnel, of whom the majority tend to be Army Reservists. 
While reservists are part-time civilian employees in times of peace, they are 
deployed with active troops during conflict situations. Within the Civil Affairs 
branch, many of the personnel have specialised skills, mainly in the humanitarian 
and engineering fields, which Wegener was able to incorporate into her program 
(Wegener 2008, 2010). 
She also created the US Committee of the Blue Shield (USCBS), which became 
functional in 2006. Their mission is to ‘help coordinate a worldwide emergency 
response to cultural property threated by armed conflict, particularly in those 
areas in which US forces are deployed’ (Wegener 2008, p. 171). According to 
Wegener, between 2006 and 2010, the ‘USCBS has trained more than 1000 
deploying Civil Affairs personnel’ (Wegener 2010, p. 39). While the program was 
praised, it was also noted that in 2010 less than 4 per cent of the total number of 
reservists in the force possessed cultural heritage expertise (Ahern 2010, p. 59). 
This indicates that further focus should be on attempting to educate more 
personnel about heritage issues. In mid-2015, the Institute for Military 
Governance expressed interest in re-establishing a program similar to MFAA. 
They advertised for uniformed officers to serve as heritage specialists, yet results 
from the announcement have yet to be reported (CHAMP 2016).          
Other responses to the need for awareness training included briefing recruits and 
officers as part of their readiness packages. Laurie Rush described how in 2004 ‘a 
group of military archaeologists realised that they would need to design and 
institute heritage awareness for deploying personnel’ (Rush 2010a, p. 86). They 
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determined an effective means of doing that was through the distribution of decks 
of playing cards specifically designed to convey their message, which began to 
circulate in 2006. Prior to deployment, soldiers were given the cards which 
depicted images of archaeological sites and antiquities, with accompanying 
messages that encouraged engagement with the local population; warned against 
collecting artefacts; cautioned against digging on sites; and emphasised how 
cultural heritage protection was of worldwide importance (Zeidler & Rush 2010, 
p. 77).  
Rush and James Zeidler described a specific incident in which they were effective 
in raising awareness within the ranks. They stated that coalition personnel had 
been visiting archaeological sites without local permission, and when they 
obtained the cards, the information they contained created awareness that their 
actions were potentially detrimental to the ruins (Zeidler & Rush 2010, p. 82). 
Similarly, Brian Rose discussed his involvement in the general cultural heritage 
awareness training he provided to military personnel through the AIA Troops 
Lecture Program. He explained: 
In every briefing I have given, the enlisted soldiers and officers have been 
riveted to the material being presented, and the other archaeologists who 
have given the briefings have received emails and letters from soldiers 
stationed in Iraq, who ask additional questions about the presentation, or 
describe their attempts to safeguard mud-brick structures inadvertently 
uncovered during construction, or chronicle their attempts to hinder 
looting. (Rose 2007, p. 148).  
The AIA partnership with the US Armed Forces manifested into the AIA-Military 
Group, which became the Cultural Heritage by Archaeology and Military Panel 
(CHAMP). They are ‘an interest group composed of archaeologists, 
anthropologists, scientists, interested lay people and military personnel from 
around the world’ who provide training for deploying military personnel 
(CHAMP 2016). This is another example of a successful partnership between 
individuals interested in promoting the need to raise consciousness about cultural 
heritage issues within military ranks. 
Since the US ratified the Hague Convention in 2009, published accounts of the 
importance of cultural heritage training in military programs have been noted by 
Zeidler, Paul Green and John Valanis. Zeidler emphasised the need to continue 
incorporating training on both the strategic and tactical levels. He discussed 
several in-progress programs that promote heritage awareness, including: general 
training via lectures; cultural heritage resource web portals; mock training 
exercises; added heritage awareness training at the Reserve Officer Training 
Corps (ROTC); a Field Commanders Guidebook; an Illustrated Archaeology 
Checklist; no-strike lists; as well as the need to produce and distribute more 
cultural awareness playing cards (Zeidler 2013, p. 78). He spoke of the necessity 
to have:   
A military force where all members have at the very least a minimal 
understanding that they may encounter cultural property and heritage 
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features in the landscape when operating at the global level; and that this 
awareness would translate into reporting features and issues up the chain 
of command. (Zeidler 2013, p. 85).   
The programs Zeidler listed are part of the operational guidelines that he and 
Rush established in 2009 for military commanders. They include training tools 
and support services which serve as part of their Combatant Command Cultural 
Heritage Action Group (CCHAG). The information is easily accessible on-line, 
which also provides links to policies, laws, as well as professional organisations 
that can be contacted with questions about cultural heritage matters (CCHAG 
2014).    
Another innovative initiative is Paul Green’s military funded Overseas Regional 
Cultural Heritage Integrated Data (ORCHID) program, which is a database that 
identifies cultural property. It is designed to aid DoD personnel when they are 
planning for munitions strikes during wartime exercises, thus avoiding sensitive 
areas. Green stated that ‘as we began this project, one of our concerns was 
appreciating how peoples around the world identify, value, and prioritize their 
own heritage resources, and how these perspectives could be addressed in DoD 
planning’ (Green 2013, p. 270). His team conducted a worldwide literature review 
and comparative analysis that listed sites by country. Green was careful to point 
out that data collection was headed by Western subject matter experts, and that 
local values may differ from their own. However, the program conveyed the 
overall message of heritage protection, and was successfully utilized in strategic 
planning workshops in 2011, which were attended by military advance planners, 
and personnel engaged in base construction and maintenance, as well as combat 
field operations (Green 2013, p. 274).  
John Valanis, who also served as a member of the coalition during the war, 
elaborated on new cultural heritage awareness training being incorporated into the 
ROTC curriculum, which trains and commissions US military officers. Cadets are 
tested on their leadership abilities, which includes scenarios that gage their 
attentiveness towards cultural property protection during battle drills. According 
to Valanis, modules incorporate matters such as how they would feel if places in 
America, for example the Gettysburg Battlefield or the Alamo, were destroyed by 
a foreign military, and how such places are comparable in importance to the Shi’a 
shrines in Karbala (Valanis 2013, p. 100). During the training courses, they are 
also given examples of poorly executed protection measures, such as the 
infamous looting of the Iraq Museum, and are required to discuss what could have 
been done differently within the constraints of combat (Valanis 2013, p. 102). 
Because the program was only recently added, results will not be seen until after 
2016. However, its implementation demonstrated that DoD was finally becoming 
proactive in educating their command personnel in heritage matters.     
On the British side, Stone developed a system in order to positively guide military 
understanding about the importance of cultural heritage protection and its relation 
to the local population. Stone’s program called for the full engagement of 
specialists with military personnel. He explained the approach as a series of four 
tiers:  
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Tier 1: Long-term awareness training that is built into routine training for 
all troops, which covers generic cultural property protection issues such as 
its value to the community and how to recognise historic properties; Tier 
2: Immediate pre-deployment training including awareness about the 
specific region where troops are deploying to and what sites they are 
likely to encounter; Tier 3: During conflict, when personnel put their 
training to use ensuring that sites are protected and laws are followed; and 
Tier 4: Post-conflict, with an emphasis on stabilization and offers of 
emergency aid, repair and conservation, as well as working with the local 
experts within the country. (Stone 2013, p. 173-4).   
He cautioned that the tiers could be blurred and were not purely linear in practice, 
such as the potential for overlap between tiers three and four. However, the 
significant contribution of this framework was to strongly advocate for the 
necessity of local involvement. Stone stated that ‘A fundamental axiom of tier 
four is the return of responsibility for cultural property to local authorities at the 
earliest opportunity’ (Stone 2013, p. 174). Stone’s approach was fully embraced 
by the military authorities and led to the establishment of the British Army’s 
Cultural Property Protection Working Group in 2014 (Purbrick 2016). Such 
endeavours demonstrated forward thinking by the armed forces.  
Relations between Members of the Coalition Forces and Iraqi Heritage 
Professionals 
Yet another area that lacked full engagement during the war, and which has been 
argued within the professional community, were the issues related to cross-
cultural relationships between the troops and Iraqis. Due to the lack of training, 
most soldiers relied on ad hoc solutions in order to work with the local heritage 
experts. For example, Pinckney, who was previously discussed, related two 
different scenarios of contact between military personnel and the local heritage 
specialists after pottery and small artefacts were found on the KRAB. In one 
instance, when pottery was unearthed during the course of a fence installation 
project in 2003, the operation was halted on the recommendation of local elders in 
order to avoid causing further damage to the artefacts (Pinckney 2010, p. 119). 
While Pinckney related that military command adhered to the requests of the 
locals in order to protect cultural heritage resources, he did not discuss further 
details of any relationship dynamics that did or did not exist between the two 
groups. However, while contact was evident in the early years of the war, 
according to Pinckney, by 2008 the local community was unwilling to work with 
the American’s due to the potential of placing themselves in danger if insurgents 
knew they were working with the soldiers. As pottery was still being found on the 
base, military personnel attempted to contact the local archaeologists for advice 
on avoidance and mitigation during construction projects, but the locals were 
unwilling to visit the base (Pinckney 2010, p. 125).   
Other examples of contact were attempted further south. In February 2008, 
members of the British Armed Forces who were based in Basra began working 
with personnel from the Iraqi Ministry of State for Antiquities and Heritage, and 
specialists from the British Museum, in order to develop a program called 
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Operation Heritage. The program was divided into two distinct projects, one was 
designed to assess the conditions of archaeological sites in order to implement 
programs that would assist in conservation efforts, and the other project was 
designed to refurbish one of Saddam Hussein’s palaces into a new museum 
(Clarke 2010; White-Spunner 2011). Hugo Clarke recognised ‘It is imperative 
that projects such as Operation Heritage are indigenously led and advice must be 
sought at every juncture, the British Museum and the British Army are purely 
supporting elements’ (Clarke 2010, p. 144). Barney White-Spunner also worked 
on the projects, and emphasised that the museum refurbishment was ‘an Iraqi-
owned project from the outset’ (White-Spunner 2011, p. 84).  
White-Spunner highlighted the history of cooperative efforts between academia 
and military personnel, and provided examples of Western archaeologists in 
Mesopotamia such as T.E. Lawrence, Leonard Woolley and Gertrude Bell, during 
WWI (White-Spunner 2011, p. 80). As discussed in the previous chapter, these 
role models were also the individuals who worked as British intelligence agents, 
which he acknowledged. However, he praised their roles for the invaluable advice 
they were able to give to troops, rather than their association with imperialistic 
notions. Tobias Richter noted ‘the archaeology-espionage conundrum is deeply 
rooted in the Eurocentric perception and appropriation of the Orient by western 
scholars, and is directly connected to the colonialist and imperialist undertones of 
the West’s engagement with it’ (Richter 2008, p. 213).  
While the British programs were honourable in their concept, neither author 
discussed the history of the British Mandate in Iraq, nor if that had any effect on 
their relations with the Iraqis during the planning phases of the projects. While 
neither project was implemented prior to, or immediately after the withdrawal of 
British troops from Iraq, in September 2016 one hall of the museum was opened 
in the converted Saddam palace (Robson 2016). At the writing of this thesis, 
results based analysis from either project is absent from the published record.  
Yet published accounts of such cooperative interactions are rare, and the coalition 
was criticized for being exclusive. McGuire Gibson outlined how:  
It became clear that the central offices in Baghdad, up through June 2004, 
had little or no information on or control over antiquities matters in the 
provinces because they had too few vehicles and no means of 
communication. Individuals in the Occupation Authority were making 
decisions about sites without consulting with the State Board and it 
appears that they even ignored the American advisors in the Ministry of 
Culture who were installed to give advice on antiquities. (Gibson 2004, p. 
119).  
The advisors whom Gibson referred to were sent to Iraq through the DoS, Bureau 
of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) division. Their role was to serve as 
liaisons between the Iraqis and the coalition forces. Between September 2003 and 
March 2005, a total of three different individuals held the position, including the 
previously mentioned Russell and Bahrani, as well as René Teijgeler (Siebrandt 
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2010). Within his role as advisor between June 2004 and March 2005, Teijgeler 
explained:   
In order to reduce the risk of ethnocentrism, I discussed all issues 
concerning cultural heritage with the appropriate staff of the museum, 
library, archives, antiquities board, or the Ministry of Culture. I referred 
heritage related requests, mostly from army units outside of Baghdad, to 
the local antiquities authority. It was my standard policy to leave all final 
decisions to the proper Iraqi authority. (Teijgeler 2011, p. 104).  
Christopher Hoh, a Foreign Service Officer with the DoS, mirrored this sentiment 
when he emphasised that local inclusion was a necessity because:  
Even with the best information in the world, there is no substitute for a 
good network of reliable experts. Particularly needed are names of the key 
in-country specialists, who know the history of the objects, sites, and 
cultures in question and are familiar with existing measures for 
preservation and protection. (Hoh 2008, p. 203).   
However, the presence of Western archaeologists working with military units 
caused debate. The cultural heritage community was divided over whether 
partnering with military forces was ethically appropriate. After his time working 
with the coalition, Teijgeler voiced the opinion that archaeologists should only 
cooperate with the military after a peace mission was approved by an accepted 
international body such as the United Nations (Teijgeler 2011, p. 99). Rush, who 
advocated for the partnership, realised that ‘unfortunately aggressive military 
actions take place whether archaeologists participate or not, and it is also critical 
to consider the importance of cultural preservation for the local inhabitants of an 
area in conflict’ (Rush 2011, p. 142). Curtis stated that he would not provide 
information pre-conflict, but would assist post-conflict because: 
The pre-conflict situation is, in fact, governed by political considerations 
over which the army has no more control than archaeologists, but in the 
post-conflict situation, when the damage has occurred, both the army and 
archaeologists have an obligation to rebuild the infrastructure, including 
cultural heritage. Working with the army post-conflict is, therefore, a 
pragmatic solution. (Curtis 2011, p. 196).    
He further said that during times of war ‘working with the military enabled 
archaeologists to engage at archaeological sites in a way that, because of the 
security situation, would otherwise have been completely impossible’ (Curtis 
2011, p. 198). Yet Jon Price questioned the ethical, moral and legal ramifications, 
and whether the engagements were for personal gain rather than beneficial to the 
local community (Price 2011, p. 201). Yanis Hamilikas was one of the strongest 
voices against involvement with the military. He criticized archaeologists who 
were willing to offer ‘professional, technical, and cultural advice and expertise on 
the next nation to be occupied, accepting uncritically and as a-matter-of-fact that 
that would be the course of events from now on’ (Hamilakis 2009, p. 50). He 
discussed other ethical concerns, such as:  
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How legitimate is it for archaeologists from the invading nations to be 
collaborating with the military of their own countries, especially since 
some of these countries (as in the case of the UK), have a long history of 
colonial rule and domination, and of colonial archaeology, in the countries 
that they illegally invaded? Why was there almost no discussion on the 
potential links between these old colonial ties and the current campaigns, 
and on the nationalist anxieties to stake claims in the post-invasion Iraq? 
(Hamilakis 2009, p. 52).  
Similarly, historian Conrad Crane and Middle East specialist W. Andrew Terrill 
submitted a US Army War College report in 2003 in which they noted ‘Despite a 
relatively short experience with French and British occupation, the Arab world 
today is extraordinarily sensitive to the question of Western domination and has 
painful memories of imperialism’ (Crane & Terrill 2003, p. 19). However, Nancy 
Wilkie pointed out that ‘the lack of communication between agencies created 
gaps in oversight that opened the door to chaos at both the Iraq Museum and 
archaeological sites throughout Iraq’ (Wilke 2008, p. 237).  
At the higher levels of military planning, Lieutenant General David Petraeus 
listed the need for being culturally aware as one of his fourteen ‘observations 
from soldiering in Iraq’ (Petraeus 2006, p. 3). Petraeus recognised the need to 
positively engage with the local populations because ‘people, in general, are more 
likely to cooperate if those who have power over them respect the culture that 
gives them a sense of identity and self-worth’ (Petraeus 2006, p. 8). Top-down 
recognition of the benefits of engaging with the local population was seen as well-
intended, yet poorly executed. In order to achieve engagement, the suggested 
solution was a program called the Human Terrain System (HTS), which entailed 
the use of counterinsurgency tactics. The HTS was designed to embed social 
scientists with coalition units to serve as cultural advisors (McFate 2005b).  
At its official start in 2007, the program was overwhelmingly poorly received by 
the anthropological community. The American Anthropological Association 
(AAA) released a report in 2009 citing among other issues, that anthropologists 
would not be able to follow AAA’s code of ethics if engaged in such an 
endeavour (Albro et al. 2009, p. 42). It was also chastised by some military 
personnel who gave reasons such as resentment of allowing civilian involvement 
in military operations (Connable 2009). Others criticised it because it operated as 
an espionage program, which was seen as contrary to generating positive relations 
with the local community (González 2008).  
It was also rebuked due to its tendency to be misleading, specifically ‘it reduces 
complex humanity to economic, ethnic, and tribal landscapes’ (Porter 2009 p. 
194). Porter’s argument continued that ‘good cultural insight requires greater self-
awareness about how and why we analyse the enemy’ (Porter 2009 p. 195). 
Something the HTS did not address. Former HTS employees also expressed 
concerns over the deficiencies they perceived were embedded in the program. 
During the 2007 AAA annual conference, Zenia Helbig advised the audience that 
‘The program is desperate to hire anyone or anything that remotely falls into the 
category of academic, social science, regional expert, or PhD’ (Helbig 2007).    
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Montgomery McFate, who assisted in the development of the HTS, argued that 
despite the colonial narrative historically attached to intelligence gathering 
efforts, that if anthropologists did not engage with the program, then military 
personnel would gather information inappropriately, which would result in 
misunderstanding cultural norms (McFate 2005a). Other military officers praised 
the usefulness of the program because ‘many, if not most, of the challenges we 
face in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted from our failure early on to understand 
the cultures in which coalition forces were working’ (Kipp et al. 2006, p. 11). 
While utilizing Western social scientists years after the war started may have 
seemed advantageous at the time, the failure to involve the local community 
meant it did not achieve its desired results of cross-cultural relationships. 
Although the program officially ended in 2014, vestiges of it continue to run as 
part of the United States Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 
albeit under the new title of Global Cultural Knowledge Network (Brook 2016). 
Such efforts are evident that military factions are willing to engage with locals, 
yet their execution requires further guidance.    
Discussion   
This chapter has demonstrated that matters related to the protection of cultural 
heritage during the Iraq war were widely published. Yet a significant lacuna in the 
existing literature is that it did not frame coalition occupation and subsequent 
damages of archaeological sites as part of the broader issue of Orientalism. The 
majority of discussions tended to focus on and around the looting of the Iraq 
Museum and archaeological sites. Coalition troops were castigated for failing to 
provide protection in the early years of the war, with authors citing their inactions 
as violating international laws modelled to protect heritage sites during armed 
conflict. However, several others also praised their presence at places such as 
Babylon and Ur because they were protected from local looting gangs. The 
arguments did not include discussion on the negative impact of how such actions 
could have been construed as a colonial inspired re-occupation of the country. 
Instead, authors focused on how the soldiers were obliged to stop the looting and 
protect the property. Yet the laws they cited were the same laws that clearly 
defined how it was illegal to build, alter, and live on a historic site, yet only a few 
authors incorporated this into their discussions.    
Because non-coalition personnel encountered difficulties when trying to gain 
access onto venues that were established as US bases, there was minimal 
understanding of the true ground situation, and this is reflected in the available 
literature. Despite the restrictions, several scholars documented physical damages, 
mainly at Babylon and Ur, which provided vital information linked to how the 
occupation impacted the scientific integrity of both sites. In addition, while a few 
authors likened the occupation to the actions of a powerful empire intent on 
gaining full control of the country, the majority did not fully engage in dialogue 
related to how the mere presence of a foreign military sent a message of revisiting 
the colonial past of WWI.   
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However, the troops were not aware of this because they were deployed without 
receiving cultural heritage awareness training or guidance, which was widely 
discussed as one of the major mistakes of the war. Yet the extraordinary efforts 
that reservists and civilians put forth to rectify this error demonstrated that 
military factions were open and willing to support new training initiatives. 
Lectures and courses concentrated on how to protect venues and avoid causing 
damages to ruins. The overall published material on training practices has 
demonstrated increased awareness for cultural heritage protection matters since 
2006, but site occupation as it pertains to notions of Orientalism is not one of the 
main topics, yet it is vital that it is fully addressed.  
Despite the absence of training, military personnel contributed to the body of 
written material via several informative narratives credited to their first-hand 
experiences of positive engagement with Iraqi heritage specialists. However, 
some of their publications demonstrated that while they were willing to behave 
responsibly towards the ruins and local community, their execution required 
guidance. Many of their stories echoed what Edward Said described as ‘the 
privileged role of culture in the modern imperial experience, and little notice 
taken of the fact that the extraordinary global reach of classical nineteenth and 
early twentieth century European imperialism still casts a considerable shadow 
over our own times’ (Said 1993, p. 5). 
In addition, a large portion of work focused on issues related to whether Western 
heritage specialists should work with the military, which became a contentious 
topic. However the arguments were on how it would affect the practitioners 
morally and ethically, not the projected impact on the Iraqis. The controversial 
HTS generated the greatest hostility, yet none of the individuals who opposed the 
program cited the overtly Orientalist ideology attached to it. One of the key 
elements left out of the program was the lack of local engagement. It was 
designed, implemented and carried-out by Westerners, which reverted back to the 
Orientalist manner in which Iraqis and their sites were treated in the past, or as 
Said called it ‘the imperial-cycle’ (Said 1993, p. 19). Although written just prior 
to the Iraq war, Douglas Little’s opinion is relevant in that US and Middle East 
relations were problematic because of American Orientalism, specifically ‘a 
tendency to underestimate the people of the region and to overestimate Americas 
ability to make a bad situation better’ (Little 2002, p. 314).  
This chapter has highlighted that authors have defined and discussed many of the 
mistakes that were made in relation to cultural heritage issues and the Iraq war. 
Yet what is notably absent from the literature is in-depth dialogue examining the 
relationship dynamics between members of the coalition and Iraqi cultural 
heritage professionals. In addition, while a few soldiers have provided first-person 
accounts of their experiences, a comprehensive study has not been completed. 
The glaring gap in published information highlights an absence of suggested 
theoretical and methodological approaches of partnering coalition forces with 
local cultural heritage experts in order to protect cultural heritage sites, which this 
thesis has set out to rectify.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the existing literature in existence on the topic of the 
Iraq War and its impact on archaeological sites, and the manner in which it has 
been addressed. Scholars and practitioners tended to focus on site damages that 
were a result of looting, with some giving voice to the construction of military 
bases on places such as Babylon and Ur. Of the authors who have covered site 
occupation, their discussions broached the issues of Orientalism, but did not fully 
address them. The same problem was found with authors who discussed 
international and domestic laws as they pertain to heritage venues. While the issue 
of cultural heritage awareness training, and relations with the local community 
were broadly covered, they too lacked comprehensive dialogue of revisiting past 
colonial biases.      
However, it must be remembered that topics related to cultural heritage and the 
war are vast and robust, and no single author is expected to have elaborated on 
every problem. The contributions of all the scholars and practitioners listed in this 
literature review have built the foundation from which this thesis further expands. 
This review is therefore evidence of the need to ‘fill-in’ the missing information, 
namely discussions on site occupation and how it pertains to notions of 
Orientalism. This chapter has elaborated on material currently in publication, but 
more importantly, it has provided the evidence of a research gap due to the 
limited literature available, and endeavours to add further guidance for military 
personnel and their engagements with local heritage sites and caretakers. 
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Chapter 4: Methodological Approach   
	
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the manner in which research was undertaken in order to fill 
the gap in knowledge about Orientalist ideologies and the occupation of 
archaeological sites during the Iraq War. The methodology incorporated 
collecting primary accounts of contact between members of the coalition who 
deployed to Iraq and Iraqi cultural heritage professionals. The most effective 
method of information gathering proved to be one-on-one semi-structured 
interviews, utilizing open-ended questions. Individuals relayed their personal 
experiences and opinions, which were analysed and integrated into three separate 
case studies. In addition, archival textual material was also included which 
portrayed the actions of nineteenth and early twentieth century Westerners 
towards sites and the local population. The following sections outline how the 
research was conceived, implemented and executed.   
Statement of Problem 
The main objective of this study was to examine and analyse the manner in which 
archaeological sites were managed by Westerners, first by archaeologists in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and later by the 2003 coalition forces; 
that is exploring if the treatment of the sites dictated relationship patterns between 
the Western factions and the Iraqi cultural heritage communities. As fully 
discussed in the previous chapter, since 2003, numerous publications have 
focused on the war, many of which included debates in regards to military troops 
occupying archaeological sites. While physical damages to ruins and artefacts 
were commonly discussed, notions of Orientalism were not fully deliberated.    
Furthermore, only a few primary narratives from personnel who were based on 
sites such as Babylon and Ur exist. As a result, the on-the-ground situation and 
the repercussions from the displays of power and control have not been entirely 
covered. Unless this is understood and changed, the same mistakes that were 
made during the war in Iraq will be repeated in the next global conflict. It is 
therefore imperative that military planners take into consideration all the 
consequences associated with occupying another country’s cultural heritage sites, 
including those associated with Orientalism. The only manner in which this can 
be achieved is by ensuring that soldiers are equipped with proper knowledge 
before their deployments through training sessions that include lessons on 
avoiding revisiting the colonial past. This thesis strives to document why this was 
not done, and how to fix it, by answering the question: ‘Was the construction of 
coalition military bases on Iraqi archaeological sites driven by Orientalist biases 
during the Iraq War?’  
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Research Design 
According to C.R. Kothari ‘research is an original contribution to the existing 
stock of knowledge’ (Kothari 2004, p. 1). Because opinions about the many issues 
related to the war were already established, this thesis was able to build on those 
concepts. Qualitative research was employed, and although the methods 
associated with it can vary, the general aim is directed at understanding the social 
world through the collection and analysis of data (Kothari 2004; Ormston et al. 
2013). The common characteristics of qualitative research seek to answer 
questions through a set of pre-established processes in order to gather and 
produce information that is not predetermined, and is applicable to research 
beyond the initial study, as outlined in Table 4.1.   
Table 4.1: Common characteristics of qualitative research 
Common Characteristics of Qualitative Research (Ormston et al. 2013, p. 4) 
• Aims and objectives that are directed at providing an in-depth and 
interpreted understanding of the social world of research participants by 
learning about the sense they make of their social and material 
circumstances, their experiences, perspectives and histories. 
• The use of non-standardised, adaptable methods of data generation that are 
sensitive to the social context of the study and can be adapted for each 
participant or case to allow the exploration of emergent issues.  
• Data that are detailed, rich and complex.  
• Analysis that retains complexity and nuance and respects the uniqueness 
of each participant or case as well as recurrent, cross-cutting themes. 
• Openness to emergent categories and theories at the analysis and 
interpretation stage. 
• Outputs that include detailed descriptions of the phenomena being 
researched, grounded in the perspectives and accounts of participants. 
• A reflexive approach, where the role and perspective of the researcher in 
the research process is acknowledged.  
The question this thesis has set-out to answer fits within the parameters of the 
above listed characteristics. It attempts to understand human experiences and 
behaviours through personal perspectives, which are related to the key topics 
outlined in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2: Key topics of the thesis 
Key Topics 
• Assessing relationships between coalition personnel and Iraqi cultural 
heritage specialists. 
• Evaluating the impact of coalition military installations on and near 
archaeological sites. 
• Exploring perceptions towards archaeological sites used as military 
installations. 
• Understanding cultural heritage training in the coalition military doctrine. 
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One approach to collecting this type of information is through conducting 
interviews. The methodological approach chosen for this study was 
‘emotionalism’ which is concerned with understanding a ‘lived experience where 
emotions are treated as central to that experience’ (Silverman 2001, p. 90). 
Interviews prove useful as a qualitative method because participants are allowed 
to reveal personal thoughts, values, prejudices, views, feelings and perspectives 
about a specific topic. As Roger Gomm explained: 
One-to-one qualitative interviews are usually conducted with the aim of 
producing a picture of the interviewee as a person with their own way of 
understanding the world, although usually as having a way of 
understanding which can be taken as characteristic of people of the same 
category or in the same social circumstances. (Gomm 2004, p. 176).    
Research Sampling  
The initial goal was to conduct a total of 40 interviews, 20 with coalition forces 
personnel and 20 with Iraqi cultural heritage specialists. This sampling was 
constructed to be an acceptable cross-section of individuals from these two 
communities. The main goal was to speak with coalition personnel who lived on, 
or visited an archaeological site during his/her deployment. However individuals 
who served in Iraq but did not frequent any ruins were also interviewed. The main 
goal of the interviews with the Iraqi heritage specialists was to speak with 
individuals who interacted with members of the coalition on or around 
archaeological sites. Individuals associated with these social units were chosen 
because their experiences and opinions have a direct bearing on the study, 
potentially providing invaluable first-hand information not previously recorded.  
Three types of sampling were used to locate and engage with potential interview 
subjects. They were: (1) judgemental or purposive sampling, which aims to 
contact individuals who are most likely to have information required for the 
research; (2) expert sampling, in which individuals are experts in their fields; and 
(3) snowball sampling, in which participants identify other people in their 
organizations who may also be willing to partake in the study (Kumar 2014, p. 
244). Individuals were identified from a mixture of these sources. They were 
drawn from a pool of known contacts of active and retired military and civilian 
personnel for coalition members, and active and retired cultural heritage 
specialists for the Iraqi participants. In addition, professionals associated with 
military and cultural heritage organizations and institutions were also targeted. 
Lastly, considerable shared communication networks exist within both the 
communities, where potential participants were able to relay information about 
the project to their colleagues. Each person was invited to attend a one-on-one 
interview either via Skype, telephone, or in-person, depending on his/her location 
and preference. If the participant was unable to communicate in English, the use 
of a translator was offered. 
Invitations were emailed to a total of 71 individuals, which included members of 
the coalition and Iraqi cultural heritage personnel. Each email included details of 
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the study, which was fully explained in a Plain Language Statement (PLS) and 
accompanying consent form. The PLS comprised of information about the 
researcher, the research topic, how data would be gathered, and the proposed use 
of the results. It also described the expected involvement of the participants, as 
well as their rights and responsibilities in the process during the project. Several 
weeks prior to each interview, each potential participant was provided with a 
letter of introduction, a PLS, and a consent form, which was signed, with the 
understanding that his/her identity and personal details would remain confidential.  
Two statements were created in order to directly address each particular group. 
The version supplied to members of the coalition asked them to reflect on their 
interactions with Iraqi cultural heritage specialists (Appendix I), while the Iraqis 
were requested to reflect on their interactions with members of the US and 
coalition military forces (Appendix II). The statement intended for the Iraqis was 
translated into Arabic (Appendix III) and was slated for translation into Kurdish 
by an individual who was to be hired upon arrival in Iraq. The consent form was 
also sent to the potential coalition participants (Appendix IV) with an Arabic 
version sent to the Iraqis (Appendix V).  
Interview Participants 
While interviews can range in format from structured to unstructured, this study 
utilized semi-structured techniques with open-ended questions, which proved to 
be the most effective means to collect primary data. The questions prompted in-
depth discussions between the interviewee and interviewer, which were useful for 
‘digging deeper into a situation, phenomenon, issue or problem’ (Kumar 2014, p. 
177). This type of communication was necessary in order to understand how 
members of the coalition and Iraqi heritage specialists interacted with each other 
within the context of archaeological sites, and what those interactions meant to 
each individual.  
A total of 33 interviews were conducted, 26 were coalition military personnel, 
and 4 were civilians who worked with the coalition. Of the nations represented by 
the coalition, 28 were Americans and 2 were Dutch. A total of 3 Iraqis 
participated, 2 cultural heritage specialists, and 1 individual who served as a 
heritage consultant during the war (Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3: Research Participants 
 
A detailed socioeconomic-demographic of each participant’s nationality, gender, 
affiliation, the years each one spent in Iraq, and archaeological sites visited, are 
all presented in Appendix VI. In order to comply with the confidentiality clause, 
when interviewees are cited within the text of each chapter, they are referred to as 
the interview number next to his or her name as they appear in the appendix.           
Coalition Participants    
Members of the coalition were located living in several countries but mainly in 
the US, and chose to hold the interviews through video Skype and phone calls. 
The calls were made from a secure office at Deakin University’s Burwood 
campus in Melbourne, Australia. Each session was audio recorded after consent 
was given by the participant, both in writing and verbally. Each interview lasted 
between 45 and 60 minutes.   
Iraqi Participants 
Two Iraqi cultural heritage specialists were located in the US and agreed to phone 
calls, which were also conducted from the secure Melbourne office. One Iraqi 
was located in Iraq and was not able to participate via phone or Skype, but did 
send his answers via email. The low figure for Iraqi participation is explained in 
detail in the Problems Encountered, section below.   	
Interview Questions 
The interviews were designed to focus on examining interactions that occurred 
between individuals from the two groups in response to coalition occupation of 
archaeological sites. The questions served as a template for starting each 
interview in order to stimulate dialogue, while still ensuring the key topics were 
covered. However, during the process a strict set of guidelines was followed to 
avoid ‘restrictive, leading, and loaded questions’ (Wellington & Szczerbinski 
2007, p. 86). In addition, full attention was given to factors such as recognising 
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that each interviewee possessed his/her own opinion and recalled experiences 
differently. These variables were taken into consideration, which followed the 
notion that individual sentiments should not be considered indicative of the entire 
population (Gomm 2004; Krauss 2005; Wellington & Szczerbinski 2007).  
Participants were asked a series of questions specific to their social group. The 
semi-structured nature of the interviews consisted of asking each participant 
open-ended questions relevant to his or her social group. For example, members 
of the coalition were invited to reflect on their knowledge about Iraq before they 
deployed, and to describe their interactions with archaeological sites and the local 
population. The Iraqis were similarly asked to describe their interactions with the 
troops. The full list of questions is presented in Appendix VII. Organizing and 
asking the questions in such a manner allowed each participant to provide as long 
or as short an answer as he or she wished, as each individual reflected on personal 
experiences. The majority of the questions prompted further ad hoc questions not 
listed in the appendix, but remained relevant to the research topics.  
Problems Encountered and Limitations 
It was culturally important to conduct the Iraqi interviews face-to-face in their 
country. However, since the 2003 Iraq war, Baghdad has been listed as a ‘Do Not 
Travel’ destination on the Australian Government’s Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) travel advice website. Therefore, it was not possible to 
conduct the research in the capital. Yet, the city of Erbil, located in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, was listed as ‘Reconsider Your Need to Travel’ due to the less 
challenging security environment. Field research was therefore arranged to take 
place at the Iraqi Institute for the Conservation of Antiquities and Heritage, which 
is located at the base of the Erbil Citadel. Cultural heritage professionals from 
across Iraq participate in conservation and preservation courses at the institute 
throughout the year. The venue therefore offered the best opportunity to interview 
a large number of individuals. Contact was made with the director, who agreed to 
provide secure office space within the institute where the interviews could be 
conducted in private.   
Deakin University officials approved the fieldwork, which was scheduled for the 
months of August and September 2014. The largest group of interview 
participants scheduled were the enrolled students and instructors working at the 
institute. In addition, the social networks of both the pupils and educators was 
anticipated to generate more interviews via snowball sampling. In addition to the 
office space allotted by the director, an interpreter/translator was arranged to 
assist with Arabic or Kurdish speaking participants.  	
While all the proper logistical arrangements were finalized, one week prior to 
departure the university permission to travel to Iraq was withdrawn. This was due 
to a change in the DFAT travel warnings, which as of 11 August 2014 listed Iraqi 
Kurdistan as a ‘Do Not Travel' location. This change was in response to US 
military forces conducting targeted airstrikes against militant factions, specifically 
the so-called Islamic State, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), who at 
the time were moving towards the city of Erbil. As a result, it was not possible to 
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conduct interviews in Iraq. The threat of the ISIS advancement into Erbil also 
forced the closure of the institute, and the Iraqis scheduled to participate in the 
study fled to different locations throughout Iraq and other countries. Repeated 
attempts were made for several months to contact Iraqi participants, requesting 
interviews via video Skype or phone calls. Due to the fluid and unstable situation 
in the country as a result of the conflict, the requests were either declined or 
remained unanswered.  
In addition, communication with Iraqi expatriate communities in both Australia 
and America were also pursued in an attempt to locate Iraqis who had contact 
with American or coalition soldiers during the war. These attempts also resulted 
in negative outcomes. As a result, only 3 Iraqis granted interviews. Because of 
these unforeseen circumstances, Iraqi involvement in this study is poorly 
represented. In addition, the 3 participants were sympathetic to the US, which 
resulted in similar viewpoints when more diverse opinions were initially 
anticipated. The original intent of the interviews was to also ask the Iraqi 
participants about their emotional connections to the archaeological sites, both pre 
and post 2003. Their reactions were expected to measure their sense of place and 
attachment to the sites. However, this could not be accomplished, and is a 
limitation in this study.  
In order to reach the overall sample of 40 participants, additional interviews with 
members of the coalition were collected over the course of several months. 
However, the goal was not reached and time constraints did now allow for 
pursuing addition participants. While a higher response rate was anticipated, from 
both the initial outreach and the additional interview requests, the final 
participants were able to provide useful personal accounts. Yet the reader should 
be cognisant that the study is based mainly on interviews with members of the 
coalition, and of those, the majority are American. Because of these 
circumstances there is a strong Western voice present, instead of dual 
perspectives that were initially anticipated. Yet, this also enabled the study to 
concentrate solely on attitudes as they were viewed through Western ideologies, 
which has not been previously accomplished, and is therefore a relevant focus of 
this study.         
Data Analysis 
The interviews were transcribed, coded and manually analysed following 
examples from similar studies in the field (Flick 2015; Gomm 2004; Kumar 2014; 
Wellington & Szczerbinski 2007). While keeping the key topics in mind, themes 
began to emerge during the analysis process. Kumar listed three strategies for 
compiling information: (1) examine verbatim responses and integrate them into 
the text of the report to either support or contradict the argument; (2) assign a 
code to each theme and count how frequently each has occurred; or (3) combine 
both methods to communicate the findings (Kumar 2014, p. 298). Both methods 
were used during the analysis of the transcriptions, which produced subgroups of 
themes that were labelled as follows:   
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• Personal engagements 
• Cooperative networks  
• Cultural differences 
• Knowledge of Iraq 
• Occupation of archaeological sites  
• Perception towards archaeological sites  
• Viewpoints towards Iraqis or members of the coalition   
• Pre-deployment training (coalition only) 
 
These subgroups generated a thematic analysis, which as described by Gomm, 
looks for themes that are present in the whole set of interviews and creates a 
framework of these making comparisons and contrasts between the different 
respondents (Gomm 2004, p. 189). Answers to the interview questions were 
coded following the examples of the above-cited authors. They were examined 
for similarities and differences, and categorized into the above listed themes. The 
coding was determined using a mixture of both a priori and a posteriori 
groupings, which is, according to Wellington & Szcerbinski ‘the most common 
and useful approach to analysis’ (Wellington & Szczerbinski 2007, p. 106). This 
generated a set of data relevant to the key topics listed above in Table 4.2, which 
included extracting direct quotes from the transcriptions that were compatible 
with the established subgroups.   
Because recognising attitudes of Orientalism was the main focus of the research, 
particular attention concentrated on understanding the epistemology that may 
have influenced how coalition troops viewed archaeological sites and their Iraqi 
caretakers. This followed the concept about the nature of perceiving what people 
‘know or think they know.’ According to Robert Audi, this is accomplished 
through perceptions or other sources of knowledge, not just a belief but rather a 
justification of a belief (Audi 2011, p. 307). Further, according to Catherine 
Dawson, there are different types of epistemologies. In the case of this study it 
was determined to be social epistemology, which ‘concerns itself with knowledge 
and beliefs within a particular social and historical context’ (Dawson 2013, p. 25).  
Textual Research  
Textual research was also conducted in order to include the history of Western 
exploration in the region. According to Alan McKee, textual research methods are 
employed to interpret texts ‘to try and obtain a sense of the ways in which, in 
particular cultures at particular times, people make sense of the world around 
them’ (McKee 2003, p. 1). This was achieved by examining diaries, travel 
journals, and excavation reports published by explorers and archaeologists in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their first-person accounts of 
interactions with the local population and ancient ruins provided what Gomm 
listed as ‘evidence of the ways in which individuals or groups interpret the world’ 
(Gomm 2004, p. 246). He further stated that the word ‘discourse’ may be 
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substituted for ‘perspective’ or ‘world-view’ and that analysis is used to gain 
insight into the minds of the writer (Gomm 2004, p. 246). Because this study 
seeks to understand if colonial archaeologist’s manifested Orientalist ideologies 
on the sites, this archival research was vital for inclusion.  
Case Studies 
The information collected from the two types of research provided strong 
narratives of a number of real life events, which were best expressed in case 
studies. This method was chosen to represent the data-set because case studies 
‘offer a detailed examination of a particular event that commonly includes 
interviews, documents and records’ (Wellington & Szczerbinski 2007, p. 100). 
Further, they provide descriptions and attach explanations related to human 
actions by looking at specific social phenomenon (Swanborn 2010, p. 13). They 
can therefore assist in answering questions about interactions related to behaviors 
and the ways in which complications and obstacles are addressed (Swanborn 
2010; Wellington & Szczerbinski 2007).  
More specifically, they can ‘use purposive, judgmental or information-oriented 
sampling techniques’ (Kumar 2014, p. 155). According to Peter Swanborn, it is 
necessary to explore one or more cases in order to clarify social relations, 
perceptions, opinions, attitudes and behavior of individuals and groups (Swanborn 
2010, p. 41). During the course of the interviews, all participants, including 
military and civilian personnel, revealed which sites they had visited, or lived on. 
The highest number of trips occurred at Ur, which was followed by Babylon, 
Kish, Uruk and others sites located in both southern and northern Iraq, as 
demonstrated in Table 4.4 which lists sites by highest to lowest visitor numbers. 
Two sites are undocumented in the archaeological record, and therefore do not 
have registered names. Ruins that were visited by personnel in Kirkuk and Najaf 
are simply listed with the name of the city where they are located.     
Table 4.4: Sites visited by coalition military and civilian personnel 
Site Name Number of Visitors 
Ur 11 
Babylon 8 
Kish 4 
Uruk 4 
Borsippa 2 
Eridu 2 
Ghamin 2 
Hatra 2 
Larsa 2 
Ubaid 2 
Agar Quf 1 
Kirkuk (undocumented site) 1 
Najaf (undocumented site) 1 
Nimrud 1 
Samarra 1 
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Although the inclusion of civilian personnel was an important part of the data 
collection, because the concentration was mainly on members of the armed 
forces, a separate chart was composed. The second chart demonstrated that Ur 
and Babylon were only separated by one less visitor, followed by Kish with the 
next highest number of visitors, which is seen in Table 4.5. It was therefore 
determined that case studies could be derived from the sites with the highest 
number of visitors.  
Table 4.5: Sites visited by coalition military personnel only 
Site Name Number of Visitors 
Ur 8 
Babylon  7 
Kish 4 
Hatra  2 
Agar Quf 1 
Borsippa 1 
Kirkuk (undocumented site) 1 
Nimrud 1 
Samarra 1 
Uruk 1 
 
Following Swanborn’s criteria, and the information generated from the 
interviews, the three sites chosen were Ur, Babylon and Kish, all located in 
southern Iraq (Figure 1.6). Because of the number of experiences at each place, 
they fit the design of selecting examples that ‘can provide you with as much 
information as possible to understand the case in its totality’ (Kumar 2014, p. 
155).   
However, it is important to understand that while this form of research can 
provide insightful information, care must be taken to recognise that weaknesses 
also exist. For instance ‘one individual’s reality of a remembered event may differ 
drastically from that of another person’s and the interviewer must be aware of 
this’ (Krauss 2005, p. 760). In addition ‘case studies can also be construed as too 
generalized, therefore the researcher must strive to be objective and examine and 
analyse them based on empirical data’ (Swanborn 2010, p. 137). Yet they also 
allow for an intrinsic and unique examination of issues that can develop into a 
greater understanding of a situation or event. As defined by Flick, case studies are 
useful for illustrating ‘a basically comparative study in order to highlight links 
between the different issues’ (Flick 2015, p. 193). These cautions were 
recognised, and objectivity remained foremost in mind in order to present results 
that were impartial and without conjecture.   
Significance of the Research  
The research undertaken for this thesis is unique in both design and execution. 
Published accounts of first-hand contact between members of the coalition forces 
and Iraqi cultural heritage professionals are rare. The objective of this study is to 
assess and determine the effect of the occupation on the Iraqi cultural heritage 
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community. Because Iraq has been a difficult place for non-Iraqis to visit for 
more than thirty years, this thesis provides empirical insight and information not 
obtainable elsewhere. The personal experiences of the individuals who were 
interviewed were able to provide invaluable primary information about cross-
cultural contact that has not been previously recorded. This study also afforded 
participants the opportunity to reflect and discuss past events, and the emotional 
responses that were generated from those events, in a non-threatening 
environment.  
A project such as this has not been previously attempted, so it is innovative in its 
scope. The proposed outcome is the creation of a list of recommendations that can 
provide a model of best practice for implementing conflict planning structures for 
Western militaries who come into contact with archaeological sites in foreign 
lands. In addition to providing guidance to governmental agencies, it is also 
expected to assist in future research endeavours for academic projects, as well as 
international public and private organizations who have a vested interest in 
cultural heritage matters during times of war and peace. As further global 
conflicts loom, Western contact with Eastern cultures and their heritage sites is 
inevitable, and should be a concern for governmental and civilian agencies.   
Ethical Considerations 
This research project required a high-risk ethics consent, which was granted by 
Deakin University’s Human Research Ethics Committee after meeting their 
criteria. As part of the approval, the Ethics Committee was guaranteed that every 
participant in the study was ensured that his/her contribution in the research was 
entirely voluntary and confidential, and that he/she would be allowed to decline to 
continue with the interview process at any time. These steps were closely 
followed before and during each interview. They were not started until the 
participant gave his/her permission to do so. Each individual was reassured that 
his/her identity would remain strictly confidential and would not be shared or 
made available to other researchers or institutions. In addition, participant names 
are non-identifiable to other researchers, the public, or revealed in any capacity 
within the thesis. Rather, they are solely identified by codes in the form of their 
interview numbers, as highlighted above, and as listed in Appendix VI.  
Because of the feasibility of the subject matter generating strong emotional 
reactions from the participants, each subject was assured that he/she could stop 
the interview at any time for a short period, or end it altogether. Conversations 
were audio recorded only; visual imagery was not used. As outlined by the Ethics 
Committee, all audio recordings of the interviews, and subsequent electronic 
transcriptions, have been stored on a Deakin University password protected 
desktop computer. Back-up copies are stored on a secure external hard drive, 
which has been warehoused in a locked cabinet in the PhD office at Deakin 
University. The password protected computer is backed up by the university on a 
daily basis, and all the data is available electronically if any physical copies are 
damaged. In addition, the committee was notified that the PhD candidate worked 
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in Iraq between 2005 and 2013, and had professional contact with some of the 
participants during that time. However, all relationships were maintained at 
professional levels before, during, and after the interviews, and any future contact 
or projects were guaranteed to be completely separate from this research.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the methodology that was implemented in order to 
cover the key topics in regards to coalition site occupation. The sampling method 
resulted in an adequate number of Western interviews, but due to the 
advancement of ISIS into Iraq, the local population is poorly represented. The 
manner in which interviews were conducted, that is the use of open-ended 
questions, allowed for each individual to confidentially discuss his or her 
experiences and opinions during the in-depth interview process. The information 
from the analysed transcriptions was combined with archival textual material, 
which resulted in case studies that fully discuss three archaeological sites that 
were used as military bases during the war in Iraq.  
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Chapter 5: The Occupation of Ur   
		
Introduction  
This chapter focuses on examining Western control of the archaeological site of 
Ur. A brief history of the city is first provided, followed by a section that looks at 
early twentieth century primary accounts collected from journalists, military 
personnel and diplomats. The site’s theological relevance, excavations, and 
British military occupation pre and post WWI are reviewed. However, the manner 
in which the site and the local population were referenced in published material is 
the main concentration. Archival research revealed that negative depictions of 
Arabs were prevalent across several disciplines, and the ruins of Ur were 
endangered during several armed conflicts. Comments about these topics are 
presented as brief background information in order to understand the occupation 
throughout the 2003 war in Iraq.  
The key question of this thesis, which aims to determine if the occupation of 
ancient sites was driven by Orientalist biases, was investigated. The information 
necessary to provide answers to this query was gathered from coalition personnel 
who visited, or were near Ur. They openly discussed the interactions they had 
with the regional specialists, their visits to the site, as well as the pre-deployment 
training they received. The analysed interviews highlighted that religious dogma 
was strongly associated with Ur, while notions of maintaining control over it were 
expressed as unavoidable circumstances due to the war. The most common factor 
was the nominal education provided to the troops in relation to cultural heritage 
issues. The interpretations of cultural differences, the use of the site, and cross-
cultural contacts are all discussed to determine if there was a demonstration of 
ownership, power and control as it relates to Orientalist tendencies.         
A Brief History of Ur 
The ancient city of Ur, also known as modern Tell el-Mukayyar, is located in the 
Dhi Qar Province of southern Iraq, approximately 300 km southeast of Baghdad 
and 20 km southwest of the city of Nasiriya. According to the analysis of 
archaeological remains, the ancient site hosted several diverse cultures for almost 
4,000 years. Excavated pottery date its early occupation to the Ubaid Period, 
when some of the first farming communities settled in the Euphrates River region 
approximately 8,000 years ago. The city was a major ceremonial and commercial 
centre between the Early and Third Dynastic Periods. During this time, elaborate 
burials took place, and the monumental Ziggurat of Ur Nammu, a pyramidal-
shaped terraced mud-brick tower, was constructed (Woolley 1928b, 1929, 1930). 
King Ur Nammu, builder of the ziggurat, was also the first king to inscribe law 
codes on clay tablets, which were created some 300 years before the better known 
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (Diamond 1957; Lloyd 1960; Wiseman 1962).  
Ur was ruled by a diverse series of kings and conquerors overs the years, 
including the Akkadian King, Sargon the Great, who sacked the city between the 
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Early Dynastic Periods, and who was succeeded by Kassite and Babylonian 
invaders. The city suffered varying degrees of damages and destruction during 
times of conquest, but also periods of rebuilding and refurbishments during the 
reigns of different kings. The last major reconstructions took place in the sixth 
century BC under the direction of Nabonidus, the last Babylonian king (Haywood 
2005; Leick 2002; Roux 1992). Habitation ceased by about 500 BC due to the 
migration of the Euphrates several kilometres south of the ancient city, which left 
the population without its main water supply. Desert sands consumed the 
abandoned metropolis, which laid buried for more than 2,000 years until Western 
explorers began mapping and unearthing the site in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries (Hall 1930b; Leick 2002; Roux 1992).  
Explorers and Excavators    
As discussed in Chapter 2, modern Western explorers often approached ancient 
sites with the intent to locate archaeological evidence in order to connect names 
of individuals and cities with books in the Old Testament. Ur was one of those 
sites, as it was thought to be the homeland of the patriarchal figure of Abraham 
(Fenollós 2011; Matthews 2003). Eighteenth century cartographers suggested the 
ruins were Biblical Ur, but it was not until the British Vice Consul, J.E. Taylor, 
began work in 1853 and discovered inscribed foundation-cylinders, that it was 
identified as Ur of the Chaldees (Hall 1930b; Loftus 1857; Taylor 1855; Woolley 
1950). The initial excavations only lasted one season, when much of the ziggurat 
was exposed. They were not resumed until after WWI, when, as British 
archaeologist and military captain H.R. Hall stated ‘by the fortune of war, 
Mesopotamia fell into British hands’ (Hall 1930b, p. vii). He was referring to the 
post-war division of the Ottoman Empire provinces or vilayets, into Allied-
controlled Arab States, which placed the newly formed Iraq under British control 
(Silverfarb & Khadduri 1986; Simon & Tejirian 2005).  
One of the results of British authority over Iraq was that numerous ancient ruins 
were easily accessible by Western scholars. One of those was Assyriologist 
turned soldier, Captain R. Campbell Thompson. He served in the British Civil 
Service Commission, the entity that regulated archaeological site management 
throughout the country. Thompson was under the orders of the War Office, on 
behalf of the British Museum, to excavate the region in 1918 (Thompson 1920, p. 
101). He did not note the presence of British troops at Ur, but stated that they 
were ‘within the protected area of Nasiriya’ (Thompson 1920, p. 102). 
Thompson’s reports focused on object descriptions rather than personal 
interactions. However, he did state that a soldier was assigned as his personal 
guard during the course of his excavations (Thompson 1920, p. 103). H.R. Hall 
was Thompson’s successor. He conducted excavations for three months in 1919, 
during which time he exposed more of the ziggurat, as well as the surrounding 
temenos, or the official province of the city (Hall 1930a).   
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Hall employed local tribal members and Turkish prisoners of war to serve as 
excavators, and when he described his workforce, it was to compare them with 
animals. He described ‘Arabs always reminded me of birds, the Turks of some 
heavy rodent’ (Hall 1930b, p. 131). Similar metaphors were not given to the 
British military forces who were his assigned security guards. Instead, in a report 
compiled for the British Museum, he expounded that ‘The arrival of an 
archaeologist who required a guard for himself and his workmen was a new 
complication, but it was met with goodwill, and Ur soon became a regular outpost 
of the garrison’ (Hall 1930b, p. 73). This marked the beginning of a long 
continuation of occupation by both foreign and domestic troops. Hall did not 
disclose if the ruins were damaged by the garrison, or their exact location on the 
site. He did however mention that officers regularly took inscribed bricks from 
the site, possibly due to their Biblical lure (Hall 1930b, p. 106).  
More than two years after Hall’s departure, Charles Leonard Woolley resumed 
excavations in 1922. This was once again on behalf of the British Museum, who 
had by this time partnered with the University of Pennsylvania Museum of 
Archaeology and Anthropology (Penn Museum) in the US. Woolley supervised 
the excavations for twelve consecutive seasons (Woolley 1950). All matters 
related to the archaeological remains uncovered at the site were mandated by 
British authorities for the duration of the work, and managed by a succession of 
Western heritage specialists (Bernhardsson 2005). While Woolley’s endeavours 
were largely scientific, he did connect the site to the Biblical figure of Abraham, 
most notably when he labelled one of his grid maps The City of Ur in the Time of 
Abraham 2100-1990 BC (Woolley 1930, p. XXXIII). In addition to the 
theological narrative, he also referenced the discovery of foundation-cylinders 
that identified the site as Ur of the Chaldees, and attributed a series of Old 
Babylonian housing foundations to the authentic home of Abraham (Woolley 
1950; Woolley & Mallowan 1976).  
However, not all scholars were convinced of Ur’s link to the Genesis narrative. 
Hall stated that ‘there is nothing from Ur that can be brought into any kind of 
definite relationship with the Abrahamic saga’ (Hall 1930b, p. 103). Stronger 
doubt has also been voiced by more contemporary scholars such as Molly 
Meinhardt, Alan Millard, H.W.F. Saggs, and Hershel Shanks (Meinhardt 2000; 
Millard 2001; Saggs 1960; Shanks 2000). One of the main arguments against 
confirming its Biblical status are suggestions that Abraham’s homeland was 
located in either Turkey or Syria (Shanks 2000, p. 67). However, Woolley did not 
only concentrate on a religious discourse during his excavations. He consistently 
referenced King Ur Nammu and the king’s ziggurat, the structure that has 
remained as the most prominent feature on the site (Woolley 1925, 1939, 1950). 
However, it is interesting to note that a Judeo-Christian Biblical figure, rather 
than a Sumerian king, has remained strongly associated with the site, as 
evidenced by interviews conducted for this thesis and which are discussed later in 
this chapter.  
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Although Thompson and Hall had stated that British troops were stationed near 
Ur during the war, Woolley did not describe any remnants of their base, or if they 
were present during the course of his excavations. In an article written for 
National Geographic Magazine, he recalled an incident that occurred during his 
first season when the camp was robbed by locals, after which a tribal sheik 
provided him with guards (Woolley 1928a, p. 221). This is an indication that the 
military was no longer stationed at Ur, and certainly not guarding Woolley or his 
team. It can therefore be surmised that they departed the Dhi Qar Province in the 
early days of British troop withdrawal, in either 1920 or 1921. The British 
Government however still maintained three air force bases in Iraq during that 
time. One in Basra, another in Mosul, and one located in the Anbar Province 
(Anderson & Stansfield 2004; Silverfarb & Khadduri 1986). Woolley noted that 
Royal Air Force pilots from the Basra base rendered assistance by photographing 
Ur from the air on at least one occasion, as seen in Figure 5.1 (British Museum 
1926; Woolley 1930).   
	
Figure 5.1: Aerial view of the ruins of Ur in 1926 (Photo credit: British Museum 1926, p. 82). 
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Yet, Woolley did not expound on any interactions that may have taken place 
between the military personnel and his team, but he spoke often of his workmen. 
He employed hundreds of local tribesmen as manual labourers, who cleared dirt 
from areas such as the Royal Cemeteries, as seen in Figure 5.2.   
	
Figure 5.2: Local men clearing dirt from the ancient cemetery 
(Photo credit: Woolley 1934b, p. Plate 7). 
He said of them:  
These Mesopotamian Arabs, whose reputation does not as a rule stand 
very high, are industrious, show keenness for the work and an intelligent 
interest in its results, and have developed an esprit de corps which assures 
honesty as well as keenness. I could scarcely wish for a better gang. 
(Woolley 1925, p. 348).   
He did not explain why their reputations were not of high standards, nor did he 
provide further descriptions. However, in another report written almost a decade 
later, he provided a less affable account of the workmen. Woolley wrote:  
It would be absurd to ask for a scientific interest in the work from men so 
ignorant as the Arabs of southern Iraq; they have no historic background, 
not even a tradition that goes back for more than two or three generations, 
and neither names nor dates can mean much to them. (Woolley 1934b, p. 
9). 
British Political Officer Stephen Longrigg held a comparable view. He stated 
‘Archaeological excavations, Iraq’s greatest claim to learned interest at the time, 
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was to Iraqis an ignored or suspect mystery’ (Longrigg 1953, p. 21). In a similar 
view voiced about local understanding of art, T.E. Lawrence was quoted as saying 
‘They are a limited narrow-minded people whose inert intellects lie incuriously 
fallow. Their imaginations are keen but not creative. There is so little Arab art 
today in Asia that they can nearly be said to have no art’ (Lawrence in 
Townshend 2010, p. 50). These attitudes were consistent with viewpoints of 
British military personnel who served during the war. According to Longrigg, 
troops were repelled by the ‘low standards of life, and as they judged it, low types 
of humanity who confronted them’ and it was only diplomats who were afforded 
opportunities to meet ‘the respectable citizens’ (Longrigg 1953, p. 81). Soldiers 
often referred to the Arabs as “Budoos” or a “subhuman sort of Caliban” which 
were negative terms marking them as antagonists to the British protagonists 
(Hammond 2009, p. 97).  
Derision and unfavourable portrayals of the Iraqis persisted well after the war. 
British officers and government officials thought that ‘The urban population was 
not only morally and intellectually defective, it was also sub-standard physically’ 
(Dodge 2003, p. 71). A retired army colonel reflected on the construction of a 
railway line connecting Basra to Nasiriya. He recalled that the military wanted to 
hire locals for the work, but ‘The local Arabs were not keen on any sort of manual 
labour. Even if the pay for it was acceptable, their Mediterranean preference for 
lying in the sun made them unsatisfactory’ (Barker 1967, p. 314). While Longrigg 
further weighed in that ‘The country passed from the nineteenth century little less 
wild and ignorant, as unfitted for self-government, and not less corrupt, than it 
had entered the sixteenth century’ (Longrigg 1925, p. 321).  
However, not all British subjects held the same opinions. Gertrude Bell frequently 
expressed an affinity with the Iraqis. She reminded government officials of ‘The 
amazing quickness of the Arab in adopting himself to new conditions and 
profiting by unexpected opportunities must never be forgotten’ (Bell 1917, p. 9). 
In a letter written to her father in February 1918 in regards to the locals working 
with the British, she stated ‘We have a few really first-class Arab officials, just as 
we have found a few really first-class sheikhs’ (Bell & Bell 1927, p. 362). She 
regularly wrote about her affection for Iraq and the local population, as well as the 
manner in which British officials oftentimes overstated their significance to the 
country. She stated ‘I often wonder whether I am right to stay here. One is so 
much inclined to exaggerate one’s own importance and if I went, no doubt the 
Arab kingdom would wag along, however much I may think it wouldn’t!’ (Bell in 
Burgoyne 1961, p. 249).  
Bell remained loyal to her own government, yet during her tenure as Director of 
Antiquities she also recognised the value of ensuring that some of the most 
important artefacts remained in Iraq. For example, Max Mallowan recounted a 
story in which she travelled to Ur to appraise the excavated objects and divide 
them for distribution between the museums in Iraq, Great Britain and America. A 
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dispute ensued between Bell and Woolley on the fate of a stone statuette of a 
goddess. Woolley requested it be relinquished to him but she insisted that it 
belonged in Iraq. Bell eventually won the argument and took the object to 
Baghdad, much to the chagrin of Woolley (Mallowan 1960). Bell recalled the 
incident in a letter written to her father ‘In my capacity as Director of Antiquities 
I’m an Iraqi official and bound by the terms on which we gave the permit for 
excavation’ (Bell & Bell 1927, p. 554). All the antiquities were subsequently 
divided between the British Museum, the Penn Museum, and the Baghdad 
Antiquities Museum (now the Iraq Museum), which adhered to the antiquities law 
at the time (Woolley 1939; Zettler et al. 1998).   
Woolley’s excavations concluded in 1934 and provided invaluable information 
about the ancient cultures that occupied the site. A few examples of his 
contributions include: conducting the first large-scale scientific excavation in 
Mesopotamia; determining when the pottery wheel came into use by diagnosing 
handmade versus wheel-made pottery; revealing previously unknown funeral 
practices of ancient civilizations, such as mass sacrifices; discovering objects 
indicating trade with people in the Indus Valley; revealing the use of modern 
architecture in the fourth millennium BC; and perhaps most importantly, 
discovering the Ubaid Period, a previously unknown civilization which predated 
the Ancient Egyptians by at least 1,000 years (Leick 2002; Woolley 1925, 1934a, 
1934b).   
Visitors to Ur 
At the close of Woolley’s last season, the site remained in the care of the local 
tribes and Western visitation is not documented. It was not until 1938 that Ur was 
once again visited by another Westerner. That was British journalist Henry 
Morton, wrote that ‘my first feeling when I looked at the Ziggurat of Ur was one 
of genuine pleasure’ (Morton 1938, p. 93). He strongly identified with the 
Biblical stories, and thought highly of the inhabitants of ancient Ur. He reflected:  
We now think of Abraham as the citizen of a culture, highly civilised 
community; he left it to become a sheep farmer and to wander about the 
world, as deliberately as a man today might leave London for Australia or 
New Zealand. (Morton 1938, p. 92).   
Yet, he viewed the modern inhabitants less favourably. Morton described a 
moment during his visit when he ‘heard whispering on the other side of a wall’ 
and saw two Iraqi site guards. He said of them ‘superstition runs in their blood, I 
think they must often feel unprotected as they prowl the ruins’ (Morton 1938, p. 
96). Further, he recalled a picnic with local Iraqis and British officials at the ruins, 
noting:   
It was odd to think they were of the same race, or even the same century. 
In all these countries which have been administered by European 
mandates, I sometimes wonder whether this class will succeed in 
educating its peasantry, or whether someday the intelligentsia will go 
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under and the people relapse into their natural chaos. (Morton 1938, p. 
101).   
WWII halted the potential for additional excavations or visits, and Longrigg noted 
that British troops ‘met slight opposition at Ur’ in late-May/early-June 1941 
(Longrigg 1953, p. 298). This indicated that the ruins were once again used by the 
military to some extent, yet he did not provide further details. References to Ur 
were absent from the public record until the mid-1950s, when the region was 
explored by two British journalists who published an account of their visit to the 
site. Just as travellers had before them, they reflected on the theological relevance 
of the ruins:  
What we can find in Ur is a city which existed at the time of the Bible said 
it did, and from this city it is very possible that the first monotheist set-out 
with the semi-nomadic Hebrews on their trek towards the Mediterranean. 
(Stewart & Haylock 1956, p. 136).  
Upon describing the ziggurat, they wrote ‘Abraham must have worshipped at this 
shrine’ (Stewart & Haylock 1956, p. 138). While these travellers did not provide 
negative assessments of the Iraqi population, they recalled meeting a German 
visitor who stated ‘I hate the Arabs, they are dirty, and of course, being Semites, 
incapable of creativity’ (Stewart & Haylock 1956, p. 96). Published stories that 
reflected both a sense of wonder for the ruins of Mesopotamia, while 
simultaneously portraying the Iraqis as antagonists, was common. According to 
Longrigg:    
The world at large finds the Middle East a region of backwardness, 
picturesque perhaps but, as regards the mass of the inhabitants, socially 
retarded as well as poverty-stricken. The prevailing image is that of the 
Arab as a scraggy, nightgown wearing, camel riding nomad. These 
pictures correspond very little to the facts of Middle Eastern life. 
(Longrigg 1970, p. 213).    
He continued to detail how the conquests and catastrophes that started in the later 
Middle Ages, including the Mongol invasion, contributed to the country’s decline, 
which tended to be the window in which the general public viewed the region 
(Longrigg 1970, p. 214). Yet such commentary was made during a period of time 
when major restorations on the ziggurat and surrounding temple were undertaken 
by the Iraqi Antiquities and Heritage Authority (Al Hamdani 2008a; Al Hamdani 
2009; Muhsen 2009). In addition, cultural activities such as the Spring Festival of 
Ur, which honoured the achievements of King Ur Nammu, also took place at the 
ruins (Baram 1983, p. 430). These accomplishments demonstrated that the image 
of the ‘backward’ Arab was misguided, as they were heavily engaged with 
maintaining the site, and involved with the cultural arts.   
However, other events had more negative repercussions. In 1971, while 
conservation projects were in-progress, the Iraqi Air Force constructed an air strip 
and accompanying military installation less than a kilometre from the ziggurat. 
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Ten years later, an Iraqi army unit was encamped approximately 1500 meters 
northeast of the ziggurat, which was within the archaeological boundaries of Ur. 
The army camp remained at the site for 22 years (Al Hamdani 2008a).  
While the Iraqi military base at Ur was constructed under Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, it is unknown why it was placed so near the ruins. It is possible that 
Hussein’s push to align the ancient Mesopotamian past with the 1970s ideology 
of connecting to the Iraqi pre-Islamic history was at fault. This was during a time 
when ‘the Arab-Islamic civilization and Arabism at large were regarded as the 
last incarnation of the new-old Iraqi people’ (Baram 1983 p. 438). That is, 
occupying the lands of the ancients in some way legitimized Hussein’s agenda. 
This followed the idea that modern Iraqis were the ‘cultural heirs and the 
biological descendants of the ancient peoples of Mesopotamia’ (Baram 1994 p. 
304).  On the other hand, it could have also been an act of passive protection, by 
placing troops on the site it was less likely to become a target during times of war. 
However, due to the presence of the Iraqi Armed Forces, Ur did become a target 
during the 1991 First Gulf War. US fighter jets strafed the military positions, as 
well as two Iraqi fighter jets that were parked next to the ziggurat. The action 
resulted in bullet damage to the southern side of the structure. In addition, several 
bombs were dropped near the Iraqi Army camp during the campaign, which 
created large craters within the archaeological footprint of the site (Forsyth 2004; 
Nashef 1992; Schipper 2005). Just a few years later in 1998, Ur was once again 
bombed during the four-day campaign known as Operation Desert Fox. This was 
when US and UK forces targeted research installations, supply depots, and 
military bases across Iraq when Saddam Hussein failed to comply with the UN 
Security Council Resolutions on disarmament (Condron 1999; von Sponeck 
2006). The explosives did not directly damage the ziggurat or standing ruins, 
however it is unknown how the unexcavated areas were impacted (Al Hamdani 
2009; Muhsen 2009).  
Because of the conflicts, foreign travel to and within the country was rare. 
However, the region was depicted in cinema, art and literature, and was therefore 
familiar to a Western audience. Stories and images of the Middle East and its 
inhabitants often promoted the derogatory stereotype of a lazy, untrustworthy 
Arab as the miscreant, or the dark and swarthy terrorist intent on harming the 
pristine Western world (Said 1993; Semmerling 2014; Shaheen 2009). Jack 
Shaheen’s research on the topic discovered that from the earliest silent movies to 
the year 2000, Hollywood projected Arabs as villains in more than 1,000 feature 
films (Shaheen 2009, p. 53). These types of negative images were digested by a 
population who already viewed the region with antipathy, prompted by concerns 
related to the on-going Arab-Israeli Conflict, and the 1973 Oil Crisis in the US 
(Little 2002; Said 2003 [1978]; Semmerling 2014; Yaphe 2006).  
In addition, news coverage portrayed the East as bringing about ‘the destruction 
of the democratic order of the Western world’ (Said 1997, p. 55). In addition, 
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media outlets portrayed Saddam Hussein as a ‘powerful, conceited, 
megalomaniac suffering a penchant for religious fervour and tendency towards 
violence and barbarity, just like past kings and leaders in the region’ (Isakhan 
2010, p. 18). The public was encouraged to see the ‘barbaric savage with the 
white man’s rifle fighting against the noble aims of the United States and Britain’ 
(Seymour 2004, p. 357). The 2003 war was approached in similar fashion, and 
troops were deployed to Iraq with these types of preconceived ideologies 
entrenched within their cultural norms.    
The 2003 Iraq War and Ur 
Coalition forces seized the existing Iraqi base near Ur in April 2003, established 
operations, and named it Camp Adder/Ali Air Base, which eventually became 
known as Tallil Air Base. A fence and checkpoints were erected around the 
perimeter, which incorporated the ruins as well as a single paved road that 
extended from the ziggurat, along the border of Woolley’s excavations, and into 
the military installation. This allowed anyone on the base access to Ur, and 
because it became part of Tallil Air Base, people outside the fence line were 
denied entry unless they were in possession of a US government issued 
identification card.  
In order to accommodate a 5,000 plus person workforce, the living area was 
expanded, which entailed the construction of temporary and permanent buildings, 
water and sanitation facilities, as well as additional roads, all of which encroached 
onto the ruins (Al Hamdani 2008a; Curtis 2009b; Siebrandt 2009). Compared to 
the photo taken in 1926, the modern structures are less than a kilometre away 
from the ruins, as seen in Figure 5.3. 
	
Figure 5.3: The ruins dominated by the Ziggurat of Ur Nammu, less than a kilometre north of 
Tallil Air Base, which is visible on the horizon. 
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These actions were in violation of Article 4.1 of the 1954 Hague Convention, 
which calls for the respect of cultural property. It states: 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property 
situated within their own territory as well as within the territory of other 
High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its 
immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for 
purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the 
event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility, 
directed against such property. (UNESCO 1954). 
In addition, Article 15 in the Iraq Antiquities and Heritage Law was also 
disregarded. It prohibits trespassing, building, altering, polluting, damaging, or 
otherwise harming an archaeological site (MOC 2002). Because Ur was listed on 
the Iraqi register, the occupation also violated Section 402 of the US National 
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA 1980). However, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
coalition compliance was not required once the site became US property (Varner 
2011). Yet, beyond the cultural heritage laws, military personnel did not consult 
nor contact any Iraqi heritage specialists upon their arrival. Local archaeologists 
admonished the occupation that degraded the educational and scientific value of 
the site, but just as significant, they were indignant that the troops were in fact 
trespassing (Al Hamdani 2008a, p. 154). However, because interactions between 
members of the coalition and the Iraqis were minimal, the troops did not 
understand how their actions were viewed. As noted by one of the interview 
participants who visited Ur in 2010:  
I didn’t have a problem with the ruins being part of the base. It was 
probably a good thing since it kept some would be looters out of there. I 
think all in all it was better that the US installation was there. I thought it 
was a positive thing, and I believe the base had already been established 
by the time we got there. (Interview 23).     
A US Air Force pilot who flew on missions from the air base during a 2008 
deployment stated:   
I don’t know what went into the decisions to put the base there and do the 
expansion. It seemed to me there was a fair amount of distance between 
the base and the ziggurat. Now I don’t know really where the lands start 
and end. But I do know on the other side of the base, we could not have 
gotten any closer to Nasiriya than we did, because that’s where the threats 
were coming from. (Interview 29).  
This echoed a statement made by Interviewee 30, who commented on the 
inclusion of Ur within the fence line as ‘I would assume it had something to do 
with force protection’ (Interview 30). Interviewee 22 added ‘People making those 
decisions, it wasn’t high on their priority list to address base placement on ancient 
ruins’ (Interview 22). While Interviewee 20 explained:       
Military necessity is one thing, but it’s hard to justify military necessity 
for a major FOB [Forward Operating Base] or a major base on a site. If we 
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want a more culturally savvy military, we just need a staff advisor at the 
battalion level who can tell the commander what an archaeological site 
looks like and say ‘hey maybe you shouldn’t go there,’ but that probably 
won’t ever happen. (Interview 20). 
Another service member who was based at Tallil in 2005 stated:   
We should have people check out locations for historical sites before 
setting up a tent if we can, just in case we discover something that 
professionals should study. I think we owe it to them. I think it’s part of 
nation building, but I don’t know if we were doing that in Iraq. (Interview 
26).  
Both subjects were however referring to Western professionals, as was 
Interviewee 30 who revealed that there were no cultural heritage or subject matter 
experts available to assist with the decision-making processes about where 
operations would be set-up. He thought that ‘a system should have been in place 
in order to consider the historical significance of the site’ (Interview 30). Article 
9.2 in the Second Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict states that any work executed on cultural 
property must be conducted in close cooperation with the national authorities of 
the occupied territory (UNESCO 1999). This was not done at Ur, even though 
there appeared to be awareness that their presence had potential to cause harm. 
Per Interviewee 1 ‘The commanders in the field, the lieutenant colonels and 
colonels, they are only interested in doing something as a career move, they want 
high visibility missions, and protecting cultural heritage is not in that category’ 
(Interview 1). 
Cross-Cultural Interactions  
Issues related to physical damages at Ur were a concern for the interview 
participants. They all understood how the occupation was detrimental to the 
scientific integrity of the site, however, the effect it had on the local population 
was addressed less frequently. During the course of the interviews, only two 
interviewees discussed the issue of the Iraqis not being able to readily gain access 
to the site. Both were sympathetic to the issue, but they also pointed out that it 
was an unfortunate result of the war. Interviewee 23 stated:  
I can feel the Iraqis frustration to not be able to go where they want to go, 
especially to something like Ur, it being a national treasure. But, it’s the 
situation, there’s a war going on and you have to maintain a certain level 
of security. (Interview 23).  
In addition, reservations about interacting with the Iraqis were voiced by some of 
the study participants. According to Interviewee 6:       
I don’t want to say I bought into the stereotype that all Muslims were 
terrorists, but because of the unfamiliarity with their culture and being in a 
war-like environment, it caused a little bit of angst. There was a fear factor 
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there, you never knew who was going to be a suicide bomber. (Interview 
6).  
Interviewee 3 had a similar reflection. He recalled that ‘I was very on-guard and 
not trusting of Iraqis, Arabs in general, Muslims I guess. I always wanted to know 
where my weapon was, so I was on the offense all the time’ (Interview 3). 
Interviewee 27 elaborated on his experience: 
When I was with the marines we worked with the Iraqi police, we went on 
patrol with them sometimes but they didn’t want to go out on patrol, they 
just wanted to stay in the station because they would get paid either way. 
By American standards we would say they are very lazy. But by Iraqi 
standards that’s just their life. They didn’t want to go on patrol or go to 
training classes, and when it was time to fight, their attitude was, ‘Allah 
will give me the guidance, Allah will guide my bullets, and whatever is 
going to happen is in Allah’s hands.’ That’s the kind of mentality they 
have. There’s no training, and your rank is determined by your status in 
the community and how much money your family has. The colonels and 
generals, once you pick up that high rank, it belongs to your family, so 
when a general dies, his cousin takes over even if he doesn’t have any 
military experience. It’s all messed up over there. We would have to be 
there for a lifetime to unscrew it. (Interview 27).   
Another soldier recalled ‘in 2003 we were trying to figure things out, there was a 
lot of suspicion on our part, like who the good guy was and who the bad guy was’ 
(Interview 25). The conflict environment was also flagged as troublesome, as 
remembered by a member of the coalition who served in 2010. He said:    
What I found difficult was being on-guard one hundred fifty per cent of 
the time every day. When we were at an Iraqi building during a meeting, it 
was always in the back of my mind that we could get blown up by a rocket 
or a suicide bomber. I was always checking my surroundings. (Interview 
21).   
Interview 30 described his experiences during his tour of duty as:   
Trying to engage with Iraqis was difficult at best. We had human 
intelligence teams in the area to determine who was legitimate and who 
was not, but it was challenging. We had to make some gross assumptions 
on who to trust and who not to trust. (Interview 30).  
The types of mistrust expressed by the interviewees was manifested in the 
restrictions placed on Iraqis wishing to gain entry to cultural heritage sites. One of 
the Iraqi archaeologists in the Dhi Qar Province recalled his attempts to connect 
with the troops in 2003, pointing out:  
We heard the US Marines were living at the Nasiriya Museum. I went to 
check the museum, but the marine at the door wouldn’t let me in. I tried to 
tell him I worked there but he didn’t understand me, he was scared. 
(Interview 16).  
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In 2007 John Curtis and Abbas al-Husseini, then director of the Iraqi State Board 
of Antiquities and Heritage, attempted to gain access to Ur in order to conduct a 
damage assessment. Curtis said of that encounter:     
The site is incorporated within the perimeter fence surrounding Tallil 
Airbase, so all access to the site is controlled by US forces. When Dr al-
Husseini arrived at the main gate, after having driven down especially 
from Baghdad, he refused to be searched and was therefore denied access. 
His entirely reasonable argument was that, as Director of Antiquities, he 
had responsibility for all archaeological sites in Iraq and should have 
unrestricted access to them. The stand-off lasted several hours, but Dr al-
Husseini’s protests were to no avail and he was unable to enter the site. 
(Curtis 2009b, p. 4).   
Because neither Curtis nor al-Husseini were in possession of an approved US 
Government identification card, they were required to submit to a search of their 
vehicle and person, directives that adhered to base protocols (The White House 
2004). Technically this complied with Article 15 of the 1954 Convention, which 
mandates that local cultural heritage experts be allowed to carry out their duties 
on property that has fallen into the opposing Party’s hands, as far as it is 
consistent with the interests of security (UNESCO 1954). Yet ‘the interests of 
security’ is not defined and is therefore open to individual interpretation.  
Site Visits  
The restrictions imposed on the Iraqis did not however apply to coalition 
personnel who regularly visited the ruins (Al Hamdani 2008a; Rush 2010a).  For 
example, Interviewee 23 recalled: 
One of my agents had been in Iraq at the beginning of the war and he told 
me he was with the Air Force Special Police, and they had actually 
camped out on top of the ziggurat one night as they were doing patrols. So 
they had a bit of a free rein there. I suppose people are likely to pick up 
stuff and put it in their pocket and walk away, but I think it was still good 
to have some sort of policing action by the US military. (Interview 23).  
Similarly, in an article written for the journal Archaeology, a soldier reflected on 
his visit in May 2008. He wrote ‘At most tourist sites, you have to wait in line, 
purchase a ticket, and see things under the supervision of custodians and docents. 
But in Ur we were free to wander and enjoy a few rare moments of peace’ (Taylor 
2011, p. 48). A British officer remembered his 2007 visit:  
I was reminded of the Biblical story where Abraham took his son to the 
summit of a mountain to sacrifice him to God. The sensation of being in 
touch with history, and more importantly a part of history which is so 
woven into Western culture, was all-pervasive. (Knight 2013, p. 36).  
Such self-guided visits were problematic, but reportedly infrequent. This was 
mainly attributed to the presence of the site curator, Dnaife Muhsen. While entry 
restrictions were maintained for all Iraqis who lived outside of the site, Muhsen 
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and his family were exempted from the regulation. Muhsen’s grandfather was a 
member of Woolley’s excavation crew, and since the 1920s, the family had been 
living in a series of houses and outbuildings located next to the ziggurat. The 
structures were incorporated within the 2003 military fence line, and despite the 
occupation of the site, Muhsen welcomed visitors from the base and provided 
tours for coalition personnel.  
During each visit, he gave a descriptive history of the ancient city, but more 
importantly, promoted cross-cultural awareness on a scale unfamiliar to most 
soldiers. Coalition troops reported minimal daily interactions with Iraqis, either 
due to limitations from leaving the base, or contact being restricted to patrol based 
activities. As stated by Interviewee 27 ‘A lot of Iraqis were afraid, even if they 
did like us, they were afraid to show it because someone could accuse them of 
being sympathizers or something, so they were very standoffish’ (Interview 27). 
An Iraqi who worked directly with coalition forces voiced a similar opinion. She 
said ‘Many of the Iraqis had hatred and anger in their eyes towards us, but mainly 
towards me for working with the Americans’ (Interview 18).  
In spite of the risks involved with interacting with the military, Muhsen provided 
daily and sometimes multiple tours a day as seen in Figure 5.4. He bridged a wide 
gap of cross-cultural misunderstanding by serving as a positive contact for the 
troops. The visits were arranged through the military’s support service unit, or the 
Moral, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) program, which regularly advertised the 
availability for 30 personnel to tour the site with the base chaplains, who served 
as ad hoc liaisons between Muhsen and the visitors (Shiloh 2009). The 
interactions were all remembered as favourable, such as Interviewee 3 who 
observed ‘I could tell the caretaker definitely cared about what he was doing’ 
(Interview 3).  
	
Figure 5.4: Dnife Muhsen guided tours and discussed the history of Ur for US military troops. 
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A service member who toured the site in 2008 recalled:  
He was really making his livelihood from American troops being there, 
we would give him a bit of cash after the tours. But he really wanted to 
impress on us the importance of the place and he was the only one doing 
this and the importance to world history and that they were able to 
maintain the site as best as they could. He told us a little bit about Saddam 
Hussein in the First Gulf War having parked jets near the ziggurat so that 
the US wouldn’t attack it. I would say the interactions were positive 
because he was happy to host us and tell us the stories about the site, and 
he seemed thankful that we wouldn’t attack the historical sites. (Interview 
29).  
While Interviewee 23 reflected:  
It was like you were looking at it through a movie, you can’t believe 
you’re there where so many people through the thousands of years had 
been. On the flipside, it was pretty disappointing that it wasn’t taken care 
of, it would be nice if experts were allowed to go there and do some 
scientific, investigative studies of the area. (Interview 23). 
Interviewee 22 worked at Tallil Air Base, but was unable to visit the site:  
I didn’t get to Ur, but it was surreal to see the ziggurat outside our office 
window. When I got there, they were doing tours through the MWR. I was 
interested in it but I was brand new to the unit so I couldn’t immediately 
take time off to take a tour. But within a month or two of me getting there 
the Iraqi Ministry made a decision that the soldiers couldn’t come over 
there for tours, you needed a particular reason to go. So I missed out on 
that opportunity. For the troops that did get to go, I liked the idea that 
people had the opportunity to have a connection to the ancient history of 
the place, just like at any ancient site, but I will admit it made me nervous, 
wondering how well it was managed. (Interview 22). 
The soldiers quoted above were referring to Western experts, rather than locals, as 
their understanding of site preservation was based on an American viewpoint. 
This Occidental focus was also evident in their initial knowledge of the ancient 
cultures associated with Ur. All were familiar with Abraham’s connection to the 
site, yet none of them had previously heard of the Sumerian King, Ur Nammu. 
For example, Interviewee 32 recalled ‘I only knew about Iraq in a basic way, that 
it was one of the great civilizations of the past. I remember studying about 
Mesopotamia and I read the Bible at the time of my deployment, which mentions 
Iraq’ (Interview 32). Interviewee 6 said:   
I was raised as a Southern Baptist, and Abraham’s a big Biblical figure for 
us. I’m not a Bible thumper and don’t know it backwards and forwards, 
but I knew Ur had some significance to Christian culture. I guess Abraham 
is significant in the Muslim culture too, I don’t think I knew that at the 
time. (Interview 6).  
Another soldier who toured the site with Muhsen in 2005 recalled:  
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If I remember right, the foundation of Abraham’s father’s house was 
original but the walls had been rebuilt under Saddam’s Regime. There was 
a place you could access the top of the walls, so we walked along the 
rebuilt walls of Abraham’s father’s house. The curator was courteous the 
whole time. I loved that site and that visit, I liked the curator from the very 
beginning, and he was more than willing to answer all my questions. I 
come from a Christian background so to put eyes on something you read 
about in the Bible, wow. I just want to say what a feeling of joy I had 
while at Ur, it was a better memory than any combat mission I did. 
(Interview 31). 
Interviewee 20 also discussed the tour he was given of the site, which highlighted 
its Biblical connections. He explained:  
They lead us to the place where there’s an old house, and we were told, 
‘This is Abraham’s house! We know it, this is it! And everyone was like 
oh yeah!’ That was because the military has a very strong Christian 
culture running through it, so most of the people wanted to see that, the 
ziggurat was great, but ‘let’s see Abraham’s house!’ A lot of them had 
brought a Bible that they put on a bookshelf that was in the house and took 
pictures of it. (Interview 20).  
Irrespective of the accuracies or inaccuracies of Ur’s association with the Biblical 
narrative, the theological interpretations promoted by Woolley persisted in the 
imagination of visitors. Although the tours were instilled with the opportunity to 
see ‘Abraham’s house’, the interactions with Muhsen played an important role in 
providing troops with an alternate perspective about the site. Interviewee 6 
equated his visit to well-known monuments in the US. He acknowledged ‘For the 
Iraqis, I would think it would be like our Washington Monument or our Capital 
building, where everyone has to see that before they die and how they want to 
preserve those things’ (Interview 6). Interviewee 20 related a story Muhsen had 
told him about Saddam Hussein trying to appropriate the past by referring to 
himself as Nebuchadnezzar. The soldier was surprised at the anger Muhsen 
expressed towards Hussein for what he said was soiling Iraq’s history. He felt 
informed, admitting ‘I didn’t know people felt that way about their archaeological 
sites’ (Interview 20).  
The situation created a quagmire. The visits afforded opportunities for positive 
interactions between the troops and Muhsen, but an Iraqi cultural heritage site was 
under the control of an occupying power. Thousands of coalition personnel toured 
the ruins, yet the local population was not afforded the same rights. Instead, they 
had to watch the soldiers walk freely across an archaeological site in their own 
county while they were denied access unless given permission by the occupiers 
(Al Hamdani 2008b; Bahrani 2003b; Rush 2013). Yet, the service members who 
were interviewed did not further discuss how their presence hindered the Iraqis 
from fully engaging with the site.  
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Pre-Deployment Training 
The attitudes of the interview participants were often a reflection of the pre-
deployment training they were provided. While they were given instructions on 
how to recognise cultural differences, and were briefed on basic Arabic word 
usage, cultural heritage awareness was not part of their curriculum. One of the 
Iraqi archaeologists observed that, ‘The difficult thing, particularly at Ur in the 
beginning of the war, was that most soldiers knew nothing about the place where 
they were sent’ (Interview 19). Interviewee 28, who was deployed on three 
separate missions recalled:   
The first time there was no cultural awareness training. The second time I 
flew in under the radar so no training then either. The third time it was 
about Iraqi customs, the history of Iraq, the different mixture of Kurds, 
Sunni, Shia, the history between them. They gave us a crash course in 
Islam, the belief system that it has, they gave us a class on the family 
structure and how it’s different than that in the USA or really the Western 
world, the respect they have for elders, also naming conventions and that 
kind of stuff. (Interview 28).  
The lack of cultural heritage immersion was voiced by a member of the coalition 
who visited Ur in 2010. He said ‘Our training was cultural interaction, 
behavioural, what to say, don’t show them the bottom of your shoe, stuff like that, 
but nothing on history or heritage’ (Interview 23). Interviewee 27 was more 
candid. He recalled:   
We had briefings about the area and the culture, customs and courtesies 
and how to address people. I applied it, little things like shake their hand, 
ask about their family, kiss their ass because that’s the way it works in 
Iraq, I kiss your ass, you kiss mine and then we are ready to work 
together. I was able to get into a lot of venues because I did that, shake a 
hand and be nice, but a lot of other guys in my unit were too hard-headed 
to do that. A lot of Americans saw all Muslims as bad guys. (Interview 
27).   
Interviewee 23 also reflected on the training he received, saying:  
We went through the DoS training, a 2-week course that was pretty down 
and dirty. We learned basic Arabic phrases but didn’t dwell too far back 
into the history of Iraq. We hit the more current things in Iraq. The 
instructor was good, he had spent a lot of time in the Middle East and 
spoke Arabic. He tried to convey some of the dos and don’ts and the 
cultural personality of the Iraqis. He did a pretty good job plus he had a 
gentleman from Basra who had migrated to the US and he came in and 
talked to us about the Iraq he grew up in. (Interview 23).  
Interviewee 25, who served two tours of duty in Iraq, relayed a similar experience 
stating:  
There wasn’t any training before the 2003 deployment, but we got some in 
2004. We had professors from Vanderbilt University who came to talk to 
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us, plus there’s a large Kurdish population in Nashville, so we had some 
cultural training from them. So I guess there was an attempt. For our 
second deployment, we knew that we needed to know things we didn’t 
know the first time. (Interview 25).  
Interviewee 6 was only given tactical training. He explained ‘When you get off 
the plane in those countries, they give you a quick cultural what to do, what not to 
do, but nowhere near what’s appropriate. You pick up a lot of that as you go’ 
(Interview 6). Interviewee 26 had a similar experience. He remembered ‘We just 
went there and did our jobs. I guess it’s just implied we don’t go into religious or 
historic sites. If I had seen something historical in my area I would have ordered 
my soldiers to leave it alone’ (Interview 26). Interviewee 31, who was in Iraq 
during the early years of the war summed up his experience:  
I never felt properly trained to operate in the country of Iraq in the 
capacity I was asked to operate. I knew next to nothing. The first thing I 
was told was to grow my moustache out because Iraqis respect men with 
facial hair. They did a poor job of preparing us to go into another country 
we were occupying and to get along with people. They trained us well for 
a full-scale conflict. But we were in a low-intensity conflict where you had 
to build relations with people. (Interview 31).    
Another member of the coalition stated:  
I did the State Department FACT [Foreign Affairs Counter Threat] 
training. One week was classroom work and the second was driving skills 
and stuff like that. The first week they did have limited cultural stuff. It 
wasn’t until I got there that I realized the whole rich history Iraq offers. 
I’m doing a degree right now and majoring in history because I’m really 
interested in history. So for me getting over there to Iraq, well I 
appreciated all the old cultural sites. But I don’t think the Iraqis 
appreciated them. They were more focused on survival, taking care of 
their family before taking care of a thousand year old site. (Interview 15).   
One of the American archaeologists who was eventually able to provide training 
to deploying troops recalled that he was only allowed short allotments of time to 
cover a topic that required in-depth explanation, noting:  
In the beginning, it was hard to get much time assigned for the cultural 
heritage pre-deployment training. I remember at Fort Bliss, where the 
army trains, most of them were going to Iraq. There were times when I 
was only given between 20 and 30 minutes to do all of the training and it 
wasn’t enough time. (Interview 5).   
Another American trainer also commented on the limited amount of time she was 
given to provide instruction, recalling:  
Sometimes we would only get an hour to train, but sometimes we’d get a 
whole day, we took whatever DoD gave us. If we trained at a base we 
would usually get half a day, but if we trained at the Smithsonian we 
would get a whole day. We did that for the Marine Corps Civil-Military 
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Operations School based at Quantico, they came to the museum for a 
whole day. (Interview 13).  
Cooperative Projects 
Despite the advancements in preparation made in the later years of the war, 
cultural heritage awareness training was not afforded to all the troops who were 
based at Ur, including Interviewee 30 and his team. Yet, in May 2008, they were 
able to engage in a project at the request of Muhsen. It entailed constructing an 
archway over the entrance road leading into Ur, as seen in Figure 5.5. Interviewee 
30 and his team were not directly involved in the project. Instead, they funded 
local contractors to implement the project as part of the DoDs CERP project. This 
was the US military initiative administered in Iraq and Afghanistan in order for 
military personnel to positively engage with local communities through sourcing 
projects that would benefit the population (Martins 2005). According to 
Interviewee 30: 
The idea was a low-hanging fruit of opportunity for the local folks to 
come out to us, also a way to give back to the community to an area that 
was clearly of significant and historic value. We didn’t have a historian 
directly attached to us, but what I do know is that there were a number of 
reach-back capabilities that our brigade civil operations team was able to 
reach back to, so they could fully understand the importance of the 
ziggurat and the Abraham excavations. So we were fairly well informed 
and very aware of what we could and could not do in that area. I think this 
is tied in with the PRT, they all came to the conclusion to highlight the 
significance of the site that defines the region and to bring tourism back. It 
was low-cost and the benefit from the local goodwill to just having the 
peace of mind, we were able to do something good to bring back a source 
of pride to the local community. The trigger was supposed to be the 
archway went up and the next thing was that we would start seeing 
tourism on the rise. (Interview 30). 
	
Figure 5.5: Modern archway over the roadway leading into the archaeological site of Ur.  
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Yet unrestricted access to Ur was not available to Iraqis until mid-2009, a year 
after the completion of the project. Therefore it is not known how it was 
beneficial to the Iraqis at the time. Interviewee 30 did not know why the 
restrictions to site access were in place for so long, and as he was deployed home 
shortly after the completion of the project, he was unable to provide further 
details. Additionally, he could not elaborate on the connections the civil affairs 
team made when he mentioned the ‘reach-back’ as he was not part of that team 
nor did he know the personnel who were. While the intention of the project was 
admirable, and was at the request of an Iraqi heritage expert, the site remained 
under the control of coalition forces, and the restrictions continued for Iraqi 
visitation.    
However, 6 years after Ur was occupied, command staff at the base announced 
that the fence would be moved, and the road leading to the site would be 
relinquished to Iraqi control. Prior to the transfer, in April 2009 a joint American-
Iraqi inspection team conducted a site survey in order to document conditions and 
propose potential projects. American participants included DoS and DoD 
personnel who had skillsets derived from cultural heritage and environmental 
backgrounds, while the Iraqi delegation was composed of Muhsen and SBAH 
archaeologists, as seen in Figure 5.6. Overall, the site was found to be suffering 
from deterioration, erosion, and neglect. Conservation efforts initiated by 
Woolley and continued by the Iraq Antiquities Authority in the 1980s contributed 
to collapsed walls and floors. Additionally, the 1991 UN Sanctions prohibited the 
importation of materials and shared knowledge that would have contributed to 
conserving the ruins (Alnasrawi 2001; von Sponeck 2006; Wilke 2008). Lastly, 
the thousands of coalition visitors from Tallil Air Base further accelerated 
deterioration due to high volumes of pedestrian traffic on the ruins, which caused 
impact damage.  
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Figure 5.6: The 2009 site survey team in front of the Ziggurat of Ur Nammu  
(Note that two of the Iraqi participants declined to be in the photo). 
 
The survey was completed while Ur was still under coalition control, and with the 
exception of Muhsen, all the Iraqis were required to submit to a search at the 
checkpoint each day. Irrespective of that, one of the archaeologists who was part 
of the team reflected on his participation thus:    
The survey was very important to us, we went over the site piece by piece 
to look for damages. Taking photos, describing the site, and that was the 
first time an intensive survey of Ur was done to evaluate the features and 
the site. It was very important and useful for future work at the site. 
Whenever I need information for my work I go back to the report and use 
that info. For me it was important to work as a team. It was the first step to 
give the city back to the SBAH. I still remember those many days we 
spent together. The cultural bridge was important. We forgot the political 
issues, the military issues, we put them behind us and we worked together 
for scientific issues. That was a great way to bridge the gap, to use cultural 
issues to connect the scientific, humanitarian and cultural issues. We put 
everything aside and worked as a team. We didn’t ask each other what our 
ideas or thoughts were, we just worked as a scientific team. Ur was more 
important than religion, or political issues, or anything like that. I believe 
we worked very well together, and we appreciated each other, and the 
resulting report shows that. (Interview 16).   
One of the other Iraqi archaeologists said ‘The soldiers came to Iraq to fight, not 
guard archaeological sites, but when they realized the importance of Ur, they 
cooperated with us to move the fence line’ (Interview 19). By the time of the turn-
over on 23 April 2009, the US military had erected guard towers and living 
trailers for Iraqi forces who were hired by SBAH to maintain 24-hour protection. 
Further, as a result of recommendations noted in the survey, CERP funding was 
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used to construct wooden sidewalks and shade shelters along the most travelled 
tourist paths, as seen in Figure 5.7. According to Interviewee 16, this resulted in 
increased local visitation (Interview 16).  
	
Figure 5.7: Wooden sidewalk and shade shelter in front of E-Dub-Lal-Mah Temple. 
All coalition personnel withdrew from Tallil Air Base in mid-December 2011, at 
which time the Iraqi Air Force took over, renamed it Imam Ali Air Base, and 
assumed full control of the area. By 2013, after almost 8 decades of scientific 
inactivity, Iraqi archaeologists once again commenced excavations at Ur. 
Although the Iraqis were back in charge, the Western legacy on the site remained. 
Interviewee 16 stated that the team began to re-examine the area surrounding the 
ziggurat and tombs. He said:  
The archaeologists are digging at the royal tombs right now looking for 
small artefacts like cylinder seals, because that’s not what Woolley was 
looking when he was digging there, so he probably missed things. He 
wanted to find the gold from the tombs, but that was normal at that time. 
(Interview 16).   
In July 2016, Ur was inscribed on the UNESCO world heritage list as part of, The 
Ahwar of Southern Iraq: Refuge of Biodiversity and the Relict Landscape of the 
Mesopotamian Cities, under the new category of mixed natural and cultural sites. 
Ur’s universal value was cited as ‘The remains offer a complete testimony to the 
growth and achievements of southern Mesopotamia urban centres and society’s, 
and to their outstanding contributions to the history of the Near East and mankind 
as a whole’ (The Republic of Iraq 2014, p. 8). The inclusion into the list further 
demonstrates the significance of the site to both the Iraqi cultural heritage 
community, as well as the world stage.   
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Discussion  
It would be impossible and misguided to completely erase the past Western 
interaction and influence on the site of Ur. As just one example, Woolley’s 
excavations at Ur and his subsequent contributions to knowledge greatly 
advanced the understanding of ancient Mesopotamian cultures. However, many of 
the initial accomplishments of the early twentieth century archaeologists also 
ensured that the history analogous with the ruins was driven by a strong Biblical 
association. This created a sense of entitlement to the Europeans who were the 
decision-makers about the use of the ruins and the distribution of its excavated 
artefacts. Without local input, the fate of the site was solely within the purview of 
British and American institutions. As discussed in Chapter 2, such relationships 
can be seen to adhere to Said’s second ‘principle dogma’ of Orientalism that 
‘abstractions about the Orient, particularly those based on texts representing a 
classical Oriental civilization, are always preferable to direct evidence drawn 
from modern Oriental realities’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 300).           
Although the soldiers who were deployed to Iraq starting in 2003 were not 
specifically familiar with the published accounts of the early excavations, the 
majority of them identified with the stories of Abraham. This translated into 
feelings of connection to the site. While this affinity was not necessarily a 
negative reaction, it did highlight the fact that theological relevance took 
precedence over the Sumerian characters. This notion was further solidified when 
the army chaplains served as de facto authorities for interactions between Muhsen 
and the troops. However, the tours were Iraqi led, which included explanations of 
the extensive history of Ur. Yet the lasting impression from the troops was that 
they had walked in the footsteps of the Patriarchal Age, with minimal 
consideration given to the Sumerian kings.    
In addition, foreign military involvement followed a pattern of imperialism that 
started with the WWI garrison that had been based on the ruins. Because of its 
strategic placement in antiquity, the site was an attractive location in modern 
warfare. This was further demonstrated when the Iraqi armed forces also chose it 
to house both air and ground troops. While it should be remembered that the 2003 
Tallil Air Base was established on an existing Iraqi installation, this did not fully 
exonerate the coalition’s use of the ruins. The air strip, numerous buildings, and 
location offered an attractive and strategic setting; it was therefore occupation out 
of convenience. The erection of the fence around the site was justified because it 
afforded protection from looters. While this was accurate, the fence also barred 
Iraqi archaeologists and the general population from entry, which hindered 
attempts for positive engagements. The coalition effectively walled themselves in 
from the surrounding province, sending a message of power and control. One of 
the factors involved in this decision that must be considered was the war 
environment itself. It created mistrust, despite the fact that the greater population 
were not combatants. The situation was further complicated due to the historical 
cross-cultural contact with British and American personnel based mainly on 
hostilities and past colonial occupation. 
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International and local cultural heritage laws were disregarded when the 
installation was constructed near an archaeological site. However, the individuals 
responsible for making those decisions were not interviewed, so their reasons for 
doing so cannot be stated unconditionally. For members of the coalition who lived 
on or visited the site, Orientalist assumptions prevented them from realising the 
occupation was perceived negatively. This included some of their suggestions for 
Western experts to help mitigate damages. Such attitudes were similar to how the 
site was managed in the early twentieth century, with the monopoly of 
pronouncements about the site being made by an occupying power. Both 
situations echoed Said’s observation of the long history of Occidental cultures 
feeling they have an ‘executive responsibility towards the coloured races’ (Said 
2003 [1978], p. 226). Coalition management of the site replicated the imperial 
cycle of the past.    
This was further manifested through the projects delegated for the site. These 
were implemented as a means to positively engage with the local population, and 
were admirable in their intent. Yet, due to the restrictions placed on the Iraqis 
entering the base, the projects were directed and controlled by coalition personnel. 
However, the engagement that did occur demonstrated that cross-cultural 
cooperation was feasible, which was an encouraging development.  
This was also noted in the manner in which the coalition personnel spoke about 
the Iraqis they had contact with. While many offered praise of Muhsen and his 
deep knowledge and guided tours of Ur, other interactions were remembered less 
fondly. Although none of the interviewees had read the accounts penned by the 
British authorities during the Mandate in the early 1900s, many of their opinions 
were shaped by similar tropes and stereotypes of the lazy and ignorant Arab. 
Coalition troops did not talk negatively about the Iraqis and their culture 
maliciously, but rather due to unfamiliarity and poor understanding of heritage 
issues due to a lack of appropriate pre-deployment training. Said’s first ‘principle 
dogm’ is applicable to these attitudes that the West is ‘rational, developed, 
humane, and superior, and the Orient is aberrant, underdeveloped, and inferior’ 
(Said 2003 [1978], p. 300).     
Training the troops was the responsibility of the DoD, who unwittingly 
accentuated the stereotype when cultural training was presented by Westerners 
and expats who had been out of the country for decades, and therefore unable to 
accurately prepare the soldiers for interactions. Additionally, because personnel 
were not afforded training in how to recognise and avoid Orientalist ideologies, 
they did not question their own actions. Unfortunately, too few soldiers benefited 
from the training that was offered, which manifested in unfamiliarity with how 
the Iraqis felt about Ur. This aligns with Said’s argument of unconscious or 
‘latent Orientalism’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 206).  
Foreign government authority over the site, whether civilian or military, resulted 
in uneven decision-making where the Iraqi input was initially absent. As the 
occupation of Ur continued, awareness increased, but much of it was self-
motivated by individuals, rather than due to widespread military sponsored 
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training programs. Overall, concepts of ownership, control, power and knowledge 
were displayed from 2003 until 2011, which followed Said’s assertion that 
Orientalism has ‘staked its existence on its internal, repetitious consistency of 
power over the Orient that has been able to survive wars and the downfall of 
empires’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 222). However, this case study has also 
demonstrated that the willingness of military personnel to proactively pursue 
valuable cross-cultural engagements marks a vital step in helping to mitigate past 
colonial mistakes.    
Because cooperation did take place, there was potential to have lessened or 
changed the coalition’s impact on the ruins. For example: find an alternative 
location for a large military encampment yet still guard Ur as a statement of their 
desire to protect cultural heritage sites; utilize Tallil but ensure that base 
expansions were directed away from the site, rather than towards it; allow Iraqi 
visitation to demonstrate good will and establish positive rapport with the local 
population; provide a safe and protected location for joint international 
excavations and conservation projects to take place. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated that Western control of Ur started with early twentieth 
century explorers and archaeologists, and their sponsoring institutions who 
controlled the information that was distributed about the site. The strongest 
message conveyed about the ruins was its connections to Biblical stories, which 
endured over several decades. Many of the individuals who excavated and visited 
the site presented prejudiced and unflattering descriptions of the local populations 
they employed or encountered during their journeys. While interactions between 
the Iraqi population and foreign visitors began to decline after WWII, the few 
published accounts demonstrated that negative attitudes and stereotypes had 
continued. Many of the problematic assumptions which underpinned earlier 
interactions were evident after the coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003.  
The interviews also demonstrated that the troops were not appropriately prepared 
to deal with issues related to the seizure of an archaeological site, nor how to 
interact with the Iraqis responsible for its care. While projects were implemented, 
they were conducted under Western authority, which revisited the colonial past. 
However, their interactions with the site curator exhibited behaviour that the 
troops held the capacity to positively engage with the local population. Yet, 
among the many mitigating factors were the challenges that were created by 
attempting to operate in a conflict environment, greatly hindering efforts at 
positive cross-cultural contact with non-combatants.   
The final analysis indicates that there is an urgent need for pre-deployment 
training that addresses these issues. This is not only true for Iraq but for anytime a 
foreign military is engaged in another country - such as the on-going conflicts in 
Afghanistan, Syria or Yemen. In order for troops to function effectively when 
they come into contact with cultural heritage sites, they require more robust 
awareness training. Curriculum should incorporate examples of how their actions 
towards sites are perceived by the local populations. Educational material 
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intended for military personnel, including coursework, presentations, and lectures, 
need to include information on Orientalism and the importance of avoiding the 
notions associated with it. This would complement information currently 
distributed to soldiers, and provide a comprehensive learning experience that has 
great potential to manifest into practical scenarios. 
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Chapter 6: The Occupation of Babylon  
	
Introduction  
This chapter examines Western control of the archaeological ruins of Babylon 
from the late nineteenth to twenty-first centuries. After providing a brief history 
of the city, the first section includes narratives extracted from archival material 
published by the explorers and archaeologists who worked on the site. Babylon, 
just like Ur, initially attracted attention due to its Scriptural connections, yet the 
scholars who conducted the largest excavations were more interested in exploring 
the grandeur of the ancient city and taking the spoils to Europe. The land and 
local inhabitants were often described in defamatory terms both pre and post 
WWI, and the ruins themselves were occupied and altered by Western military 
factions during that time. This background information explores the Orientalist 
narrative in which Europeans and Americans continued to describe the site and 
local community, up to the 2003 occupation of Iraq.   
The goal of this thesis, which aims to determine if Orientalist biases drove the 
occupation of archaeological sites, is explored through the analysis of the primary 
accounts taken from interviews with Westerners who were on or near the ruins 
between 2003 and 2011. Their feelings about the site, the people, and the training 
they received in preparation for deployment revealed an overall sense of 
providing protection. However, their understanding of the situation was 
understood through their own perspectives, without considering the Iraqi 
viewpoint. Contact between base personnel and the heritage specialists was 
recalled as minimal, to entirely absent, while pre-deployment training was 
remembered as inadequate in preparing the troops to deal with cultural heritage 
matters. The full range of these topics are discussed in this chapter in order to 
determine if the coalition was blind to the issues of Orientalism before and during 
the occupation of the historic site of Babylon. 
A Brief History of Babylon 
The ancient city of Babylon is located approximately 88 kilometres south of 
Baghdad. The site was initially inhabited during Mesopotamia’s Prehistoric Era, 
but was not a dominant entity in the region until the Amorite King Hammurabi 
established it as his capital in the eighteenth century BC (Bertman 2003; Leick 
2002; Roux 1992). The city gained political importance under his rule, and was 
the largest commercial centre in the region. One of Hammurabi’s long-lasting 
contributions to civilization were his 200 law codes, which were inscribed on a 
2.5 metre tall basalt stone stelae, and subsequently influenced modern Western 
law. His successors however, were unable to maintain power, and the city fell into 
decline following the end of Hammurabi’s rule (Finkel 1988; Harper 1904; Urch 
1929). For almost a millennium, Babylon was subjected to a series of Hittite, 
Kassite and Assyrian conquerors who destroyed and rebuilt the city. However, it 
retained its religious importance, specifically as the site for the Akîtu or New 
Year’s Festival, an annual springtime ceremony held in order to establish 
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harmony between the gods and nature. It entailed the local population 
participating in several days of prayers and rituals, and culminated with a 
processional parade through the city in honour of the main Babylonian god 
Marduk (Pallis 1926; Sommer 2000; Van De Mieroop 2003).   
The city again rose to great importance when it became the capital of the Neo-
Babylonian, or Chaldean, Empire. Nebuchadnezzar II, the second Chaldean King 
who is renowned for enslaving the Jewish population of Jerusalem after he 
besieged that city, ruled from 605 BC until 562 BC. At the time, it was the largest 
city in the world. His municipality included the mythical Hanging Gardens of 
Babylon, the Ishtar Gate, and the Ziggurat of Etemenanki, a Sumerian word that 
can be roughly translated as 'The Foundation Platform of Heaven and the 
Underworld,’ which was later associated with the Biblical story of the Tower of 
Babel (Fenollós 2011; George 2005; Leick 2002; Rich 1811). The Persian king 
Cyrus the Great conquered Mesopotamia in 539 BC, seized the city and set the 
Jewish population free, an event that ended Babylonian rule. The Persians 
retained control until Alexander the Great captured it in 331 BC (Bertman 2003; 
Hanson 2007; Mallowan 1972).  
Alexander restored large portions of the city and ordered the construction of an 
amphitheatre, but died only eight years later in the palace of Nebuchadnezzar II. 
After his death, Babylon remained the capital, yet slowly fell into decline under 
different Hellenistic and Persian rulers and was abandoned sometime after the 
first century AD. However, the slightly altered but long standing tradition of the 
Akîtu Festival, which honoured the cosmic gods and factual kings who reinstated 
order after periods of chaos, continued well into the Seleucid Period (Leick 2002; 
Luckenbill 1914; Sommer 2000). The modern city of Hillah is located 
approximately twelve kilometres north of the ruins, and while the ancient city was 
covered by the desert sands after its abandonment, the local population have 
always referred to it as Babel, or Babilani meaning ‘gate of the gods’ in the 
ancient Babylonian language (Moussa 2008; Rennell 1800). 
Explorers and Excavators  
The local name for the ruins, coupled with descriptions in the Book of Genesis 
about a city and its towers also referred to as ‘Babel, or ‘Belus,’ were one of the 
forces that drove Westerners to search for Babylon and connect it with the story 
of God’s punishment to humankind (Hiebert 2007; Kramer 1963; Seymour 2014). 
As noted by H.R. Hall ‘Of all regions of the earth, probably the Near East has 
had, and will have, the greatest interest for us Europeans, for from it sprang our 
civilization and our religion’ (Hall 1932, p. vii). Also inspired by the writings of 
Herodotus, Diodorus and Strabo, the search for the true location of the ancient 
city was conducted in the twelfth century. Yet is was not until the seventeenth 
century that it was accurately identified from inscribed bricks that were later 
transported to Europe, which subsequently generated further scholarly interest 
(Fenollós 2011; Kramer 1963; Leick 2002).  
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Major James Rennell, a British Naval officer and geographer, utilized the 
classical writers in order to find what he asserted were the ‘hanging gardens near 
the river’ (Rennell 1800, p. 355). Throughout his description of the ruins, Rennell 
failed to mention local interpretations of the site, but said:  
Should the antiquities of Babylon become an object of curiosity amongst 
the learned, there is little doubt that they might be abundantly gratified. 
The delineation and description of the site and remains would prove one 
of the most curious pieces of antiquity that has been exhibited in these 
times. (Rennell 1800, p. 388).   
Babylon did become an object of curiosity, yet scholars who aspired to see the 
glories of the past were disappointed. Claudius James Rich, a British diplomat 
and collector of antiquities, described the ruins much as he saw all of 
Mesopotamia, writing ‘I found the whole face of the country covered with 
vestiges of buildings, in some places consisting of brick walls surprisingly fresh, 
in others, merely a vast succession of mounds of rubbish’ (Rich 1818a, p. 2). The 
main purpose of Rich’s visit was to collect artefacts for the British Museum, 
which he excavated from Babylon, but also acquired through sale and trade from 
the local community. In his second memoir, Rich recalled that ‘Hillah is the 
general depot for antiques found throughout this country, the most interesting are 
the Sassanian and Babylonian’ (Rich 1818b, p. 47). Thus vast quantities of 
artefacts arrived in London and were placed on display in the museum, or in 
Rich’s private collection (Gadd 1953; Harper 1896).   
Robert Mignan, who travelled from Basra to Babylon in 1827, had similar views 
about the region. He described ‘All around seems convulsed and fallen, nature 
appears to languish and to inform the traveller how wretched is the state of the 
people’ (Mignan 1829, p. 13). Yet of Babylon he recalled the former majesty of 
the ruins when he stated ‘By one means or another, Babylon became so great and 
famous a city as to give name to a very large empire, and it is called in scripture, 
great Babylon and the glory of kingdoms’ (Mignan 1829, p. 131). In 1849 
William Loftus, a British geologist, briefly noted his visit, but elaborated that ‘the 
ruins have been so frequently described that it is unnecessary to dwell on this 
portion of our journey’ (Loftus 1856, p. 131). Yet his journal included 
information about rising tensions in the region between the locals and the 
Ottoman troops. He was assigned a contingent of Turkish soldiers due to ‘the rude 
and almost savage race of nomad Arabs who are continually at war with each 
other and the Turkish authorities’ (Loftus 1856, p. 131).   
One year later, Austen Henry Layard, better known for his work at Nimrud and 
Nineveh, dug test pits at Babylon for approximately one month. He was one of 
the rare exceptions of the men who worked in the region at that time who 
expressed an understanding of the importance of connecting with the locals. He 
recalled ‘My first care on arriving in Hillah was to establish friendly relations 
with the principle inhabitants of the town, as well as with the Turkish officer in 
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command of the small garrison that guarded its mud fort’ (Layard 1882, p. 271). 
He was also one of the few early excavators to mention the Islamic traditions at 
the site. He described the water-well located within the ruins where ‘Within it, 
suspended by the heels until the Day of Judgment, are the two fallen angels, Harut 
and Marut, and the Arabs relate endless tales of the evil spirits which haunt the 
place’ (Layard 1882, p. 286). Yet as he travelled further south into the 
marshlands, his opinion more closely matched those of previous explorers when 
he wrote that ‘The south of Mesopotamia abounds in extensive and important 
ruins, of which little is known. The country around them is inhabited by Arabs 
notorious for their lawlessness, and scarcely more intelligent or human than the 
buffaloes which they tend’ (Layard 1882, p. 307).  
The main Babylon excavations were conducted between 1899 and 1917 by the 
German Oriental Society, which were led by Robert Koldewey (Fagan 1979; 
Leick 2002). In the preface of Excavations at Babylon, Koldewey discussed his 
initial visit to the site when he spotted fragments of enamelled brick reliefs, which 
he took to Berlin for consultation with the Director General of the Royal 
Museums. That meeting resulted in the decision to excavate ‘the capital of the 
world empire of Babylonia’ (Koldewey 1914, p. vi). He did not note if he 
consulted with the local population before or during his excavations, but it is 
unlikely, and there is no record on file. There was however reference to adhering 
to procedures imposed by the ruling Ottoman Empire. For instance, the Ishtar 
Gate was ‘shipped to Berlin under a special export license that Koldewey had 
obtained from the Ottoman authorities’ (Magee 2012, p. 74).  
Koldewey’s team concentrated on unearthing the city centre or temenos, which 
dated to the reign of Nebuchadnezzar II, and included the main palace and its 
alleged hanging gardens, Ishtar Gate, the city walls, and Processional Way, which 
was the parade thoroughfare for the Akîtu Festival. While Koldewey utilized 
Herodotus’s descriptions of the city as a rough blueprint during excavations, he 
cast doubt on the validity of the classical stories. While Koldewey provided 
detailed lists on physical features and artefacts, he did not offer narratives on 
personal interactions or insights into the local population. He hired locals to dig 
the site and often included them in his photographs, such as the men digging 
around Ishtar Gate in Figure 6.1. Yet unlike Leonard Woolley who, as was 
discussed in the previous chapter, reflected on personal feelings, Koldewey’s 
pragmatic style did not include private thoughts.  
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Figure 6.1: Local men excavating Ishtar Gate, 1 April 1902 (Photo credit:  Koldewey 1914, p. 40). 
He also refrained from making strong Biblical connections to the site or 
excavated material. When he referred to a large stone lion, now known as ‘The 
Lion of Babylon’ he did not commit to its significance. Rather he noted ‘Some 
see in it Daniel in the lion’s den, and others, Babylonia above a defeated Egypt’ 
(Koldewey 1914, p. 161). The longest reference he made to the topic was when he 
wrote about the area where the ziggurat had once stood:     
The colossal mass of the tower, which the Jews of the Old Testament 
regarded as the essence of human presumption, amidst the proud palaces 
of the priests, the spacious treasuries, the innumerable lodgings for 
strangers, the whole must have conveyed an overwhelming sense of 
greatness, power, and wealth, such as could rarely have been found 
elsewhere in the great Babylonian Kingdom. (Koldewey 1914, p. 196).   
 
Excavations continued as WWI encroached on Mesopotamia. At the time, Mark 
Sykes, one of the creators of the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement, travelled 
through the region with different Arab tribes, whom he described as ‘a more 
rapacious, greedy, ill-mannered set of brutes it would be hard to find’ (Sykes 
1915, p. 441). This attitude towards the locals became more prevalent as the war 
continued. By 1917 British government personnel made statements such as ‘It is 
worthy of note that one might as well try and control or placate a pack of jackals 
or hyenas as any Arab tribe’ (Buchanan 1938, p. 22).  
Koldewey was forced to hurriedly abandon his work in 1917 due to the 
advancement of British military forces into the province. Artefacts were either 
stored in the archaeological dig houses, or crated for future transport to Germany. 
The objects included hundreds of cuneiform tablets, statues and pieces of the 
Ishtar Gate (Hall 1930b; Lloyd 1955). When Bell stopped at Babylon to assess the 
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remaining collection, she expressed her sadness at the departure of Koldeway, 
stating:  
It’s no good trying to think of him as an alien enemy and my heart ached 
when I stood in the empty dusty little room where Fattuh used to put up 
my camp furniture and the Germans and I held eager conversation over 
plans of Babylon. What a dreadful world of broken friendships we have 
created between us. (Bell & Bell 1927, p. 359). 
However, she did not mention the Iraqis, and her statement made it clear that 
Westerners controlled all decisions about the ruins. This practice continued when 
British troops converted one of the dig houses into military barracks. Captain 
Hall, who was mentioned in the previous Ur chapter, stated that their presence 
ensured the security of the site and prevented thefts (Hall 1930b, p. 29). This 
attitude was to remain the same well into 2003, which is discussed later in this 
chapter. Hall also described the British commander’s interest in the site:   
General Costello, who had taken great interest in the place, had tried to 
make it attractive to visitors by grading roads up to it and beyond it, 
marking out paths, and labelling the chief portions of the site such as the 
Ishtar Gate with their names. He also had placed two British soldier-
guards on duty to keep it in order, as I have said, and had written and 
printed a small guide to Babylon, with the help of Captain R. Campbell 
Thompson. This I found generally used by visitors, and I hope still is. 
(Hall 1930b, p. 33).  
Hall’s observations provided evidence that Babylon was occupied, controlled, and 
altered by British troops. He did not acknowledge any Iraqi input for the tourist 
guide he mentioned, nor did he indicate his targeted audience, but it was assuredly 
Western. When he departed Babylon in late 1918, the military was still residing 
on the site, and the dig houses were bricked closed with the artefacts still intact. 
Bell conducted an inventory in 1923 but resealed the rooms, and it was not until 
1926 when she and a German archaeologists by the name of Dr Walter Andrea, 
reopened the rooms to find nothing had been stolen. Bell and Andrea proceeded 
to divide the artefacts for delivery to the museums in Baghdad and Berlin (Hall 
1930b, p. 52). Neither Hall nor other sources published information about when 
the British troops vacated Babylon, yet similar to the situation at Ur, it is likely 
they would have left by 1921 or 1922 as Bell did not mention their presence in 
her later diary entries.  
In the years following the end of the war, the attitudes of British subjects did not 
vastly improve towards the country, as noted by one army engineer ‘So far as one 
can judge, a hundred years may pass and the greater part of Mesopotamia, or Iraq 
as it is now called, will remain the dreary wilderness that it was when the British 
first marched through the country’ (Buchanan 1938, p. 252). Others however 
were appreciative that the Iraqi government, who were finally in control of sites 
‘had the wisdom to recognise that the antiquities of Mesopotamia are practically 
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unlimited and the sharing of artefacts between the digger and the Iraq Museum is 
best for all parties’ (Thompson & Hutchinson 1929, p. 103). However, that 
statement was in response to foreign museums still being allowed to take half of 
excavated material to their home countries. Despite the removal of extensive 
portions of the Ishtar Gate and thousands of other artefacts, Koldewey’s work 
contributed greatly to the science of archaeology. He developed modern scientific 
techniques for excavating mud brick remains, and his large-scale excavations 
allowed scholars to analyse the archaeological sequences of Babylon from the 
recent Parthian deposits, down to the remains of Nebuchadnezzar II sixth century 
BC city (Leick 2002; Roux 1992).  
Visitors to Babylon 
While excavations did not immediately resume after the war, a few Westerners 
published accounts of their visits. During Henry Morton’s 1938 Ur trip, which 
was discussed in the previous chapter, he also stopped at Babylon. He noted: 
While I stood on the summit of the ruins, an Arab approached and told me 
that he had worked there with Professor Koldeway. His name was Umran 
Hamed, the guide of Babylon. He was a good fellow and he had absorbed 
a quantity of accurate information from the German archaeologists. We 
walked about the ruins and he pointed out many things which I should 
have missed without him. (Morton 1938, p. 175).  
Morton did not provide further details about his encounter with Hamed, he only 
stated that he was shown the hall where ‘according to the Book of Daniel, 
Belshazzar saw the writing on the wall’ (Morton 1938, p. 177). The reference to 
its Biblical significance was also pointed out by others. Two 1950s British 
travellers wanted to see ‘the opulent city that was in both the Old and New 
Testaments as a symbol of human pride, carnality and sin’ (Stewart & Haylock 
1956, p. 141). Instead they said ‘one’s impression is of a bombed, battered city, 
left to scorpions and jackals’ (Stewart & Haylock 1956, p. 143). They discussed 
the Iraqi education system and how it suffered after two world wars, but was 
recovering. They commented that ‘the Iraqi workmen, the descendants of the 
Babylonian artisans, are as capable as any one of the learning industrial 
techniques, provided they are trained properly’ (Stewart & Haylock 1956, p. 246). 
It was also during this time that the Iraqi Directorate General of Antiquities 
performed restoration work on the exposed ruins, re-established excavations with 
teams from Italy and Germany, and constructed a site museum and half-scale 
model of the Ishtar Gate at the entryway (Orchard 1962, 1963). Furthermore, the 
long dormant Akîtu Festival was revitalized in order to ‘show the importance of 
Iraq to the world, both as an original source of world culture and as a 
contemporary cultural centre’ (Schipper 2005, p. 261). In addition to the festival, 
Alexander’s amphitheatre was reconstructed and hosted plays such as The Epic of 
Gilgamesh, which ‘included more than 60 actors and actresses, staged in front of 
an audience of two thousand spectators, most of them inhabitants of the district’ 
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(Baram 1983, p. 429). This was in stark contrast to Middle East experts such as 
Milton Viorst, whom Said criticized for representing the region as ‘uncomfortable 
with intellectual challenge’ (Said 1997, p. xxv).      
As the Iran-Iraq War began in 1980, refurbishments continued under direct orders 
from the Ba’athist Government. Upon the reconstruction of the Southern Palace 
of Nebuchadnezzar II, Saddam Hussein insisted that every brick be emblazoned 
with the inscription ‘To King Nebuchadnezzar in the reign of Saddam Hussein’ 
(Isakhan 2011, p. 262). This encouraged a juxtaposition for the world to view the 
country as being led by a long continuation of evil Eastern despots (Bahrani 1998; 
Meskell 1998). Hussein’s rebuilding of Babylon was seen as arrogant and 
decadent, and a man who ‘rendered ordinary Iraqis virtually invisible, 
undermining their cultural worth’ (Seymour 2004, p. 358). While an Iraqi military 
base was not constructed at Babylon as it was at Ur, Hussein’s government 
officials established themselves on the ruins.   
In addition to rebuilding the ancient city, several modern buildings were 
constructed on the site. These included hotel rooms, meeting halls, and a large 
palace placed on an artificial mound on the western half of the ruins, built so that 
Hussein could overlook the restored city (ICC 2009). This aligned with his need 
to form personal connections to the ancient past. Of Babylon he said ‘from here 
Nebuchadnezzar set forth and arrested the elements that tried to degrade the land 
of the Arabs and brought them chained to Babylon’ (Hussein in Baram 1994 p. 
311). Just as the kings of the past used it as a place of power and control, Hussein 
followed in similar fashion.   
Because of the war and the ensuing international 1991 conflict, Western visitation 
was absent. Babylon was not targeted during the First Gulf War as Ur had been, 
and heritage specialists who travelled to Iraq afterwards found it abandoned but 
undamaged. Western archaeologists Elizabeth Stone and Paul Zimansky said of it 
‘We paid a brief visit to the ruins of ancient Babylon, the most popular attraction 
in the country for both Iraqis and foreigners, and found no one there. No 
archaeologist, native or foreign, is excavating in Iraq today’ (Stone & Zimansky 
1992, p. 24). While the UN Sanctions deterred further foreign travel, the image of 
Babylon’s Biblical relevance persisted. This was evident from media coverage 
that ensured that it was valued for its strong ties to Western interests that 
culminated in ‘our culture’s rise to the pinnacle of modern civilization’ (Pollock 
& Lutz 1994, p. 272). While sanctions continued, a Western archaeologist was 
able to visit the site in 1999. Friedrich Schipper conducted assessments, and said 
of the infamous Tower of Babel:  
Today, visitors to Babylon will be disappointed, as nothing is left of that 
city's monument, except a big marshy pit in the ground. As far as we 
know, it was Alexander the Great who demolished this tower in order to 
re-erect it, newer and mightier, but he died before the job was finished. 
(Schipper 2005, p. 259).  
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By March 2003, during the coalition’s advancement into Iraq, the site had been 
subjected to years of occupation, worship, destruction, and repair. Half the site 
had been reconstructed, and half remained as ruins, as visible in Figure 6.2. The 
history of occupation was continued when it was used as one of the largest 
military bases during the early years of the Iraq war.    
	
Figure 6.2: Reconstructed walls visible behind the ruins of Babylon. 
The 2003 Iraq War and Babylon  
The First Marine Expeditionary Force arrived at Babylon in April 2003 and 
occupied the Ba’athist Era palace that overlooked the ruins. Soon after, Navy 
Seabees attached to the unit engineered dirt berms, concrete barriers, gabion 
fortification barriers filled with soil, metal fencing, and check points around the 
ruins. This secured the area, and Camp Babylon, more commonly known as Camp 
Alpha, was constructed on the south side the refurbished palace of 
Nebuchadnezzar II, as seen in Figure 6.3 (ICC 2009; The International Audit 
Commission 2004). By September 2003, Camp Alpha had been designated as the 
command post for the Multinational Division (MND) Central-South forces. It was 
headed by a Polish command staff, which served as the main communication 
centre for military decisions related to all provinces located between the Babil and 
Wasit governorates (Bahrani 2006a; ICC 2009).  
The structures that had been in place since the 1980s were utilized as offices by 
the division, but in order to accommodate the 3,000 military and civilian 
personnel who were deployed to the camp, major construction works were 
commissioned. These included digging and levelling unexcavated areas of the site 
for parking lots, helicopter landing pads, and the erection of living trailers. In 
addition, the sandbags and fortification barriers that served as a perimeter fence 
were filled with archaeologically sensitive soil (ICC 2009; Moussa 2006, 2008). 
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Just as the WWI officers had ordered alterations to the city 86 years earlier, once 
again a foreign military command modified the site for their own use.  
 	
Figure 6.3: The reconstructed palace in the left side of image, with Camp Alpha within the red 
triangle, as it looked in 2005 (Photo Credit: John Russell, US Department of State). 
 
According to Zanib Bahrani, coalition forces did not engage with Iraqi 
archaeologists prior to, or during the occupation, and disregarded written requests 
from the Iraqi site director who asked that the military cease construction and 
vacate the site. She further stated that she was unable to find evidence to 
corroborate the military’s claim that marines were deployed to Babylon in order 
to protect it from looters (Bahrani 2006a, 2008).  
Laurie Rush recalled that ‘as the invasion of Iraq unfolded, US Marines were 
assigned to protect the ancient city of Babylon from looting’ (Rush 2012, p. 363). 
However this is contradictory to what a marine, who was based at Babylon in 
April 2003, relayed. He revealed that he and his unit allowed the looting to go 
forward unchallenged because they were not given orders to stop it. More 
specifically he said: 
We saw men looting the Babylon Museum as we were sitting in the 
courtyard. The looters walked past us and we looked at each other, and 
they looked kind of scared, but there were no orders to stop the looters so 
we didn’t. They realized that we would not stop them, so they left with all 
the stuff they looted. It was mostly office stuff, computers and chairs and 
stuff, but they came back several times because they knew we wouldn’t 
arrest them. Unless we had specific orders to stop and arrest them, we 
weren’t going to do anything. (Interview 33).  
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However, stories of cooperation were noted in an Associated Press article that 
discussed how the marines who occupied the ruins intended to refurbish the small 
site museum for the Iraqis. The article quoted Commander Emilio Marrero, who 
stated ‘On my first day here, I caught many people. A few looters were arrested, 
and US authorities pushed everybody outside the gate so that we could preserve 
the city’ (Marrero in Mroue 2003). The article’s author further noted that 
‘Babylon has since been closed to the public, but the Marines hope to reopen the 
site within two months’ (Mroue 2003).  
While troops were not observed nor reported to have been looting artefacts, the 
narrative that they were assigned to Babylon in order to secure it from looters did 
not appear to be their primary directive, rather, it was a secondary result of the 
occupation. This was further voiced by Interviewee 33 who said Babylon was not 
important because ‘it was just a bunch of old rocks’ (Interview 33). The decision 
to construct a military base on Babylon was summarized by Middle East Expert 
John Curtis as thus:   
In the early days after the war, a military presence at Babylon served a 
valuable purpose in that it prevented the site from being looted. But it is 
regrettable that a military camp of this size should then have been 
established on one of the most important archaeological sites in the world. 
(Curtis 2005, p. 8).  
Similarly, Interviewee 24 stated ‘Even though the base was a negative, the 
population benefited from the security of the military being there’ (Interview 24). 
A marine captain who possessed a university degree in archaeology at the time of 
his deployment also related his experience at Babylon in April 2003:  
I was at Babylon when we occupied it. When we got to Al Hillah my 
platoon sergeant told me we were going to Babylon. I’m pro military and 
all, but what we the coalition did at Babylon, was for military 
convenience, not military necessity. Military necessity would be to engage 
forces or protect civilians, but everything we did when we went to 
Babylon was for military convenience. I recognised that when we got 
there and wondered why we were doing that. I couldn’t believe what was 
going on. They were bulldozing, filling up sand bags, I saw pot shards in 
them I walked over to some engineers and said ‘hey didn’t we do a 
survey?’ And they said ‘we don’t have to do that here.’ Back then people 
didn’t know enough, guys were taking pieces of brick. The leadership 
were a bunch of jackasses, except for the chief of staff, he told the guys he 
wasn’t worried about them looting things, he warned the leadership that 
the people were going to rebel against the regime because they saw 
archaeology as one of the tools that Saddam used to repress people. He 
told them that but no one listened to him. I talked to someone who was 
with the operation cell of the group, and I asked him what we were doing 
at Babylon and he asked me why I cared and I said because I had a 
background in archaeology and he said, ‘take your pith helmet off and put 
your Kevlar back on and get back to fucking work captain,’ he wasn’t 
going to listen to me. After that we put down a helicopter landing pad, a 
bunch of vehicles went up Processional Way and cracked the bricks. At 
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Babylon there was no military necessity for being there. It was done out of 
arrogance and stupidity. (Interview 11).  
The removal of bricks is reminiscent of the inscribed bricks at Ur that were taken 
by British troops in WWI, as was discussed by Hall in the previous chapter (Hall 
1930b, p. 106). This demonstrated a continued disregard by military forces for the 
value of preserving the scientific integrity of archaeological sites. One of the 
coalition soldiers said that ‘building the base was misguided, but that’s not 
something the military does, I mean being aware of cultural heritage, there is no 
common mission for it, and it’s not even a part of planning considerations’ 
(Interview 25). Interviewee 20 also noted it was erroneous to put the base on 
Babylon, saying ‘in general it’s not good, we don’t need to do that, especially in 
the case of Babylon, good lord how did that happen’ (Interview 20). Another 
soldier stated that the site was chosen because if offered a strategic defensive 
position. He elaborated: 
Like Alexander the Great was there because it had great over-launch, so 
were we there for the same reason. Also, when you are driving around 
looking for a good place for a base, it’s better to find a fixed building than 
have to set up tents, and there were all those concrete buildings at 
Babylon. (Interview 32).    
Due to the existing infrastructure, Babylon was an attractive location. Further, one 
of the civilian interviewees speculated that it was occupied because of the lack of 
understanding the value of ancient ruins:  
We don’t have any archaeological sites in the US, we have a serpent 
mound in Ohio that you can walk all over. So I think it was disrespectful 
to be on Babylon, but being respectful to ancient ruins is not part of our 
cultural understanding, because we don’t have those kinds of sites. If you 
find an arrowhead you pick it up and put it in your pocket, it’s not that big 
a deal. But I think it comes back to the Iraqis, after years of oppression, 
even if military forces were not being respectful of archaeological sites, I 
doubt the Iraqis would have cared themselves because they didn’t care, 
and they couldn’t afford to care. (Interview 17).   
This was similar to the opinion voiced by Interviewee 7 who said:  
The place was surrounded by busts of Saddam and that fake palace on top 
of the hill that was Saddam’s. I think that was the lens the Shia security 
forces we worked with were generally looking at it through, rather than a 
historic site. It was hard for them to take it at face value in some respects. 
When they would show us things most of the focus was on ‘this is what 
Saddam did here and Saddam built this here’ but it was all anti-Saddam. 
(Interview 7).     
However, the construction of a Western military base on Babylon did cause 
distress and anger within the international cultural heritage community. The site 
director acknowledged that ‘The use of the city as a military camp was a major 
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affront towards the world-renowned archaeological site’ (Moussa 2008, p. 144). 
An Iraqi archaeologist who spoke about the occupation said:  
Well it bothered me, it bothered everyone that they were on a heritage site. 
Babylon was already damaged by Saddam, he built on top of it, making 
excavations difficult. But having troops on any archaeological site is 
unacceptable, regardless if it’s a reconstructed site like Babylon, or any 
other site. (Interview 16).  
Bahrani further admonished:  
The occupation of Babylon was a deliberate symbolic expression of power 
over Mesopotamia. The occupation of sites and the images of military 
force at the ancient ruins can be described as an aesthetic of occupation, a 
display of force that uses the sign of history and its control as a statement 
of victory. (Bahrani 2006a, p. 244).    
Because of the prominence and general familiarity of a place like Babylon, its 
occupation drew greater attention from the media and was highlighted in the news 
more than Ur and Kish, the other case study that is discussed in the following 
chapter. Constructing a military base on a site that historically represents notions 
of power and control could easily be misinterpreted as a deliberate and 
antagonising act. This narrative was further enhanced because unlike Ur, where 
the Iraqi caretaker was based at the ruins, at Babylon, only Westerners were 
making decisions about the site.  
Site Visits  
The coalition occupation and control designated Babylon off-limits to everyone 
except coalition personnel who possessed a US government issued identification 
card. Neither the Iraqi archaeologists, nor the site director, were able to freely 
access the site (Bahrani 2003b, 2006a). As reported on 30 September 2004 in The 
Iraq War & Archaeology project, only five SBAH staff were allotted entry 
permits (Deblauwe 2003). Soldiers were allowed unlimited entry, while the Iraqi 
caretakers were restricted in their movements (Koliński 2004). One of the troops 
who was based on the ruins said that he never met an Iraqi. He said ‘Someone 
pointed out to me someone who was supposed to be the Iraqi archaeologist, but I 
never met any of those guys. We went on a tour but a public affairs guy gave the 
tour’ (Interview 11). Another coalition officer remembered ‘The Iraqis didn’t 
have a say in what happened to the site’ (Interview 2).  
When the base was placed under command of the Polish forces, they embedded 
three archaeologists from their Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) centre with 
the troops. The archaeologists were assigned to Babylon from May 2004 until 
November 2004, with orders to document, intervene and protect it and other sites 
located within the MND Central-South area of responsibility. They reported to the 
command staff, but also provided information to UNESCO (The International 
Audit Commission 2004).  
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One of the coalition officers who was temporarily based on Babylon explained:   
The Polish archaeologists were there on special request from the Polish 
Commander. Their primary function was to make sure that as little as 
possible harm was done to the site. To do that operation they had contact 
with Iraqi archaeologists, especially those that worked on the Babylon 
site. They helped those archaeologists to restart their operations. A lot 
equipment was stolen during the unrest after the invasion, so they 
provided new computers and set up contacts with international 
archaeologists. (Interview 24). 
The Polish archaeologists consulted with the Iraqis, and were credited with 
stopping the expansion of a helicopter landing zone in November 2003 which was 
at the request of the Iraqi site director (Koliński 2004). However according to 
Bahrani, they did not always adhere to the site director’s request that the work 
stop:   
These officers can be well intentioned, but they themselves were at time 
responsible for damage to Babylon, because they felt that they could make 
decisions on construction projects despite the Antiquities and Heritage 
Law, or requests from the SBAH representative that they do not work at 
the site. (Bahrani 2006a, p. 244).    
Including the Polish archaeologists in the framework of base personnel was an 
honourable attempt to preserve the integrity of Babylon. One coalition officer 
recalled that:    
During the winter of 2003 the former Polish Division Heads had ordered a 
large amount of grit to harden the muddy surface of the lodging area, so 
they brought in 1500 cubic meters of grit and put it down. It was all driven 
into the unexcavated area of the site. In preparation to that operation we 
had contact with the Iraqi office of archaeology in Baghdad. My 
commander was very sensitive to the issue of cultural protection so with 
everything that happened in the camp, for instance if there was a need to 
reinforce the barrier, there was always an archaeologist present to make 
sure there was no damage done to the surface. That was sometimes a 
conflict with the Polish protection commander because he wanted to dig 
holes and the archaeologists made sure that they couldn’t. But in general, 
the commander was cooperative in not further destroying the site. 
(Interview 24). 
However, Iraqi presence and input were non-existent throughout the construction 
operations. Polish command staff eventually restricted troop access to the site 
through the issuance of an order that allowed visits only if accompanied by an 
Iraqi guide. However the order was not strictly followed, and it was not until 
December 2003 that visits were closely regulated (Koliński 2004). For example, 
according to Interviewee 2, in 2008 ‘The military was holding reenlistment 
ceremonies on the ruins without the site director’s permission, which caused 
problems’ (Interview 2). This suggested that unsanctioned visits continued to 
occur. As was discussed in the previous Ur chapter, the occupation of Babylon 
was also in violation of international and domestic laws. US Army Regulation 
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200-4 section (f) states that ‘Commanders outside the United States will comply 
with (1) Substantive cultural resources requirements of general applicability 
included in host nation law and regulation’ (DoD 1998, p. i). Additionally, similar 
to Ur, because Babylon was also on the Iraqi archaeological register, it was 
protected under Section 402 of the US National Historic Preservation Act, which 
calls for avoidance or mitigation of damages to foreign heritage sites (NHPA 
1980). This indicated that the construction was in violation of Iraq antiquities 
laws that prohibited building on or within a kilometre of an archaeological site. 
However, as was previously discussed in the literature review, because the site 
was considered US territory once a base was built on it, Iraqi laws did not 
necessarily apply (Varner 2011).      
Cross-Cultural Interactions 
Some coalition personnel understood the problems associated with their presence, 
and recognised the importance of the ruins. One of the interviewees expressed his 
understanding by noting ‘Babylon is important to Iraqis for many reasons, for 
tourism, but also as a symbol of their greatness and their history’ (Interview 2).  
However, during the initial months of war, other personnel said it was not 
foremost on their minds. Interviewee 26 who was deployed at the start of Shock 
and Awe Campaign and stayed until 2004 said that ‘At the time I didn’t even 
think about coalition forces occupying an archaeological site. I was indifferent to 
it. I was more interested in not dying and my soldiers not dying’ (Interview 26). 
Yet the majority of coalition personnel did not have direct contact with Iraqi 
archaeologists in order to understand their point of view, such as Interviewee 8 
who recalled ‘I never met an Iraqi archaeologist or anyone in the SBAH’ 
(Interview 8).  
In fact, contact with residents throughout the province was minimal. Despite this, 
the soldiers recalled their interactions with different demographics of the 
population. Interviewee 29 outlined how:    
I didn’t have any interactions with Iraqis but my colleagues did. They 
mentioned interacting with the local people and it generally seemed 
positive. They understood that the American’s were there to help and not 
hurt. It seems later on that the interactions were more guarded. There were 
Iraqis working on the bases, in the laundry and the kitchens, but my 
interactions with them were just business. People seemed friendly, but 
there wasn’t a lot of interaction beyond the daily course of business, 
dropping off laundry, ordering food, stuff like that. (Interview 29).  
Interviewee 17 held similar experiences with Iraqis who worked on the various 
bases located throughout the country. She believed ‘they were already 
predisposed to be supportive of the United States, and their circle of friends were 
the same’ (Interview 17). Interviewee 32, who served in 2004 recalled a specific 
event:       
Most of my interactions with Iraqis were very brief and not personal. We 
were doing engineering assessments in the south but often there was 
112	
	
nobody around so I didn’t have any contact. The contacts I did have with 
the Iraqis were cautious but friendly. Everyone stayed back, they just 
watched us until one brave person, usually a younger person, would come 
up to us and try to speak with us in broken English. They figured out that 
we weren’t going to be hostile towards them, so that drew bigger crowds 
so people would come around and watch what we were doing. One time 
we had a crowd of about 50 and there were just 6 of us. That did make me 
nervous since I didn’t want to do anything stupid to set off the crowd, so I 
was very careful not to be aggressive. (Interview 32).  
Interviewee 10 reflected on his work with the Iraqi Army, stating:  
It was like working with any other ally, very interesting because the 
officers and NCOs were real professional, but some of the soldiers would 
do stupid things that would almost get them killed, such as handling live 
bombs. I would get angry at them for doing that. (Interview 10). 
A soldier who served as a translation specialist observed positive interactions. He 
noted that on several occasions ‘A lot of guys would be sitting around, smoking, 
trying to chat using a bit of English and Arabic on both sides, that was very 
heartening to see’ (Interview 22). Coalition civilians who travelled with the 
military also recalled amicable relations, including Interviewee 17:     
I would say sixty per cent of the time our convoy was rerouted, and it 
often took us through markets. I would see kids following us and waving, 
even though we were disrupting their market day and there’s a gunner in 
the turret who has a gun, but he’s waving so everyone’s waving back. 
(Interview 17).   
Interview 30 recalled that most interactions were based on military strategies. He 
explained: 
We engaged with leaders who had never been engaged before. There were 
towns where nobody had ever seen a US uniform. People were initially 
afraid of us, but soon as we started engaging with them and listening to 
their concerns, the quicker we were able to get a small scale CERP or PRT 
type project going. Those little projects turned into trust, and that trust 
turned into intelligence gathering and understanding how the little rat-lines 
from Iran were filtering money and materials into the country to build 
roadside bombs. So our ability to target the bad guys was incredibly more 
significant towards the end of our 14-month tour than it was at the 
beginning. We used it as an enabling tool. (Interview 30).  
Interviewee 6 also discussed his perceptions about his contact with the Iraqis. He 
remembered:  
The relationships were cordial. During the first couple of months I think 
there was hesitation on both sides, we were uncomfortable with each 
other, uncomfortable with the culture, trying to figure each other out. I 
clearly had no idea what they’d been through, cultural sensitivities of their 
culture, but they didn’t know a lot about our culture either. (Interview 6).  
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Pre-Deployment Training 
Unfamiliarity with cultural differences and local heritage matters, in conjunction 
with minimal contact with Iraqis, specifically archaeologists, was due in part to 
the lack of pre-deployment training, which had not begun until 2006 after the 
military base had moved off the site. A few of the participants in this study were 
aware of historical Babylon from either its affiliation with the Tower of Babel, or 
Alexander the Great. Yet, collectively the knowledge was limited. A 
commissioned officer who served in 2004 stated:  
Cultural heritage protection in general is not a real concern to the 
operational commander, unless he expects to be confronted with negative 
media attention related to the effect the operation has on cultural heritage 
sites. This of course is contrary to The Hague Convention and treaties, but 
in general only the higher levels of command are aware of the content of 
these conventions. Commanders therefore only make a special effort to 
protect when they are aware that a military attack on a site has a direct 
impact on the acceptance of his troops by the local population, or on the 
perception of public opinion in their home nations or the world. (Interview 
24).   
Another coalition member recalled ‘We were given a stack of books to read and 
told of the basic niceties of what to do and what not to do, but you really had to 
learn when you got there’ (Interview 3). Interviewee 7 said that his unit received 
training in cultural interactions. He elaborated: 
Our training was don’t show your feet or talk to women, we were also told 
about the tribal system, and history and religion. Regarding sites, we were 
told don’t go in a mosque, just that basic religious site training, but 
nothing in terms of archaeological or historic sites. (Interview 7).  
Interviewee 31, who deployed in 2005, said of his training:    
We received approximately 5 minutes’ worth of information on cultural 
heritage issues. All we were told was that heritage sites were off limits to 
us because of damages that occurred before we ever got out there. I 
specifically remember the instructor mentioning the Hanging Gardens of 
Babylon and that we couldn’t go see those, but he had seen them and said 
they were really cool. (Interview 31).  
A commissioned officer who served two tours in Iraq, the first during the 
invasion, and the second within the Babil Province in 2007, explained: 
In my view, there is no structured way to safeguard those cultural 
treasures in any battle space, whether it’s Iraq or somewhere in Africa or 
somewhere else, there is no process in place. There was absolutely no 
guidance given to us about that. Never have we talked about that in 
training, or the lead up to rolling across the border. You would have 
thought by 2007 when I came back the second time someone would 
recognise that we were on top of a lot of really rich cultural history and we 
need to make sure that in addition to what we are doing in terms of the 
provision of security to the population, we are doing for the security of 
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those sites as well. There was never any discussion about that, never any 
systems put in place. (Interview 12). 
The failure to understand the significance of the regional archaeological sites was 
not an isolated phenomenon. Cultural misunderstandings also presented 
themselves via other means. Interviewee 25 discussed some of the difficulties he 
encountered while on routine patrols:  
We had people come up to us and tell us they were Christian, or Sunni, or 
Shia, which meant absolutely nothing to us. We didn’t understand that 
religion was such a significant part of their lives. For Americans, we just 
don’t talk about religion that much, it would be intrusive. (Interview 25).  
This sentiment was echoed by Interviewee 17 who argued:  
There were no Americans in Iraq for thirty years so we didn’t know how 
to behave. We were just given books, but that doesn’t work because we 
didn’t understand the culture. We could have been told about how they 
view truth, lies and fiction and that would have made our jobs easier. But 
nobody ever said that to me. We relied on the local population for 
community engagement and we never did that before. (Interview 17).  
An Iraqi archaeologist stated that:  
Despite the fact that many American archaeologists had contacted the 
American military in charge before the war of 2003 about the importance 
of archaeological sites, it become obvious that the coalition forces had no 
clear plan how to deal with cultural heritage, which led to disastrous 
consequences for the Iraq Museum, Ur, and Babylon. (Interview 19).  
Similar criticism was expressed by others, such as Interviewee 13 who said there 
was a lapse in training material available for the troops. She noted ‘The Special 
Warfare Centre and School had not published a new guide to Arts, Monuments 
and Archives since 1989’ (Interview 13). One of the civilians who provided 
training for the troops expressed his view that training deficiencies were not 
solely a DoD issue, but rather more cross-disciplinary, stating:      
In retrospect, archaeological institutions were asleep at the wheel for far 
too long. We should have started doing cultural heritage training at the 
start of the First Gulf War, if not before, and we didn’t. During the times 
when there were regular bombings in Iraq in the 1990s, during the period 
of the no-fly zone, we should have been much more directly involved in 
cultural heritage protection and offering our services to the Department of 
Defense to do training sessions. Even after the destruction of the Bamiyan 
Buddha’s, we should have had a stronger voice. All the archaeological 
organizations should have tried to speak in unison, with a common voice, 
which we did not do. (Interview 5).  
The insufficiencies in troop training led to some well-intended but misunderstood 
efforts. Interviewee 8, who served near the Parthian site of Hatra in 2006 said:  
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My commander was a real go-getter and had plans with some Special 
Forces guys to guard Hatra, get some archaeologists on the site and 
actually do some work. I wasn’t sure exactly what he was going to do, but 
I thought we could help with cultural tourism and revitalize the site. But 
some Western archaeologists who were in the press said we were doing 
something devilishly wrong and threated us with violating Geneva 
Convention stuff. Our commander had a vision, but when we were 
threatened, he instead took his money and built a road someplace. But you 
have places like Hatra and Nimrud, centres of pride and identity, people 
cared about them, and it would not be controversial to try and put money 
into those places. (Interview 8). 
Misunderstandings such as described by Interviewee 8 could have been alleviated 
had proper cultural heritage awareness training been offered to all deploying 
personnel.  
Cooperative Projects  
Yet, not everyone met with opposition. Two months after the occupation of 
Babylon, Marines and Seabees were credited with assisting the museum director 
to repair the damaged site museum (Sweet 2003). In addition, after repeated 
requests from Iraqi officials to vacate the site, on 1 June 2004, the US Army 
issued an operations fragmentary order, referred to as FRAGO 096, which 
imposed a halt to the construction on Babylon (DoD & DoS 2003). Shortly 
thereafter, coalition forces prepared to depart, and an International Audit 
Commission report was drafted by the Polish archaeologists embedded at Camp 
Alpha. They conducted a survey of the site, and provided digital images and 
descriptions of the areas that were damaged by the occupation (The International 
Audit Commission 2004). The report listed several Iraqi names as participants, 
members of the military as attendees, as well as an international expert from the 
British Museum as part of the Commission. Yet it is unclear what role each of 
these individuals performed during the survey, as the report did not provide a 
description or outline about responsibilities or personal interactions.  
After nearly two years of occupation, coalition forces vacated Babylon on 22 
December 2004, and Iraqis were once again in control of their site (Bahrani 
2006a; Moussa 2008). After their departure, contact was maintained between the 
Iraqis and the Babil PRT, which was located approximately 3 kilometres south of 
the ruins, and included a contingent of US soldiers. CERP projects provided 
repairs to the 1960s half-scale model of the Ishtar Gate, as seen in Figure 6.4, and 
the visitor courtyard, as well as additional refurbishments to the site museum. 
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Figure 6.4: The refurbished 1960s half-scale model of the Ishtar Gate. 
From 2004, until the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq, coalition 
visits to the site continued, albeit with Iraqi consultation and consent. The tours 
included the water-well that Layard had previously identified as the location of 
the Day of Judgment for the angels Harut and Marut, as seen in Figure 6.5. These 
tours not only provided an Iraqi controlled means for troops to see the sites, but 
also exposed them to an Islamic history they might not have been previously 
aware of.  
	
Figure 6.5: Coalition personnel are guided to the well where tradition marks the site where the two 
fallen angles, Harut and Marut, were hung by their heels during the Day of Judgement. 
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Interactions between the troops and the Iraqi tour guides were amicable, but 
interviewees did not relate strong personal connections to them, as the soldiers did 
with the Ur caretaker. The soldiers expressed their appreciation for the visits, such 
as ‘I heard about Babylon in Sunday School, and in movies, so being there, I 
could imagine what happened with the Persians, Romans, and the Greeks, I was 
awe of the place’ (Interview 3). Similarly, Interviewee 12 related:  
I grew up reading Greek mythology, and Babylon was important to my 
understanding of that history, like Alexander the Great. I must have read 
every book about Alexander the Great before deploying so I knew about 
Babylon and the East-West conflict back in 320 BC. I was naturally drawn 
to that part of the world, that site and how it related to history. (Interview 
12).  
Although the concept of Orientalism was not voiced by the interviewees in this 
case study, they did acknowledge an understanding of the negative repercussions 
the coalition occupation had on Babylon and the Iraqi archaeologists. However, 
some of the higher ranking officers seemed to be unaware or dismissive of the 
issue. This was evident when Colonel John Coleman, the former chief of staff for 
the Marine Division that originally established themselves at Babylon, infamously 
said in regards to a request for an apology from the head of the SBAH ‘if it makes 
him feel good, we can certainly give him one’ (Coleman in Stone & Bajjaly 2008, 
p. 11).           
Yet many soldiers were willing to positively engage and assist with programs at 
the site. By the end of the occupation, the Iraqi heritage specialists began to 
partner with international subject matter experts through UNESCO, the DoS, and 
the World Monuments Fund (WMF) Future of Babylon Project, which was 
designed to develop and implement a site management plan for the ruins (WMF 
2015). Between 2007 and 2011, coalition forces provided logistical support for 
those teams on numerous occasions (Curtis 2009a; Russell 2010). In the course of 
the projects, soldiers had the opportunity to engage with the local specialists, such 
as American and UN personnel speaking with an Iraqi archaeologist within the 
walls of the Ishtar Gate, as seen in Figure 6.6. As of 2015, the WMF project was 
still in-progress and nearing its end goal of providing the documentation needed 
to list Babylon on the UNESCO World Heritage List as a cultural landscape and 
archaeological city.    
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Figure 6.6: Coalition troops interact with an Iraqi archaeologist between the walls of the Ishtar 
Gate. 
Discussion  
While the discovery of Babylon’s rich archaeological past was unmistakably 
driven by Western experts, initially fuelled by a search for the Tower of Babel, it 
would be a mistake to fully criticize the contributions of early explorers and 
archaeologists. Specifically, Koldewey’s methods of mud brick excavation 
ensured minimal damage was done to the scientific integrity of Nebuchadnezzar’s 
ancient city. In addition, he provided comprehensive empirical evidence to trace 
the history of the many occupying cultures, just as Woolley had done for Ur. But, 
similar to Ur, decisions about the site were made without local contribution. In 
fact, many of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century travellers often 
referred to the low intellect and savagery of the local population. There was little 
regard for positively engaging with the locals, as these men were on explicit 
missions to collect antiquities for their home museums. Degrading the Arabs and 
their lifestyle can be understood by what Said explained as old Orientalism, that 
is, ‘rarely were Orientalists interested in anything except proving the validity of 
their own musty truths’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 52).   
From the 1920s through the 1950s, Western attitudes did not improve. The region 
was regarded in the romanticised Occidental version perpetrated by 
characterisations of the East by the West (Said 1992; Lockman 2010). The East 
continued to be viewed as backwards and culturally deficient well into the late 
twentieth century. Past perceptions of the country and its people, coupled with 
Saddam Hussein’s Regime, created an Iraq that was to be feared and hated, which 
was the atmosphere the troops deployed into. These attitudes matched Said’s first 
and fourth ‘principle dogmas’ of Orientalism, the perception of the superior West 
and the inferior East, and that the Orient is something to be feared and controlled 
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(Said 2003 [1978], p. 300). The history of utilizing the archaeological site as a 
military base in WWI was revisited in 2003, which demonstrated that little had 
changed or been learned. Similar to the case at Ur, the location of Babylon 
offered tactical advantages to for armies, whether ancient or modern. When the 
US and its coalition partners occupied the site in 2003, they knowingly or 
unknowingly paralleled many of the actions of the British some eight decades 
earlier.             
A common theme among the interviewees was their recognition of how 
constructing a military base on Babylon was objectionable because it damaged the 
historical and scientific integrity of the site. Additionally, several participants 
acknowledged that preventing the Iraqi archaeologist’s free access to the site 
created not only physical boundaries but also hindered abilities to build trust and 
affiliations. While positive engagements were achieved during some projects such 
as site refurbishments, these occurred after the military vacated the ruins. During 
the occupation, the presence of the Polish archaeologists who made decisions on 
behalf of the Iraqis, while very well intended, in reality revisited the issues of 
power and control that Western factions had on the site pre-WWI. Despite this, 
the concept of an Orientalist ideology concerning Western dominance over 
Babylon was not voiced.  
In addition, members of the coalition perceived that the Iraqis did not care about 
the site, as other matters were foremost of concern. This followed a pattern of the 
West failing to understand Eastern cultures, and tending to interpret the feelings 
of the locals. Specifically, it is in accord with Said’s third ‘principle dogma’ of 
the Orient being unable to define itself, and must therefore rely on the West to do 
it for them (Said 2003 [1978], p. 301). Therefore, the importance of the ruins to 
the Iraqis was not fully understood by the soldiers. The need to establish relations 
was recognised by some of the coalition soldiers, yet acting on it was hindered by 
a lack of proper preparation by the higher echelon. Having culturally aware troops 
in their units was supported by some commanders, but shunned by others. This is 
an indication that the importance and implementation of such training has failed 
to reach staff who are the decision-makers.       
The soldiers saw their presence at Babylon as providing security, not as an affront 
to the Iraqis. Yet they viewed the site through their own ideological lens, and 
failed to appreciate that there could be an alternative Iraqi viewpoint. This was 
not maliciously intended, rather it was an indication of the failure to properly 
prepare them to understand the local culture. Babylon was a seat of power in the 
past, and because the soldiers were on it, there was great potential for the Iraqis to 
see not just occupiers but conquerors who wanted to wield power and control over 
them and their country. Many of the interviewees mentioned Alexander the Great, 
who was a Westerner whose accomplishments included conquering Eastern 
worlds. While the soldiers did not directly liken their presence to his, it was 
interesting to note how so many of them were admirers. Such connections could 
have been highlighted as an Orientalist narrative during the course of training 
programs. However, because this type of dialogue was not offered during their 
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pre-deployment preparations, they did not have the proper guidelines to address 
or recognise it.   
In addition, the interviewees reported limited interactions with Iraqis in a general 
sense, and non-existent with archaeologists. This was mainly due to the fact that 
many of them served in combat units, and those who were restricted to the base 
maintained non-personal relations. In addition, it should be noted that the Iraqis 
who worked en masse on the military bases were reminiscent of the hundreds of 
labourers Koldewey and other Western scholars had employed to participate in 
the original excavations. The coalition barricaded themselves into Babylon, away 
from the population, which created physical and psychological barriers. While the 
caretaker at Ur actively interacted with the troops, at Babylon, only the Polish 
archaeologists had contact with the Iraqis during the occupation. Overall this was 
a demonstration of power and control, two of the driving narratives of 
Orientalism. It can therefore be surmised that the occupation followed the past 
colonial monopoly on the site, but it was not recognised as an issue at the time of 
occupation.   
In addition, the secondary effects in regards to the occupation resulted in the loss 
of respect with potential coalition partners in the Arab World. According to Rush, 
planning meetings were being organized for the 2009 Bright Star War Games in 
Egypt. Yet when she and her colleagues approached Egyptian military officials 
about training heritage and archaeology as part of the joint ‘games’ the response 
was that ‘the people responsible for the destruction of Babylon should not be 
teaching anyone about heritage preservation’ (Rush 2010b p. 103). She further 
stated that one of the lessons learned was ‘Damage to the ancient ruins of 
Babylon and looting of the Iraq National Museum during the US invasion of Iraq 
left a negative impression around the world, possibly greater than we [the US 
military] appreciate’ (Rush 2010b p. 104). 
Additionally, similar to the discussion about Ur in the previous chapter, a more 
robust awareness of the military impact on the ruins could have been recognized 
and prevented. For example: not using Babylon as a base but rather providing 
local caretakers with the resources to protect it; set-up temporary quarters that do 
not require major construction projects that cause ground damages; establish a 
secure environment that would allow for local visitation and international 
excavation and conservation projects.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has highlighted how the ruins of Babylon were under Western 
control initially for the purposes of scientific excavations, and during WWI for 
use as a military outpost. The attitudes of academics tended towards describing 
the site with Biblical references, the countryside as desolate, and the population as 
unlearned. These opinions were interjected with discussions and decisions about 
the site based on what was beneficial to foreign museums or the British war 
effort. By the time the Iraqis were in control of the site, they were able to revisit 
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ancient traditions and demonstrate their artistic talents for an international 
audience. However, the wars that began with the Ba’athist Party eventually halted 
all foreign visitation, and perpetrated the traditional notion of yet another despotic 
Mesopotamian ruler, which was the image many soldiers had in mind when they 
were deployed during the 2003 conflict.   
The occupation resulted in damages to archaeologically sensitive areas, and 
prevented Iraqis from gaining access to the site. While the security measures 
prevented looting activity, it was not the prime directive for the base placement 
but rather a secondary result. As was seen in the case of Ur, troops who deployed 
to Babylon were not adequately trained to positively engage in cultural heritage 
matters. However, criticism should not be aimed at the soldiers but on the 
establishment that sent them to Iraq. Individuals that were willing to work with 
the heritage personnel were met with resistance on several levels. They also 
tended to see the site through an ideological Western viewpoint, because they 
were not provided with guidelines to behave otherwise.  
Yet one of the most notable issues was the widespread lack of contact with the 
local population. The absence of relationships meant that cross-cultural 
understanding was non-existent. Babylon was seized by a foreign military power 
who then proceeded to wall themselves in and the Iraqis out. This created a notion 
of imperialistic control over the ancient past, and the present situation. The final 
analysis of this case study indicates a need for the DoD to fully recognise and 
understand Orientalism, and work with willing institutions to properly train troops 
in how to avoid it during future conflicts. 
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Chapter 7: The Occupation of Kish 
	
Introduction   
This chapter examines Western control of the archaeological site of Kish, from 
the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries. After a brief history of the site, the 
first section is devoted to providing narratives from the primary accounts of 
European and American explorers and archaeologists who visited the ruins of the 
ancient city. Unlike Ur and Babylon, which figure prominently in Scripture, Kish 
was not renowned, but rather located as a result of an extended exploration of 
Babylon. However, similar to the other sites, it too was managed in a decidedly 
Western-centric fashion. The land and the people were described in less than 
flattering terms in the archival records, and were not credited for their 
contributions and discoveries. The commentary is presented as background 
information in order to understand the Orientalist connotations associated with the 
site.    
The objective of this thesis, which aims to determine if Orientalist biases drove 
the occupation of archaeological sites during the 2003 Iraq war, are fully 
discussed in the following sections. The data necessary to answer this question 
was gathered from military and civilian personnel who visited or were near Kish. 
While none of the participants were familiar with the site prior to deployment, 
several understood its importance to the historical and scientific record. However, 
that same awareness did not transfer to appreciating how the locals viewed the 
site. As was examined and determined in the other case studies, coalition 
personnel were not adequately prepared to positively engage in cultural heritage 
issues, and were reliant on self-motivated efforts. These issues are analysed in this 
chapter in order to determine if an Orientalist bias was associated with the 
occupation of Kish during the course of the war. 
A Brief History of Kish  
Kish, one of the first city-states in history, lies in ruins approximately 13 
kilometres east of Babylon. The city was at its zenith during the Early Third 
Millennium BC, when several temples and palaces were constructed on the site. 
In addition, twin ziggurats, known as Hursagkalama (modern-day tell Ingharra) 
and Uhaimir were also erected, and dominated the flat desert landscape, of which 
the remains still stand today (Field 1929; Langdon 1924). Just as Ur and Babylon 
had experienced shifts in cultural powers, Kish too was subjected to periods of 
destruction and rebuilding during the rule of the Early Dynastic kings. The rise of 
Sargon the Great (2334 - 2279 BC) founder of the Akkadian Empire, ended the 
Dynastic Period. His seat of power was established as Kish, where he ruled over 
almost the whole of Mesopotamia. Although his capital was moved to the still 
unidentified city of Akkad, Kish was maintained as an agricultural centre, and 
retained supremacy over the region for 180 years (Langdon 1924; Mears 2002; 
Roux 1992). The population experienced a dark period after the fall of the 
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Akkadian Empire, and thereafter was ruled by the Dynastic Kings of Ur. It was 
eventually absorbed into the Chaldean Kingdom (Langdon 1924; Roux 1992).  
Large-scale city works took place throughout the city with the induction of each 
new king, including reconstructions of the Pre-Sargonic temples and the 
ziggurats. Under the reign of Babylon’s Nebuchadnezzar II, a defensive wall was 
constructed, which extended 25 kilometres from Kish, northwest to the Euphrates 
River (Field 1929; Langdon 1924). Records for the city and its population are 
minimal after this time, yet Persian and Macedonian armies were known to have 
passed through the region in the course of their campaigns, and the city was 
occupied until at least the end of the Sasanian Empire. The city was abandoned 
sometime after AD 1000, and desert sands buried its remnants. However, Arab 
tribes lived in the general vicinity of the ruins from that point until the arrival of 
Western explorers in the nineteenth century (Field 1935; Moorey 1976).  
Explorers and Excavators  
While the ancient Mesopotamian cities discussed in the previous two chapters 
both had strong Biblical significance, Ur with its associated Abrahamic legend, 
and Babylon and its Tower, the circumstances for Kish were different. The 
ancient city came to the attention of Western archaeologists as a consequence of 
Claudius James Rich’s 1811 visit to Babylon, when locals informed him about the 
ruins (Rich 1839). Rich initially believed the ruins were part of the eastern 
boundary walls of Babylon, a belief which was based on Herodotus’s writings 
(Langdon 1924). By the time J.S. Buckingham, a British author and traveller, 
examined the ruins in 1816 and cast doubt on the accuracy of Herodotus’ 
accounts, the ruins were determined to be a separate city from Babylon 
(Buckingham 1827). Similar to his contemporaries who have been discussed in 
the previous chapters, Buckingham also kept a diary of his experiences. He 
described the mud brick remains he collected for later analysis, and cited that the 
ruins were a popular destination for British diplomats and military personnel who 
served in the region (Buckingham 1827, p. 454).  
While Buckingham did not specifically denigrate the locals in his publications, 
some of his language was decisively Orientalist. For instance, during his travels, 
he discussed the Battle of Gaugamela, in which ancient sources estimated that 
Darrius III had amassed an army of a million men to fight Alexander the Great in 
modern-day northern Iraq. Buckingham reflected that the high calculation could 
be accurate because of ‘the living cloud of Barbarians that have spread 
themselves in different ages over the Western world’ (Buckingham 1827, p. 316). 
Similarly, Robert Mignan who first travelled to Babylon in 1827 visited Kish. He 
continued the rhetoric voiced by his peers when he discussed the overall 
atmosphere of the country as ‘scarcely ever in a state of tranquillity from the spirit 
of rebellion and tyranny innate in the heart of all Muslims’ (Mignan 1829, p. 82).  
124	
	
Another British traveller who visited the site encountered different communities 
during his journeys. He described a visit to an Arab camp south of the city of 
Hilla as:  
In all my experience with Turkomen, Kurds or wandering tribes, I had 
seen no such wild-looking savages. Their lank black hair hung around 
their black visages, and the only points of relief in the wild countenance 
which loured from under their strange headdresses were the dark piercing 
eyes and the white teeth. Notwithstanding all their wild and fierce 
appearance, there was in their actions and demeanour a sort of native 
politeness, the more remarkable from the contrast, proceeding, no doubt, 
from the same indomitable spirit of independence which breaths in and 
produces a similar effect in the North American Indians. (Fraser 1840a, p. 
341).  
When he reached Kish he noted ‘there is so little to attract attention in this mound 
except a certain white powder which is found in layers between the bricks’ 
(Fraser 1840b, p. 36). However, the site did generate interest from other Western 
scholars when the names of the Kings Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar II were 
identified on inscribed bricks found within the ruins (Field 1929; Langdon 1924).  
The first excavations were conducted in 1912 under the direction of French 
archaeologist Abbé Henri de Genouillac, who recovered over 1,400 tablets dated 
to the Amorite Period. They were distributed to the Istanbul Archaeology 
Museum and the Louvre Museum in Paris; none remained in Mesopotamia (Field 
1929; Moorey 1964). WWI halted excavations, and it was not until 1923 that they 
were resumed (Field 1929; Langdon 1924). The decision to recommence 
excavations was not based on the need to prove a Biblical discourse, which was 
the case at both Ur and Babylon as discussed in the previous chapters. Rather, it 
was the Western appetite to explore the past. According to archaeologist Henry 
Field ‘In the spring of 1922, Mr. Herbert Weld expressed a desire to excavate 
some ancient Babylonian site, and he chose the ruins of Kish as offering the most 
important site’ (Field 1929, p. 4).  
Weld, a British philanthropist and archaeologist, had visited Mesopotamia in 
1921 and purchased a number of inscribed tablets, cylinder seals, bricks and 
foundation cones that originated from several different sites. One of the clay 
prisms in the collection contained a list of Sumerian and Akkadian kings, which 
was similar to a cuneiform tablet housed at the University of Pennsylvania 
Museum. These two objects, along with other Mesopotamian tablets, eventually 
became known as the Sumerian King List, which named Kish as the first 
antediluvian city, thus forming connections to the Genesis flood narrative 
(Langdon 1923a, 1923b).  
Chicago’s Field Museum of Natural History and the University of Oxford in the 
UK, formed the ‘Field-Oxford Expedition to Kish’ in order to search for 
additional artefacts. The joint team excavated seventeen mounds, which 
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uncovered material that dated from the Proto-Literate Period, to the Sasanian 
Empire (Field 1929; Langdon 1924; Moorey 1964). Initially Langdon was not 
impressed with the site, believing ‘A thorough investigation of this area is not 
attractive on account of the dishevelled condition of the surface, full of the pits of 
Arab diggers and distorted with hummocks thrown up by various adventurers’ 
(Langdon 1924, p. 33). His observation indicated that the site was subjected to 
previous unscientific exploration. However, he did begin work on the site, and 
analysis on artefacts that were unearthed during ten seasons of work proved the 
historical relevance of the ancient city. These included evidence of horse 
domestication 1,500 years earlier than previously recorded, and the discovery of a 
library with some of the earliest known writing implements (Field 1929; Langdon 
1924; Moorey 1964; Ross 1930).  
Similar to the excavations at Ur and Babylon, the Western archaeologists who 
worked at Kish also employed individuals from the local community. Henry Field 
described the methodological approach used to excavate the site, noting ‘There 
are two distinct divisions of labour among the workers, the gangs or “jokhas” who 
remove the earth with baskets, and the jokhas who work with light railway trucks’ 
(Field 1929, p. 25). He explained further that ‘It is the duty of the pick-men to 
send one of the basket-boys to one of the Europeans the moment that he finds an 
object, so that the scientist can do the more skilled work of removing the 
surrounding earth’ (Field 1929, p. 27).    
Recognising the Iraqis during the course of the excavations did extend further 
than acknowledging their contributions as manual labourers. Mackay described 
his workmen in one passage as:  
Two gangs of natives were set to work on the mound to determine as 
quickly as possible what lay within it. In the course of the first day a burial 
was completely cleared. It contained pottery of an entirely new type, and 
more men were at once put to work to make a more extended 
investigation. (MacKay 1929, p. 75).  
He did not name the Iraqis who discovered material that was considered 
important to analysing the history of the site, rather he identified them in terms of 
general categories of workers. Iraqis were regularly featured posing next to ruins 
in site photographs, yet they were unnamed. An image of a mud brick temple on 
tell Ingharra is simply titled Sanctuary of the Neo-Babylonian Temple and Two 
Workmen, as seen in Figure 7.1.  
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Figure 7.1: A 1926 image titled, Sanctuary of the Neo-Babylonian Temple and Two Workmen 
(Photo Credit The Field Museum 1926 Negative 59603).   
While all the cultural layers were of interest to the excavators, the objective was 
to discover evidence of the world’s earliest civilization. Concentration was 
therefore focused on the stratum that indicated a flood had destroyed the city in 
antiquity, which was believed to parallel Noah’s Deluge (Field 1929; Langdon 
1923b). Excavated material was shipped to the UK and US in an attempt to verify 
these assumptions, and to generate further scholarly interest. Ernest Mackay’s 
1925 report was prefaced by Langdon who stated ‘I know the gratitude with 
which the scholars and the public of Europe and America at large have read of the 
remarkable discoveries at Kish’ (Langdon in MacKay 1925, p. 8).   
Previous to the work at Kish, in 1872 Assyriologist George Smith conducted 
analysis on a collection of cuneiform tablets that were originally excavated in 
Nineveh and housed at the British Museum. He discovered a poem that relayed 
the story of King Gilgamesh and a boat he constructed to survive a flood foretold 
by the gods. Similarities between the Mesopotamian poem Smith uncovered, and 
the Genesis story were such that he asserted ‘The details given in the inscriptions 
describing the Flood leave no doubt that both the Bible and the Babylonian story 
describe the same event, and the Flood becomes the starting point for the modern 
world in both histories’ (Smith 1876, p. 307).  
Using Smith’s findings, Leonard Woolley attempted to connect the Kish stratum 
with the Noah account. However, he instead located evidence of multiple flood 
events that dated over a range of several different time periods, which negated 
suggestions of only one historic deluge (Woolley 1930, 1953). Scholarly 
consensus was that the flood narratives were most likely a composition of poems 
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and stories that were shared and borrowed between and across cultures, as there 
was no physical evidence to substantiate one specific deluge (Dundes 1988; 
Lambert 1965; Mallowan 1964; Ross 1930; Watelin & Langdon 1934). While the 
site lost some of its Biblical appeal after this, excavations continued, and as was 
evident at Ur and Babylon, Iraqis were not factored into the decision-making 
processes during excavations. For instance, during one of her regular visits, 
Gertrude Bell questioned the expedition’s decision to send only one scholar to 
Kish, writing:  
They’ve sent out a man called Mackay; but a one-man party can’t possibly 
conduct the excavation of so important a site with success. I’ve made a 
protest to the Joint Archaeological Committee at home and meantime have 
insisted on his taking on an English foreman. (Bell in Burgoyne 1961, p. 
311).  
Bell’s insistence on a British national rather than an Arab indicated that she felt 
that only a Westerner possessed the skills necessary to complete the job. Further, 
at the end of each season, the artefacts were divided between the Field Museum in 
Chicago, the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford, and the Iraq Museum in Baghdad. 
The conditions of the excavation were controlled by the Western entities, and 
according to Stephen Langdon: 
The Trustees of the Field Museum of Natural History, through its Director 
Mr D.C. Davies, agreed to supply one half of our funds with the 
understanding that they are to receive the greater portion of the 
anthropological material, in return for which Oxford University obtains 
the largest portion of the inscriptions. (Langdon 1924, p. 55).  
Iraqi percentages were however not mentioned. In addition, as Field outlined ‘The 
specimens are chosen alternately by the Director of Antiquities for Iraq and the 
Field Director of the expedition. When this division is finished, the objects for the 
Iraq Museum are packed in wooden cases and sent to Baghdad’ (Field 1929, p. 
31). The director was a Westerner, and the position of the Iraqi Antiquities 
Director was held by Bell until 1926, and by another British national, Mr R.S. 
Cooke, after her. Field stated ‘In all the divisions, Miss Bell and Mr Cooke 
showed the utmost fairness and cooperation, and it was always a pleasure to have 
them visit the site of the excavations’ (Field 1929, p. 31).  
As was noted in the two previous chapters, Bell was conscious of the importance 
of ensuring that artefacts remained in Iraq. Max Mallowan recalled that ‘All Iraqis 
have reason to be grateful for her custodianship. In the division at Kish with 
Langdon she insisted on retaining the Kish pictographic tablet, still a world-
famous and unique example of the beginnings of writing’ (Mallowan 1976, p. 83). 
This was a common theme among the archaeologists, who saw their contributions 
as helpful to the Iraqis. As written by Field:  
King Feisal told me during a short interview last July that he welcomed 
the work of excavations within his territory. The British, who act as 
advisers to King Feisal and his Parliament, have always been most 
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courteous, and have definitely furthered the cause of scientific work, not 
only in Mesopotamia, but throughout the world. (Field 1929, p. 31).  
In a March 1924 letter written to her father, Bell discussed how the Kish material 
was divided. She wrote ‘We worked from 1.30 to 10.30 with brief intervals for tea 
and dinner, choosing and packing, till I felt absolutely broken with fatigue’ (Bell 
& Bell 1927, p. 557). There was not however, any mention of Iraqi participation. 
Bell advocated for the Iraqis, yet she held strongly to her notions of Western 
control over the country. For example, she recalled an occasion when a visiting 
scholar accompanied her to observe the partitioning of the excavated material:   
The American professor expressed himself as much impressed by the 
fairness of the division. He comes from Yale and I rather hope that Yale, 
urged by him, may ask for a permit to dig at Warka. It’s a big mound 
which I could only entrust to a big, rich institution. (Bell in Burgoyne 
1961, p. 386).  
Bell was the authoritative voice on archaeological issues due to the British 
Mandate, which allowed the West to manage and control the sites to their 
specifications. At that time, the Iraqis did not have a voice in antiquities matters. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, changes in the 1936 Iraq Antiquities Law 
mandated that all excavated material was to remain in Iraq (Abdi 2008; 
Bernhardsson 2005). At the close of the 1933 excavation season, when the new 
antiquities regulations were proposed, Langdon expressed dissatisfaction when he 
decided not to return to Kish the following year. He prefaced volume four of his 
Kish book series with the passage:  
Owing to the unfavourable attitude of the Department of Antiquities of the 
Government of Iraq in regard to the division of archaeological objects and 
other threatening regulations, which would harass the work of an 
excavator. In the hope that these proposed regulations might be withdrawn 
next season, we decided to discontinue for one season. (Langdon in 
Watelin & Langdon 1934, p. I).   
R. Campbell Thompson agreed, stating that:  
Indeed, it may be said that these laws have cost Iraq thousands of pounds, 
both in loss in wages and other expenses in excavating, and in the 
decreased interest of the tourist, who prefers to see diggings actually in 
progress rather than formless and uninteresting mounds. (Thompson 1937, 
p. 724).   
This followed the narrative that the Iraqis were unable to make informative 
decisions about the site. Seton Lloyd, the last Western advisor to the Iraqi 
Antiquities Department, reflected that the Ottoman Empire had greatly hindered 
the Iraqis ability to appreciate and value the ruins because ‘six centuries of 
oppression had left them backward and ignorant’ (Lloyd 1955, p. 212). He 
believed that Western archaeologists were the saviours of antiquities and ‘could 
hardly be blamed for preferring to see them installed in a museum within reach of 
an epigraphist, rather than rotting in a mound where a chance rainstorm might 
leave them at the mercy of Arab gypsum-hunters’ (Lloyd 1955, p. 212). Despite 
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the objections of Iraqi interference and calls for Western management, the laws 
were resolute, and the Field-Oxford Expedition never recommenced. Field 
returned to Kish in 1934 and met with the locals. He described the occasion as ‘I 
was greeted with wild cheers; they thought the excavations were to be reopened. 
Dismay followed as I explained we had come to abandon the Kish camp’ (Field in 
Gibson 1972b, p. ix). He arranged for shipment of the excavated material, which 
included ancient human remains, to the US.  
The human skeletal remains were recovered from the tomb excavations. Physical 
anthropologists from the US and UK compared the ancient cranial measurements 
with the contemporary tribal members who lived near Kish. This was done in 
order to determine racial classifications across space and time, which were then 
compared to European subjects (Field 1935; Watelin & Langdon 1934). While 
this system is no longer a valid scholarly practice, early twentieth century 
anthropologists employed it as part of their ‘framework of global historical 
development envisioned in European narratives of a unilineal progress of 
civilization that naturally culminated in modern Europe’ (Bahrani 2006b, p. 50). 
The narrative about both the ruins and the people who inhabited the ancient city 
continued to impress Occidental domination on the achievements and progress of 
the Mesopotamian past.     
While both Ur and Babylon were reconstructed to different degrees by the Iraqi 
Antiquities Department between the 1960s and 1980s, Kish was not. Some of the 
temples were shored with modern bricks, but the ruins remained largely original. 
Furthermore, while the Biblical appeal of the above mentioned sites attracted 
foreign visitors, accounts of travellers to Kish are absent from the published 
record. An American team from the University of Chicago, Oriental Institute, 
completed a reconnaissance survey for one season in 1966, which was ‘carried 
out with the fullest cooperation of the Iraq Directorate General of Antiquities, Mr. 
Ghanim Wahida’ (Gibson 1972b, p. xi). Additionally, Western archaeologists 
visited Baghdad in the 1970s in order to study the Kish artefacts stored at the Iraq 
Museum, but they did not make note of personal encounters with Iraqis (Gibson 
1972a; Moorey 1970a, 1970b, 1975).  
The ruins remained untouched until 1988, when a team from Kokushikan 
University in Tokyo conducted excavations for three months with the SBAH 
(Clayden 1992; Wilkinson & Matthews 1989). Archaeologists did not return in 
the following years, and while the site was not targeted during the First Gulf War, 
the conflict and subsequent UN Sanctions impeded further work. In November 
2000, the Tokyo team was able to excavate for a short three-week period, but 
were unable to return after that (Matsumoto & Oguchi 2002). Excavations did not 
resume and the site remained undisturbed until the 2003 war in Iraq.      
  
The 2003 Iraq War and Kish      
In a similar manner in which Ur and Babylon were seized by coalition forces in 
April 2003 and used as operating bases, Kish was also overtaken by military 
personnel. US soldiers were tasked with erecting and maintaining a radio-
telecommunications post for the southern region of the country. The ruins of Kish 
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were selected as the most advantageous location to establish the post, and a 
Company of US soldiers built a base on the site. While it was not turned into as 
large a FOB as Tallil Air Base or Camp Alpha, up to 200 personnel worked and 
lived on the ruins of Kish. The main structure was a radio relay tower that was 
constructed on top of tell Ingharra, the ruins of one of the original twin ziggurats, 
as seen in Figure 7.2. Living trailers were positioned along the edges and base of 
the mound, and a defensive barrier comprised of concrete walls, sand bags and 
concertina wire was erected as a perimeter (McDonald 2003; Siebrandt 2010).   
	
 Figure 7.2: A radio relay station and defensive barriers on the remains of the ancient city of Kish. 
As previously discussed, once a site was occupied, non-coalition personnel were 
prohibited entry due to US imposed regulations (The White House 2004). The 
restrictions remained for the duration of the occupation, actions that were in 
violation of international and domestic cultural heritage laws, yet were 
ambiguous, as discussed in Chapter 3 (Gerstenblith 2010; Varner 2011). Entry 
attempts were made in June 2003 by Iraqi and American archaeologists who 
noted that ‘a new fence of barbed wire surrounded the mound, and the UNESCO 
expert team was not allowed to enter’ (Bouchenaki 2003, p. 4). The site was never 
visited by any cultural heritage specialists for the duration of the US forces 
occupation, and the military personnel were reportedly unaware of its 
archaeological significance. Similar to the opinions expressed by interview 
subjects discussed in the Ur and Babylon chapters, coalition members also felt 
that military presence on Kish deterred looters. Interviewee 21 said that ‘soldiers 
should feel proud of their attempts to provide protection for the ruins and 
artefacts’ (Interview 21). He elaborated that ‘nobody’s touching or moving that 
stuff due to the fact that you are there’ (Interview 21).	
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The same UNESCO team who attempted entry to the site stated that the military 
presence was a serious problem, and ‘the army units were not informed on the 
nature and complexity of the cultural landscape where they were working’ 
(Bouchenaki 2003, p. 4). Similarly, while presenting at the International 
Congress of Assyriology and Near Eastern Archaeology conference in 2003, 
Elizabeth Stone noted that the soldiers living on Kish were unaware that they 
were based on an archaeological site (Stone 2003). However, a coalition member 
who saw the site in 2010 observed that, ‘Pottery was popping out of the ground 
everywhere, you wouldn’t have to dig too much to find something, and anyone 
could take what they found’ (Interview 3). Notwithstanding the argument that the 
Americans were unfamiliar with recognising an archaeological ruin, expertise in 
the discipline was not required in order to identify that they were on top of a 
human-made structure, as seen in Figure 7.3. 
	
Figure 7.3: Soldiers standing next to the ruins of an Early Dynastic Temple at Kish. 
While the previous chapters discussed ‘site visits’ by coalition personnel, Kish 
did not attract the same attention, and other than being occupied, it was not toured 
by the troops. It did however remain under US military control until April 2005. It 
was then yielded to an Iraqi Army unit who moved onto the site and continued to 
operate the equipment at the radio station, keeping the site closed to non-military 
personnel. Although none of the interviewees in this case study were based on the 
ruins while it was a US installation, several were involved with the Iraqi unit who 
were. Interviewee 12 offered speculation as to why the site was initially chosen 
for an outpost. He believed it was ‘because the ruins offered a high vantage point 
in an otherwise flat landscape’ (Interview 12). One of the commanders concurred, 
and after conducting his own Internet search about the site, explained:   
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If you look at the history of why the ancient city was there, if I remember 
correctly, historically a river ran close by it and shifted after thousands of 
years in between the founding of the city and now, and what made it 
militarily important was it gave you a great view from the heights. It was a 
hill city then along the river, and now on top of the ruins, it still had great 
visibility of the main highway in southern Iraq called MSR Tampa so I 
think it was selected for that reason, you could control the road with the 
visibility of that site. (Interview 7).   
Regardless of their reasoning, according to one of the former Chairmen of the 
SBAH, the occupation of Kish and other sites demonstrated to Iraqis that the 
coalition forces displayed a ‘profound indifference to Iraq’s cultural legacy if not 
outright complicity in the cultural wasting of the Iraqi nation’ (Al-Hussainy 2010, 
p. 84). As one of the Iraqi’s interviewed for this study said ‘At the beginning in 
2003 the impression the Iraqis had of the US military, well it was hard to see them 
on our land’ (Interview 18). Another Iraqi interviewee stated ‘It is a sad truth that 
cultural heritage is often the victim of war. So deploying heavy armoured vehicles 
to an archaeological site would of course have a negative impact’ (Interview 19). 
Bahrani also illustrated that archaeological sites have served as agents of memory 
for the Iraqi population, and when the sites were damaged, those memories were 
damaged as well, a concept that the military did not recognise (Bahrani 2003a, p. 
14). 
Cross-Cultural Understanding     
A civilian who worked with the coalition reflected on understanding connections 
between the sites and the people, stating:  
Sometimes people from the West just don’t think the Iraqi caretakers share 
and have sophisticated history and knowledge of the places which are also 
their homes. The site is their home. These are their ancient lands and the 
strength of the attachment to the land is really impressive. (Interview 4).   
Interviewee 24 voiced a slightly different sentiment when he reflected on what he 
witnessed during his tour in 2004:     
In perspective it should be noted that the cultural awareness of the local 
population in Iraq in general was limited to areas or buildings of their 
religious interest. Only the better educated Iraqis had an actual 
understanding of the historic importance of their region in world history 
and therefore cared for its remains. The local population was only 
interested in protecting the sites if it helped to ward off intruders to their 
tribal region, and when they received financial support from the coalition 
to be active in its protection. (Interview 24). 
While Interviewee 24 related his personal experiences, his comments could be 
construed as what has been seen as ‘Westerners incorrectly perceiving that 
modern Iraqis have no connection to the ancients since the seventh century’ 
(Bahrani 1998, p. 162). Additionally, as Isakhan has examined ‘symbols, 
monuments and artefacts play a central role in Iraqi identity’ (Isakhan 2015b, p. 
275). 
133	
	
Yet when discussing damaged archaeological sites, a coalition member who 
served in Baghdad in 2003 said: 
It’s not the intent of the army to destroy things that are important to 
somebody else. For example, we would avoid destruction for self-
preservation reasons, such as if something is important to the local guy, 
and we destroy it, they will be mad at us and bad things will happen 
around our camp where we are living, which we don’t want. (Interview 
32).  
Another coalition member also understood this and agreed that ‘It’s very 
important to protect all the sites because they are important to the history of the 
whole world. The sites have shared memories for all of mankind, but there can be 
different interpretations of that’ (Interview 1). One Iraqi participant who grew up 
in Baghdad shared her experiences with archaeological sites. She noted that 
educational institutions only provided ancient history courses for students in 
humanities courses, and because she was enrolled in the sciences, she did not 
receive formal schooling about Iraq’s history. She added:   
I think in middle or elementary school I went to Agar Quf, we were very 
close to it, it was a fieldtrip. We also had a family trip to Samarra, and 
Babylon. I can’t remember if I went to the museum. Not every school 
takes their students to archaeological sites or the museums, some schools 
do, but not as much as they should appreciate the treasures in our country. 
But for sites like Babylon, it’s not easy to get permission to take students 
that far because of the safety of the bus, plus they need to collect money 
from the families and the families didn’t have extra money. Plus the sites 
were not well maintained so there weren’t good places for students to buy 
food or water. So we only went to places close by. (Interview 18).  
However, even though interviewee 18 and other Iraqis may not have visited many 
sites, their attachment to the ‘place’ was still relevant, as according to geographer 
Yi-Fu Tuan, ‘connections to a place can be conceptual, a physical presence is not 
necessary to validate strong bonds to a place’ (Tuan 1979, p. 388). That is, even if 
an individual has never visited a specific place in his or her homeland, the concept 
of belonging can be embedded in memory (Vanclay 2008, p. 9). Some of the 
interviewees recognised this and sympathised with the Iraqis. However, 
channelling concern for the local community was reliant on the coalition 
command staff. Due to the war, their focus was most often on security issues, 
rather than cultural heritage sites and how the local community was affected by 
their occupation.  
Cross-Cultural Interactions  
Engagement on heritage issues were mainly a result of commanders seeking 
approaches to more effectively fight the war. One of the outcomes of this tactic 
was positive contact with the Iraqi Security Forces and the tribal sheiks in the 
area. Interviewee 12 elaborated further:  
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You can’t serve trust, you have to build trust, which means you have to 
put an investment into that relationship. It’s counter-cultural to what the 
military does because the mindset is, unless you are part of the 
organization you aren’t to be trusted. So the Iraqi police or army or tribes 
or sheikhs can’t be trusted because everyone has their own agenda. Yes, 
that is true but we aren’t going to gain their trust unless we shed our 
insecurities and develop a trust with them. That was the biggest and most 
difficult task for me up front, to teach my subordinates to have that trust. I 
would use the analogy of telling them to imagine they were at their 
grandma’s house and a bunch of men came into the house and started 
yelling at them. Have we actually won them over whether we are right or 
wrong? No we haven’t. So we need to change the focus of how we 
interacted with these people and sometimes let them be in charge. In many 
cases we shifted the focus so that they were in charge and we were just 
there to support them. Over time what happened is that we started to get 
information from them that was much faster than our own organic way. I 
was getting cell phone calls from Hilla Swat or the sheik’s telling me ‘hey 
this is what’s going on, this is what’s going to happen,’ and I would never 
had got that info if we hadn’t built that level of trust. To me it was 
genuine, they are people, they love their families, so to me it was a no-
brainer, we had to make an investment in these relationships, and they all 
bore fruit. (Interview 12). 
Other members of the coalition revealed similar experiences, such as Interviewee 
9 who mainly served in the Anbar Province. He said that he did not have any 
problems trying to interact with the Iraqis ‘except for the language barrier, but we 
had a translator, and even with that, I never sensed hesitation or unwillingness 
from anyone to communicate with us, anyway, most of their complaints were 
about their own government’ (Interview 9). Other soldiers did not have translators 
and reported:  
We didn’t have any interpreters, so I tried using German, which worked 
sometimes since some Iraqis had been to Eastern Germany. We also had 
guys try Spanish, or different languages in addition to using hand signals. 
Sometimes there was no understanding and that was very difficult, not 
having any way to talk to people. (Interview 25). 
Another non-heritage interaction was recalled by interviewee 27:  
When I was in the marines, my second night on patrol we caught the 
second most wanted guy in Iraq. It was a big deal to the Iraqis. We just 
turned him over to the Iraqis, I think that was a big achievement. 
(Interview 27).  
Several of the soldiers found that the younger demographic of the population 
were more willing to interaction with them. While on routine patrols, Interviewee 
8 recalled ‘My best contacts there were 8 or 9 year old kids who had no problem 
telling me what they had seen’ (Interview 8). Interviewee 10, who worked in 
Baghdad between 2008 and 2009, said he did not have many interactions with the 
community ‘except for some of the schools, we met the teachers and students, but 
really just to say hello’ (Interview 10). He remembered that: 
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There was a captain who was in charge of the task force I was in who did 
most of the interaction with the Iraqis. I think in some ways maybe the 
culture was that the Iraqis only wanted to talk to the person in charge a lot 
of times. It wasn’t anything personal, they just viewed me as the second in 
command so they didn’t talk to me directly. (Interview 10).  
An Iraqi interviewee who was originally from Baghdad said that many of the 
interactions were approached with caution because:  
During the Saddam Regime there was a lot of anti-American propaganda, 
that’s why most Iraqis were very careful in their interactions with 
Americans, because they were going by what they had been told for 30 
years and they didn’t have any other exposure to say what they were told 
was not accurate. (Interview 18). 
Interviewee 28, who was deployed to Iraq for three separate tours between 2002 
and 2009 recalled interactions with the local community as a combat officer:    
I was an armoured battalion officer and I’d meet quite frequently with 
Iraqis that were giving us intelligence information or who were our 
detainees and were either sheiks of tribes, also police officers and the Iraqi 
civil defence core. The ones that provided us info, they were in their late 
teens to early 20s. At first they were hesitant to talk to us, but eventually 
as they saw we treated them with respect they talked to us often. They 
usually had some kind of motive for giving us information, sometimes 
they would give us info about a rival tribe so it could have been some kind 
of tribal conflict. Initially, not knowing then what we know now, we 
would take that info at face value sometimes. We probably did some raids 
we should not have since our information was inaccurate. A lot of times 
they would try to paint the other tribe’s leader as corrupt, we eventually 
caught onto this, understanding who had power and influence in a region 
and who didn’t. I also think some Iraqis interacted with us just to get the 
money. We gave a lot of money to one individual and he became a 
powerful person in his area and we realized later that was a mistake. 
(Interview 28).  
A civilian contractor similarly questioned some of the interactions:  
I think a lot of positive relationships we had with the Iraqis were not as 
genuine as we liked to think they were. I think the positive interactions 
had a lot more to do with them getting what they wanted. I would show up 
at meetings and they would ask for money and stuff, but when I asked to 
see the equipment we had already gave them earlier in the month, well it 
was at somebody’s son’s house. (Interview 17).  
Interviewee 11 discussed how the lack of interface with the Iraqis isolated the 
troops. He elaborated by noting that:     
We didn’t really engage with the community. One of the guys on my team 
said, ‘You know this is the first war where we aren’t bringing home 
wives.’ In the Korean War, guys were bringing home Korean wives, in 
WWII, German wives, even in the Civil War, Yankees were bringing 
136	
	
home Southern Belles, it even happened in Vietnam, but not Iraq. There 
were some high level Iraqi women that married Westerners, but not many. 
My point, is, when you engage with the community, despite religious and 
cultural differences, you break down those boundaries, and that didn’t 
happen in Iraq. So we weren’t engaging. We were so closed-off from that 
population, we stayed in our sterile environments. (Interview 11).  
Interview 25 also recalled problems:    
We, the US military, never did a Needs Assessment in Iraq. We never 
assessed what they needed. We as Americans would visit these little towns 
once or twice a month, we would go in with our 10-tonne trucks with our 
guns bristling, disturb people, shake down houses, yell at people, tell them 
to get out of the way, and then leave. Imagine if you’re a teenager in that 
situation, you have no food, you have no prospects for a job, and these 
guys come in and disturb your village, pretty regularly, you’re going to be 
an angry young man. I don’t know what we thought we were doing by 
acting that way. (Interview 25).   
However, Interviewee 18 thought the dynamics changed as the conflict 
progressed, observing:  
When I interpreted at meetings, I think the intentions were better 
understood in the later years. Things became more flexible and more 
productive after meetings. At the beginning everyone was careful and later 
when each side began understanding more from each other, it became 
easier for both sides to understand the view of the other and how the other 
side was thinking. (Interview 18). 
Cooperative Projects   
As relationships remained precarious, the violence of the war escalated during the 
troop surge of 2007 (Kagan 2009). During that operation, in November 2007, the 
Iraqi Army unit that had been based on the ruins of Kish was removed. A US 
Cavalry Regiment was tasked with assisting in their relocation to an area closer to 
the city limits of Al-Madatiyah. As planning meetings for the move progressed, 
Interviewee 7 stated that neither the Americans nor the Iraqis involved in the 
discussions were aware that the radio station was located on an archaeological 
site. He was informed about the issue during a joint meeting, recalling:  
I think it was an American or an Iraqi on the military side who mentioned 
it, I don’t remember. They made reference to a concern that the governor 
might get blamed if there was any damage to the site. That’s when we first 
realized that there was more going on than simply moving an Iraqi Army 
Company who didn’t have the logistics or equipment to make the move 
themselves. They were very anxious to move as quickly as possible, but 
much faster than we were prepared to do it because of our lengthy 
logistics planning. When the information about it being an archaeological 
site came to light, that slowed down the process to allow us to find out 
more. (Interview 7). 
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Further, when he first arrived at Kish he observed:  
When we got there, there was significant damage to the site already, the 
unit that was living there was literally living on top of the site. There was 
an area that was fenced off, but it was being used to deposit garbage. It 
had also been apparent after searching records, that it has been occupied 
prior to the Iraqi Army by US units very early on in the war. This had 
been a military occupation for about 4 years at that point. (Interview 7). 
Because the regiment did not have a specialist within their ranks, they sought 
advice and assistance from the Cultural Affairs Office at the US Embassy in 
Baghdad, who employed a cultural heritage management officer. According to 
Interviewee 7, he ‘had heard that an archaeologist was working there’ (Interview 
7). Arrangements were made for embassy staff to visit the site and offer guidance 
to the troops before the move took place. Prior to this, the SBAH General 
Director was contacted for both permission to visit the site, and to request the 
presence of an Iraqi archaeologist. However, the security situation at the time 
rendered it impossible for any of the SBAH staff to join the team, and an 
assessment was completed without their direct involvement.  
The assessment noted that the US and Iraqi military occupation caused visible 
damage to the mound of Ingharra, as well as the surrounding archaeologically 
sensitive areas. Years of pedestrian traffic and the use of heavy military vehicles, 
as well as the weight of trailers and caravans located on the north side of an Early 
Dynastic Temple impacted excavated and unexcavated portions of the site. In 
addition, fighting holes and tents positioned on the highest point of the original 
ziggurat, and a trash pit located in the area originally identified by Henry Field as 
a library, contaminated the integrity of the site. Further, the majority of mud brick 
structures showed signs of deterioration due to environmental erosion and 
conservation neglect. While the assessment was conducted with full consultation 
and permission from the SBAH, it was a Western led and implemented project. 
However, the soldiers participated as a learning experience, as seen in Figure 7.4, 
and ‘understood the danger that the ruins were in from the modern human 
habitation’ (Siebrandt 2010, p. 130).  
The removal of the radio station was completed without causing additional 
negative impact to the ruins, and on 14 November 2007 military occupation 
ceased, and control and maintenance of the site was transferred to the Iraqi 
Ministry of Culture (Siebrandt 2010, 2015). A separate project was headed by 
civilian and military personnel from PRT Babil, who provided funding for the 
removal of debris from the site. According to a military officer who was involved 
in the project:      
We did a project at Kish, an Iraqi-American employee at the PRT ran it. 
After an Iraqi military unit moved off the site, it was full of trash. We used 
military funding to hire a local contractor to clean it up. We asked 
permission from the Babylon site director who said it was okay. But we 
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didn’t understand the politics involved, and the site director really wasn’t 
authorized to approve the project, so that caused problems. It was hard for 
the director to say no to us, especially because the Iraqi-American at the 
PRT used to be her teacher when he lived in Iraq, so she felt that she had 
to say yes to anything he asked. The problem was that the contractor 
showed up with rakes and shovels, which caused panic in the 
archaeologists. The Iraqi archaeologists and contractors didn’t talk to each 
other, so that also caused problems. The site was cleaned but it wasn’t a 
smoothly run project. The Iraqis didn’t understand their span on control, 
they left it up to us, so that also caused problems. (Interview 2). 
 
	
Figure 7.4: A US soldier in discussion with a cultural heritage specialist on top of the remains of a 
temple wall at Kish. 
Similar to the assessment, the PRT project was also Western controlled. While 
Iraqis were involved on the periphery of each one, neither demonstrated on-site 
primary interactions. The ruins were cleared of the modern debris that had been 
left by the military, but they showed the impact of the occupation, as 
demonstrated in the aerial view in Figure 7.5. However, a supplemental visit by 
DoD and DoS personnel in 2010 finally resulted in one-on-one engagements with 
the local community. Tribal members met with the Americans at the site to 
discuss protection and conservation efforts, as seen in Figure 7.6. While the 
projects were Western dominated, the regiment’s initial foresight to contact 
heritage experts displayed an awareness that was absent during the first few years 
of the war.  
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Figure 7.5: Aerial view of Kish after it was cleared of military debris  
(Photo credit: Marion Carter, US Army).  
	
	
Figure 7.6: Local tribal members engage with DoS and DoD personnel at Kish  
(Photo Credit: Frank Valli, Department of Homeland Security).      
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Pre-Deployment Training 
While the project engagements were positive developments, the failure of military 
staff to recognise that the base was on an ancient site for over 4 years was 
indicative of a lack of training in cultural heritage awareness. Although the 
training discussed in previous chapters was operating in 2007, the interviewees 
for this study stated that they had not received any instruction, and it was not a 
factor in their decision to seek assistance with the move. Rather, the regiment’s 
commander was looking for different methods to gather intelligence in order to 
understand how the insurgency operated. He anticipated he would be able to 
achieve that by connecting with the local population, explaining:  
I challenged my staff to look at the problem of the insurgent activity in the 
area on multiple levels, not just the traditional military level, because I 
thought we were missing the point. I thought the people were doing what 
they were doing based on a threat perspective based on the history of the 
region. (Interview 12). 
Leading by example was cited as one of the ways in which the soldiers interacted 
with archaeological sites and the surrounding communities. Interviewee 28 
elaborated: 
How soldiers view their leader matters, if they have respect they will 
emulate what you do. So you are taught that you don’t treat an Iraqi with 
vicious intentions, or they bring havoc on your area. You don’t want to 
have a cultural incident because that doesn’t benefit anybody. (Interview 
28).   
Interviewee 8 pointed out that ‘The US army will do whatever it is told. It doesn’t 
matter if they think it’s important or not, they get orders from the commanders, 
and do what they are told’ (Interview 8). Reflecting on his contact with Kish and 
other sites, Interviewee 12 further acknowledged that his team was not fully 
prepared to deal with cultural heritage issues:     
I would like to emphasize how important it was to have, I call it a layer, a 
layer of analysis, and I think every military operational plan missed this, 
the importance of understanding the cultural and historical significance of 
different places. Why didn’t we build that into our planning? We have no 
appreciation for it. We always look at things through our own perspective. 
Even just in the USA, if we went to Kentucky and someone was not 
familiar with Kentucky, we would screw it up because we don’t 
understand Kentucky. For the military, it’s not in their doctrine to 
understand cultural differences, we don’t train for it. The only military 
organization that does that is Special Forces, but they aren’t big enough, 
they are only a division. (Interview 12).  
Interviewee 31 had a similar view on failures in training when he said: 
The people with the command and the money won’t listen to folks who 
talk about culture and heritage because it’s not part of our society. If you 
look around the states, well in places and pockets we value our culture, but 
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you look at the cultural clash that happens just here in the USA, say 
between the south and the north, or westerners and mid-westerners, we 
still don’t get along. We also don’t value our own cultural history. 
(Interview 31).  
Interviewee 25 expressed another opinion on cultural heritage awareness and 
military personnel:  
Soldiers are most interested in getting into air conditioning and getting on 
their video games or the computer to talk to their families, not damaging a 
site or taking anything. It’s the double-edged sword, if they had known 
about being on an ancient site, there may have been soldiers looting. 
Because if they know about something and it’s interesting, then it could 
become something they might covet. So there’s some strength in people 
not always knowing the value of something they are guarding. When you 
start subscribing the value of it, you start giving people ideas they might 
want it. But they could also destroy it because they don’t know about it. 
So there are two extremes, destruction through ignorance, and security 
through ignorance. (Interview 25).  
Interviewee 1 recalled that military lawyers provided deploying troops with an 
overview of the importance of adhering to the mandates in the 1954 Hague 
Convention, but they ‘give maybe 20 minutes of training, but the troops don’t 
know how to implement it or what it means in practice’ (Interview 1). A civilian 
trainer who provided instruction for some of the deploying troops explaining ‘We 
provided an introduction for non-specialists who wanted to do the right thing, and 
who wanted to provide good support to their commanders’ (Interview 14). He 
further stated:  
We had fairly simple points about what you should do and should not do, 
and a bit of historical background. We also discussed how to handle the 
media, commanders and the public perception, as well as the value of 
building trust with the people in Iraq. (Interview 14).  
Another trainer added:   
It was our experience that the soldiers who had deployed already were the 
ones who got it immediately. That in-country experience had taught them 
that there was incredible value in terms of being able to identify and 
respect other people’s sacred places and heritage. (Interview 4).  
Yet, soldiers should have been provided with proper training before any of their 
deployments. Further, while the projects assisted them with engagements related 
to cultural heritage issues, cross-cultural interactions were still lacking. Some 
positive measures have been enacted since 2010 in order to rectify these 
deficiencies, specifically the ROTC cadet training discussed in Chapter 1, which 
includes cultural heritage awareness in the curriculum for the emerging officers 
(Valanis 2013). Yet, more still needs to be done. As of the writing of this thesis, 
Kish remains free of military occupation, but excavations have not resumed at the 
site. However, a two-year conservation project for excavated material housed at 
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the Field Museum in Chicago was executed in 2009, and completed in 2010. Iraqi 
conservators from the SBAH travelled to the US and worked in collaboration with 
their American counterparts on artefacts excavated from Kish by the early 
twentieth century archaeologists (Kott 2011). The project was successful in 
forming cooperative scholarly ties, although it was built on a collection that was 
removed from Iraq by those early Orientalists. 
Discussion 
Similar to the excavators at Ur and Babylon, the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century archaeologists who worked at Kish made significant 
contributions to their discipline by advancing knowledge about one of the first 
established cities in the world. Yet their narrative was directed by a Western 
voice, without Iraqi input. While it is tempting to find fault with the Orientalist 
manner in which early scholars operated, it was the unfortunate cultural norm at 
the time. That is, studying the East was viewed as an intellectual pursuit of 
understanding the past – even if this was informed by the ideology of Western 
superiority that pervaded at the time (Lockman 2010, p. 69).  
These attitudes were especially compounded by the fact that the majority of the 
material was shipped to the US for analysis. Scholars saw themselves as the 
saviours of the site and artefacts that would otherwise be left vulnerable if the 
uninformed local population was allowed to decide their fate. These were 
quintessentially Orientalist attitudes, as the scholars viewed themselves as the 
‘hero rescuing the Orient from the obscurity, alienation, and strangeness which he 
had himself properly distinguished’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 121). They controlled 
and shaped the knowledge and presented it to a Western audience, which gave 
them progressively more acclaim as the experts in the field. The absence of an 
Iraqi voice was not considered a detriment to their research, which followed 
Said’s second and third notions of Orientalist dogmas detailed in Chapter 2. That 
occidental interpretations of the Orient take precedence over the realities, and 
because they are unable to define themselves, the East requires the West to do it 
for them (Said 2003 [1978], p. 300)                 
In addition, published records often referred to the Iraqis as savages and 
barbarians, and only acknowledged them for their skills as manual labourers. This 
was despite the fact that the Western archaeologists stated that the workmen often 
unearthed unique artefacts that contributed to an in-depth and scholarly 
understanding of past cultures. They were therefore seen as acceptable ‘diggers,’ 
but not capable of providing input about the past they unearthed for the 
foreigners. Even less commendation was bestowed on the local population when 
the antiquities laws changed and Iraqis were finally in a decision-making role. 
Once their control was taken away, the message from foreign scholars was one of 
anger and disappointment that the site could not be properly managed by the 
Iraqis, and they no longer wished to be contributing participants. This again 
displayed attitudes of the Occidental dogma of individuals who saw ‘the West as 
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rational, developed, humane, and superior, and the Orient as aberrant, 
underdeveloped, and inferior’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 300). Although scientific 
work continued on artefacts originally excavated from the site, Western 
excavations never resumed after 1933, and publications waned.     
While Ur and Babylon were occupied by British forces during WWI, Kish was 
not, nor did it ever reach the same levels of high-esteem to match either site. 
However, the imperial cycle of Western control was revisited when coalition 
forces constructed an outpost on the ruins in 2003. Troops were not familiar with 
Kish unless they were involved in one of the above listed projects. While this may 
be an explanation for why it was determined that none of the soldiers initially 
recognised that it was an ancient city, it is difficult to lend credence to this notion 
due to the pottery and standing ruins that were clearly visible and identifiable 
throughout the site.  
Yet, it must also be remembered that a war was in progress during the course of 
the occupation of Kish, and the soldiers believed the strategic location rendered 
the site attractive for an outpost. While it is not known if other areas were 
considered before Kish was chosen, Iraqis were not consulted for their input. As 
was discussed in the other case studies, the occupation of Kish was in violation of 
international and domestic cultural heritage laws. It is important however to 
acknowledge that none of the participants in this research had malicious 
intentions towards the site, or the local population. In fact, the alertness of the 
soldiers involved with the 2007 outpost relocation should be commended for 
contacting DoS experts once they knew they would be working on an ancient site.   
However, this case study does establish that personnel were deployed unprepared 
to effectively interact with the landscape and the people, and were forced to be 
reactive rather than proactive. The interview participants acknowledged that they 
lacked cultural heritage awareness training, and were not properly schooled in 
how to engage with the community. In addition, they recounted that commanders 
expressed different attitudes towards protecting Kish and other sites, and did not 
demonstrate a pattern of inclusive consistency. This seemed to be a result of 
whether or not an individual was attracted to the discipline of history on a 
personal level. This was problematic, because regardless of individual interests, 
all of the command staff should have been following the same guidelines. Yet 
those were not available in the early years of the war, an issue that reverts back 
once again to the failures of the US government and their allies to properly train 
personnel in cultural heritage matters before they were deployed to Iraq.    
The presence of the soldiers on the site rendered it off limits to non-military 
personnel, which included Iraqi archaeologists and the local community. As 
previously noted in the discussion of Ur and Babylon, in addition to barring 
access to the ruins, the soldiers sequestered themselves within the walls they built. 
Therefore, they had minimal contact with the population, and did not gain an 
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understanding of what Kish, or any other site, meant to the locals. They could 
only offer speculations that were erroneously based on Western perspectives.   
Coalition personnel were not ignorant of the need to form positive relations with 
the locals, but they were not given the sufficient resources or opportunities to do 
it. As several of the interview subjects discussed, even in their home country there 
are failures to communicate across state and cultural lines. If that was difficult, 
trying to do so in an unfamiliar environment proved even more challenging. 
Because of the lack of contact, coalition personnel could not fully understand how 
the Iraqis felt about their ancient sites. Speculations were made, with many 
voicing an opinion that the Iraqis did not care, yet these were Western projections 
of how they thought the local population felt, not a true representation of 
ideologies held by the Iraqis.      
While the projects that removed military occupation and cleaned the site were 
important and well-intended, the site assessment conducted prior to the military 
vacating the ruins did not include on-the-ground Iraqi participation, and the site 
clean-up was managed from a Western perspective and without archaeological 
expertise. Both projects therefore continued to send a message of power and 
control over the site. The interviewees for this study sincerely believed they had 
rendered valuable assistance, which was true. But this type of rapport is an 
example of the Orientalism where issues of control and uneven relationships 
experienced between cultures promoted divisions (Said 1985, p. 100). In addition, 
the emphasis on cooperation in order to gather intelligence information was 
reminiscent of the legacy of the Western spy network and archaeological sites that 
was discussed in Chapter 2.      
Overall, the site was valued by the archaeologists in the twentieth century for its 
historic significance, and by the soldiers in the twenty-first century for tactical 
usefulness. In neither case was the local population consulted or included in 
decisions related to the fate of ruins. Although separated by a span of 70 years, 
both are examples of relationships based on the power and domination of the 
West over the East (Said 2003 [1978], p. 5). Although not done with conscious 
intent, the construction of a military base on Kish revisited this Orientalist past.  
As was discussed in the two previous case studies, alternatives to placing a 
military encampment on the ruins could have been explored. For example: instead 
of building on top of Kish, erect temporary and removable guard towers of a 
similar height outside the archaeological footprint of the site; offer site protection 
to allow local visitors as well as joint international excavations and conservation 
projects.     
Conclusion  
This chapter has provided evidence of Western control over the ruins of the 
ancient city of Kish, when antiquarians initially mistook it for the eastern suburbs 
of Babylon. While they were unable to empirically connect the site with Biblical 
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text, as was done at the other sites, scholars collected and transported vast 
quantities of artefacts to European and American museums for interpretation and 
analysis. One of the driving factors was connecting the past cultures with a 
European ancestry, which in-turn legitimised modern Western interest. In 
addition, the manner in which the local population was described followed the 
Orientalist rhetoric that was prevalent in academia throughout the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Unfortunately, accomplishments at the site after the 
1930s were minimal as the ancient city did not generate widespread attention 
from scholars or the general public, and it remained largely undisturbed.      
Previous Western control over Kish was revisited with the advent of the 2003 
war. Damages to the ruins due to the presence of a military base were substantial. 
They were caused by both the occupation, and the inability of Iraqi archaeologists 
to access the site and maintain and conserve the crumbling structures. There was a 
perception by some members of the coalition that the Iraqis did not fully 
appreciate the ancient history of their country. While it may not have been 
directly displayed by the local population, there was a sense of their belonging to 
the geographic space.  
While some command staff were fully engaged in attempting to create positive 
cross-cultural relations, as a whole, troops felt that was not a priority within the 
military hierarchy. A need therefore exists to rectify the gaps in cultural heritage 
awareness training within all levels of the establishment, but especially in the 
higher ranks. Military troops are required to adhere to their commander, and if he 
or she sets an example of respect and cooperation, it will be followed. Educating 
emerging officers during their formative years in the Reserve Officers Training 
Corps Academy has been a welcome step, yet more emphasis needs to be on 
avoiding the Orientalist behaviour of the distance, and not so distant past.  
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Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Introduction  
This thesis has utilized the theoretical framework articulated by Edward Said in 
his work on Orientalism. It examined the ways in which Westerners interacted 
with Iraqi archaeological sites and the local cultural heritage community. 
Background information was provided by exploring the published records from 
nineteenth and early twentieth century European and American scholars who 
visited and worked in the region. Their journals, travel logs and excavation 
reports narrated how they related to the ruins of Ur, Babylon, and Kish, as well as 
the local population. The three case studies highlighted that the remains of those 
ancient cities were manipulated for Western purposes, and valued for their 
connections to Biblical stories that linked them to an Anglo-Saxon past.  
The local heritage professionals and the broader Iraqi population were rarely 
consulted and, more to the point, were generally viewed through an Orientalist 
lens as immoral, ill-mannered, and intellectually defective. Via the original 
empirical insights gleaned from 26 interviews with coalition forces and 4 civilians 
who worked for them, this thesis goes on to demonstrate how this Orientalist 
legacy shaped the viewpoints of those who visited or were based at the military 
bases built at Ur, Babylon, and Kish following the 2003 intervention. A temporal 
and ideological connection can therefore be drawn between successive Western 
engagements with these sites. Control of the sites exerted by the early 
archaeologists was repeated in the Iraq war when coalition troops constructed 
military bases on them and all but ignored the local heritage professionals.     
The views and attitudes voiced by the troops were recorded and analysed, with 
some of the participants echoing ideologies that were prevalent almost a century 
earlier. While they all appreciated the associated ancient histories, familiarity was 
mainly from a theological understanding, and many saw themselves as providing 
protection for ancient ruins. Drawing upon the research findings documented 
throughout this thesis, this final chapter concludes with a discussion of the overall 
findings in relation to the research question: ‘Was the construction of coalition 
military bases on Iraqi archaeological sites driven by Orientalist biases during 
the Iraq War?’ This chapter also outlines recommended actions for militaries 
involved in present and future conflicts. It argues that a key lesson of the Iraq war 
of 2003 concerns the failures of foreign forces to be sensitive to local cultural 
heritage and the need to work with native heritage professionals towards the 
protection of sites.  
Evaluating Said’s Principle Dogmas of Orientalism  
As outlined in Chapter 2, this thesis has sought to examine the extent to which the 
interactions between foreign coalition forces and Iraqi heritage professionals can 
be measured and analysed according to Said’s four ‘principle dogmas’ of 
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Orientalism. The first is ‘the absolute and systematic difference between the 
West, which is rational, developed, and superior, and the Orient which is aberrant, 
undeveloped, and inferior’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 300). The second is ‘that 
abstractions about the Orient, particularly those based on texts representing a 
classical Oriental civilization, are always preferable to direct evidence drawn 
from modern Oriental realities’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 300). Said’s third dogma is 
‘the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself; therefore it is 
assumed that a highly generalized and systematic vocabulary for describing the 
Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and even scientifically objective’ 
(Said 2003 [1978], p. 301). His last dogma is ‘the Orient is at bottom something 
either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or 
to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, or outright 
occupation whenever possible)’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. 301).             
The first dogma was demonstrated within the publications of the early 
archaeologists and adventurers, as well as the Iraq war veterans. For example, the 
common narrative of the uneducated and untrustworthy Muslims who inhabited 
an unattractive wilderness, was voiced by European explorers (Buchanan 1938; 
Mignan 1829; Morton 1938). Travelling between Basra and Babylon in 1829, 
Robert Mignan reflected on his observations about the ‘tyranny innate in the heart 
of all Muslims’ (Mignan 1829, p. 82). More than a century later, British journalist 
Henry Morton questioned the intellectual competencies of what he described as 
the ‘peasantry’ when he wrote ‘I wonder whether someday the intelligentsia will 
go under and the people will relapse into their natural chaos’ (Morton 1938, p. 
101).  
Similar views were held by several coalition forces who interacted with the Iraqi 
heritage professionals. For example, Interviewee 27 stated ‘we would have to be 
there a lifetime to unscrew the place’ (Interview 27). Other coalition members 
such as Interviewees 3 and 6 emphasised cultural differences between themselves 
and the Iraqi population, questioning their motives, viewing them as 
untrustworthy, and feeling uncomfortable in their presence. These attitudes 
projected the Western sense of supremacy highlighted by Said. However, 
throughout the interviews, a counter-narrative emerged. Despite the conflict 
situation, several of the interviewees engaged in cooperative projects. One 
example is the archway at Ur discussed by Interviewee 30. It was enacted through 
a request from the site curator, which demonstrated that the Iraqi voice was 
represented at the ruins, and he was viewed as an equal.  
The second dogma noted by Said was that the Western interpretation of the Orient 
is privileged over its complex realities. Woolley’s excavations at Ur, Koldewey’s 
Babylon digs and to a lesser extent, Field and Langdon’s work at Kish, were all 
influenced by theological stories, and constructed in their subsequent publications 
through that lens. During the excavations, the local population was employed as 
labourers, but they were not consulted regarding their opinions about the ancient 
sites (Field 1929; Koldewey 1914; Woolley 1950). This was highlighted when 
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Woolley described his excavations at the Royal Tombs of Ur, which revealed 
ancient Mesopotamian burial practices that were unknown at the time. When 
speaking about his local workforce, he said ‘It would be absurd to ask for 
scientific interest from men so ignorant as the Arabs of southern Iraq’ (Woolley 
1934b, p. 9).    
During the 2003 war, troops who visited Ur and Babylon, such as Interviewees 
23, 32 and 6, expressed feeling connections to those sites based on Biblical 
perspectives. They were not however familiar with the Pre-Dynastic or Islamic 
histories. Interviewee 6 was able to appreciate his tour at the ruins of Ur for its 
Abrahamic legacy, admitting ‘I guess Abraham is significant in the Muslim 
culture too, I don’t think I knew that at the time’ (Interview 6). Similarly, 
Interviewee 32 said all he knew about Iraq was that ‘it was one of the great 
civilizations of the past’ which he read about in the Bible just prior to his 
deployment (Interview 32). 
A few of the interview participants developed an understanding that the Iraqis 
were unable to devote emotional energy or time towards caring for the ruins, 
because as Interviewee 17 stated ‘they had more pressing matters to attend to’ 
(Interview 17). However, this was her conjecture, not a direct Iraqi viewpoint. 
The ancient ruins in Iraq were unearthed, examined, analysed, and epitomised by 
a Western voice. This legacy continued within the psyche of some of the 
members of the coalition who deployed to Iraq.   
Said’s third ‘principle dogma’ of Orientalism is that the Orient lacks the 
ontological and epistemological capacities to define itself and must therefore rely 
on the West to construct seemingly objective methods for interpreting it. This 
rhetoric was demonstrated by archaeologists such as Woolley, who questioned the 
scientific intellect of the local population, as well as Field and Bell, who believed 
it was their essential duty to make decisions about excavated artefacts for the 
Iraqis (Bell & Bell 1927; Field 1929; Woolley 1930). For example, Field would 
only allow the Iraqis to serve as ‘pick-men and basket-boys’ while decisions 
about excavated artefacts were made by the Western scholars (Field 1929, p. 27).  
While Bell discussed the intensive appraisals that were required to divide the Kish 
artefacts for distribution between the museums, the decisions were made by her 
and her Western staff without Iraqi consultation (Bell & Bell 1927, p. 557). Even 
if there was little to zero interest from the local community, the sites were on their 
lands, and therefore they should have been consulted for their local opinion.        
This attitude was revisited in 2003 when the Polish archaeologists embedded at 
Babylon were in control of the ruins, rather than the Iraqi site curator (Interviewee 
24). The notions of Western archaeologists being the saviours of Iraq’s past was 
also discussed by Interviewee 8, who recalled that a military commander was 
attempting to engage with American experts in order to conduct work at Hatra. 
He said, his ‘commander was a real go-getter and had plans with some Special 
Forces guys to guard Hatra, get some archaeologists on the site and actually do 
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some work’ (Interviewee 8). However, the plans did not include local 
contribution, and it was poorly received by the international cultural heritage 
community. While their intentions were not malevolent, they were misguided and 
demonstrated that the West was once again making decisions for Iraqi 
archaeological sites.   
However, there are positive moments that reflect a more consultative and co-
operative relationship between coalition forces and local heritage experts. One 
example occurred at Ur, which was utilized as a military base and therefore under 
Western control for six years. However, when command staff understood the 
significance of the ruins to the local heritage community, arrangements were 
made to release it to Iraqi authorities. The joint American-Iraqi survey that was 
then conducted provides a positive example of collaboration. It was conducted 
with the full cooperation and support of coalition military personnel. As one of 
the Iraqi archaeologists recalled ‘that was a great way to bridge the gap, we put 
everything aside and worked as a team’ (Interview 16).  
Since then, USCENTCOM has made a positive and much needed addition to the 
Environmental Regulations 200-2, which addresses base management practices. 
Chapter 6 was added to provide guidance on how to mitigate damages to historic 
sites, including cooperation with the local custodians (USCENTCOM 2009). In 
addition, DoD Directive 3000.10 provides further requirements for personnel 
engaged in planning for base operations outside the US. Policy 3(h) instructs 
personnel to minimize adverse impact on local populations and cultural resources 
(DoD 2013). Furthermore, a 2016 US military manual addresses best practices in 
order to minimize damages to cultural property during different phases of 
conflict. This much-needed publication was put together with input and 
collaboration between UNESCO, NATO and the United States Committee of the 
Blue Shield, and provides guidelines and regulations on protecting cultural 
property during different phases of conflict.  
While the majority of the language focuses on preventing physical damages, it 
also includes sections that call on cooperation and dialogue with the local 
population. For example, chapter III reads in part ‘military forces deployed in an 
unfamiliar cultural environment should be encouraged to visit or otherwise 
communicate with local communities so as to gain an appreciation of their 
culture, including of their cultural heritage’ (O’Keefe et al 2016 p. 18). Further, 
chapter IV states that the ‘prevention of misappropriation and vandalism of 
cultural property in occupied territory can also benefit from communication and 
cooperation between occupying forces and the local populace’ (O’Keefe et al 
2016 p. 54). In the UK, Stone’s ‘Four Tier Approach’, which calls in part for 
cooperation with the local population, was incorporated into British Army 
training in 2014 (Purbrick 2016).  
Outreach and support for the local community can produce positive cross-cultural 
contacts. As Porter stated ‘Falling prey to flawed ideas of culture may have 
strategic costs, while a rethinking of culture can have concrete benefits for 
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militaries’ (Porter 2009 p. 197). Additionally, reports from the DC based Strategic 
Studies Institute highlighted that ‘Basic knowledge of local norms and customs 
can prevent a lot of ill will in an occupied country’ (Mockaitis 2007 p. 54).     
Said’s last dogma, that the Orient is something to be feared and controlled by the 
West, was demonstrated during WWI when Babylon was occupied by British 
troops. Army personnel were in control of how the site was managed and altered. 
As Hall explained ‘General Costello, who had taken great interest in the place, 
had tried to make it attractive to visitors by grading roads up to it and beyond it, 
and marking out paths’ (Hall 1930b, p. vii). For the soldiers, the Arabs were 
‘antagonists to the British protagonists’ (Hammond 2009, p. 97). Viewed through 
this lens, archaeologist R. Campbell Thompson was assigned a British guard for 
the duration of his 1917 excavations at Ur (Thompson 1920, p. 102).   
The 2003 invasion of Iraq also meets the criteria of Said’s last dogma. Iraqi 
Government buildings in central Baghdad were seized and controlled by coalition 
forces, and established as military headquarters (Chandrasekaran 2010; Isakhan 
2011, 2013). As discussed by Isakhan, former palaces of Saddam Hussein were 
spared destruction during the Shock and Awe campaign as a sign that the US 
planned to use them as bases of power and control (Isakhan 2013, p. 232). Similar 
attitudes were demonstrated by the occupation of the archaeological sites of Ur, 
Babylon and Kish. As Interviewee 23 explained ‘it’s the situation, it was a result 
of the war’ (Interview 23). Control of the sites provided the troops a secure 
environment from which to operate, which was once again more indicative of the 
combat situation than conscious Orientalism.  
Despite concepts based on fear and distrust, attempts at relationship building were 
found in both the archival research and during the interviews. In the nineteenth 
century Layard acknowledged the necessity of positively engaging with the 
locals. At Babylon, he learned about the Islamic traditions associated with the site 
and was able to associate local affinity to the sites historical attributes, not just the 
Western narrative (Layard 1882). Similarly, professional relationships between 
American and Iraqi soldiers during the Iraq war were discussed as successful by 
Interviewees 22, 12, 10, and 7. Interviewee 10 recalled ‘It was like working with 
any other ally’ (Interview 10). In addition, according to Interviewee 32 ‘the army 
is not intent on destroying things that are important to other people’ (Interview 
32). The examples cited above demonstrate that a gap existed in cross-cultural 
understanding as a result of unfamiliarity with Eastern customs, concepts and 
ideologies, in both the early twentieth and twenty-first centuries.      
Answering the Research Question   
This information was vital in answering the research question: ‘Was the 
construction of coalition military bases on Iraqi archaeological sites driven by 
Orientalist biases during the Iraq War?’ Ur, Babylon and Kish were occupied 
because they were each strategically, tactically and conveniently located. In 
addition, existing Iraqi infrastructures, such as modern buildings located on both 
Ur and Babylon, were easily incorporated into base operations. This had potential 
to be viewed as a purposeful demonstration of power and control, which reverted 
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back to the ninetieth and early twentieth century Western monopoly over 
Mesopotamia. While a majority of the interviewees recognised that living on or 
near an ancient site damaged its historical and scientific integrity, none of them 
were in an authoritative position to stop construction. Individuals who identified 
the occupation as a mistake were ordered by their command staff to serve in their 
capacities as soldiers, and not as archaeologists.   
While many sympathised with the Iraqis being unable to visit the sites, they 
viewed the problem through a Western interpretation. For example, several 
interview participants suggested that the Iraqis were concerned with everyday 
survival, rather than ancient ruins. Troops were often faced with an unwinnable 
decision. If they were to guard the sites, their presence caused damage, but if they 
did not, the ruins were vulnerable to looters. This led to opinions of seeing 
themselves as the protectors who prevented the looting activity. However, this 
attitude was construed by some as displaying Orientalist motivations in regards to 
controlling the sites and who was allowed entry.   
In addition, it was difficult to form relations with the local community because 
the coalition isolated themselves by building walls that did not allow them to 
leave the base, while Iraqi entry was restricted. This resulted in nominal cross-
cultural interactions. Attitudes about the occupation and the locals varied, but 
malicious intentions were not voiced by any of the interviewees. However, 
cultural misunderstandings and unfamiliarity were common, which resulted in 
frustrations and suspicions. Overall, the manner in which a site was treated and 
how contact with the locals was approached, was dependent on how the unit 
commander viewed any given situation. While soldiers were independent 
thinkers, stringent military structure prohibited comprehensive engagement in 
cultural heritage matters if the highest-ranking officers did not recognise a need to 
do so.  
However, a few of the soldiers acknowledged that promoting cultural heritage 
awareness and cross-cultural cooperation were beneficial to the troops and the 
community. This was evident when the interviewees discussed the various 
projects they worked on during their deployments. The majority were devised, 
implemented and completed by the Westerners. On one hand this accentuated the 
perception of the troops holding an Orientalist attitude, but on the other, there 
were also several positive results. The entry arch at Ur was erected per Muhsen’s 
request, and the site assessment at Ur was conducted by a joint American-Iraqi 
team. The base removal project at Kish was approved by the General Director of 
the SBAH, which encouraged positive relations between the Western subject 
matter experts and members of the armed forces, on behalf of the Iraqis. The war 
environment unfortunately dictated Western involvement, as none of the projects 
would have been implemented without their involvement. Yet, projects were 
devised because of the invasion. This ambiguity could result in countless 
reiterations of the same arguments for and against the war, but the focus of this 
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study has been on the advances and achievements made thus far, and providing 
recommendations to avoid negative actions in the future.    
The occupation of sites and misunderstandings of the people were attributed to a 
lack of cultural heritage awareness training, which did not begin until 2006, a full 
three years after the war began and after thousands of troops had already 
transitioned in and out of the country. Yet, even once training was provided, it 
was not afforded to all deploying personnel. It was only available for a few units 
at selective training camps. The troops who benefited from the instruction were 
schooled in how to recognise and avoid damaging sites, and warned against 
stealing artefacts. These were important messages, and the instructors should be 
credited for their diligence in pressing the DoD to allow them classroom time. In 
spite of those advances, the topic of Orientalism was not covered, and has yet to 
be fully indoctrinated into current curriculum.   
It must also be noted that the Iraqis discussed in the case studies were willing to 
cooperate with the coalition, and must be commended for their part in ensuring 
contacts were beneficial. Feelings of resentfulness and anger would have been 
understandable, and while some may have felt that way, their conduct was 
welcoming, with a desire for successful cross-cultural relations. This facilitated 
reciprocal dialogue when all parties agreed to suspend reservations and embrace 
the challenges of forming positive relations that benefited the ruins and the 
people. However, soldiers who were restricted from leaving the secure bases were 
unable to form opinions about the Iraqis due to the lack of first-hand contact. 
None of the participants in this study were part of the collective who made 
decisions about base placement, as those procedures were under the purview of 
high-level personnel. This indicates that there is a need for unit commanders and 
ranking officers to receive in-depth training in order to gain an understanding of 
Orientalism and its connection to the occupation of a foreign country’s cultural 
property. However, as was discussed in the literature review, training courses 
tended to focus on the protection of the artefacts and standing ruins, rather than on 
relationship building strategies.   
Therefore, the answer to the research question is that the occupation of sites 
unintentionally revisited Orientalist biases, mainly due to the failure to understand 
the past Western control over Mesopotamia. In the 2003 preface of Orientalism, 
Said discussed the Iraq war and stated that there is ‘a profound difference between 
the will to understand for purposes of coexistence and humanistic enlargement of 
horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes of control and external 
domination’ (Said 2003 [1978], p. xix). While the soldiers did not intend to 
control the sites, the occupation dictated their actions, and the colonial past was 
revisited.  
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Recommendations 
In the following section, there are several suggestions posed that military 
leadership could embrace in order to alleviate the issues associated with troop 
activity at and around archaeological sites in foreign counties. The cultural 
heritage awareness training programs discussed in this thesis set a fundamental 
context that this research was able to expand on. The implementation of the 
archaeology checklist, the environmental contingency plan, the US and UK 
training directives, the websites that offer guidance on protecting cultural 
property, and the inclusion of coursework in officer candidate schools, were met 
with appreciation from all levels of the military.  
Yet, training organizations could expand these programs and curriculum to 
demonstrate the importance of cross-cultural cooperation in relation to protecting 
cultural property, and how it can serve as a method for enhancing relations with 
local populations. Because military culture is grounded in following the orders of 
superiors, it is essential to ensure that troops on all levels receive proper training, 
with a special emphasis on coaching for command staff. The recommendations 
listed below are not specifically modelled for Iraq, rather, they could be 
implemented in any country where armed forces units are engaged in conflict or 
post-conflict operations.  
The information provided in this thesis demonstrated that cultural heritage 
awareness training was generally embraced by members of the coalition who 
served in Iraq, but they recognised that it requires a more robust approach. One of 
the prevalent resolutions to this problem was the suggestion to reinstate civil 
affairs teams, and employ experts as part of the US Army Reserve Units. 
However this program, while well intended, continues the Orientalist biases 
which this thesis argues against. It puts Westerners in charge of foreign sites, and 
mimics the actions promoted by the poorly received Human Terrain System. 
Therefore, a more valuable tool would be for on-the-ground troops to have a basic 
understanding of how to recognise and avoid Orientalism biases in times of 
conflict and at heritage sites, while also promoting positive engagement with local 
experts. 
Although military doctrine may be seen as rigid and set, this is not necessarily 
true. As was demonstrated in the case studies, many soldiers were willing to 
diverge from their comfort zones and explore new ways of performing their 
duties. Therefore, innovative approaches such as including new training methods 
are anticipated to be well received. Proper instruction that demonstrates how 
connections to the colonial past pose a hindrance to relationship building would 
be well placed in practical coursework. Ideally, this could be incorporated into 
curriculum for officers, non-commissioned officers and the lower enlisted ranks 
in order to ensure that all members within the military hierarchy were reached. 
While training should continue to emphasise the importance of how to recognise 
and protect ancient ruins and artefacts, the archaeology checklist and lecture 
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series discussed in this thesis effectively cover those topics. However, in order to 
strengthen the training, it would be advisable for military planners and engineers 
to add awareness about avoiding the Orientalist component and provide 
instructions on how to coordinate with local specialists before choosing a location 
to build a base. First and foremost would be a warning to not use cultural property 
for military purposes. The mistakes made at Ur, Babylon, and Kish provided 
empirical examples of bad practice, and could be incorporated in ‘lessons learned’ 
training guidelines.    
If a base must be constructed near a historical site, full engagement with the local 
heritage specialists is vital, and they must not be barred from entering the site. In 
addition, the aforementioned reserve program could ensure that all of their experts 
were individuals who have and maintain close professional connections with local 
communities, and are positioned to provide in-field support. They would ensure 
that communication with the local experts was strictly followed, especially if 
discussion turned towards using cultural property for military purposes. Overall, 
recognizing local autonomy would need to remain a prime directive. The 
Combatant Command Cultural Heritage Action Group and Cultural Heritage by 
Archaeology and Military Panel websites could also add information about 
avoiding the colonial past on their electronic tutorials and links.  
The looting of sites was of significant concern to several of the scholars who were 
discussed within the literature review. Suggestions to have troops render 
protection to vulnerable ruins was posed as one possible solution to curtail 
looting. Many of the interviewees stated that their presence at Ur and Babylon 
deterred illegal activity. Yet the initial base placement on those sites should have 
been in close consultation with the Iraqis. If similar circumstances present 
themselves in the future, any placement of a foreign military near cultural 
property, every measure would need to be taken to ensure that international and 
domestic cultural laws are followed, and that the local heritage experts lead 
decisions related to the use of the site. The benefits of such close cooperation was 
outlined by the interviewees who had productive interactions with Muhsen, the 
site curator at Ur, as opposed to Babylon and the lack of contact with the 
archaeologists there.   
The past focus on ‘save the sites’ and ‘don’t damage the sites’ can often be seen 
as only protecting a ‘bunch of old rocks’ which not everyone necessarily 
embraces as a valid cause, and in which military operations take precedence. 
However, the military supports different concepts related to building relations, 
and are amicable to new ways of approaching this. Therefore, cultural heritage 
protection efforts could add an additional component, and that is to emphasize 
how the occupation of sites causes animosity and resentment, and revisits a 
colonial past. Such actions do not win the hearts and minds of the community. 
Protecting sites is not only enacted to save ancient ruins, but to positively engage 
with the local population.  
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Several of the soldiers communicated that they were most comfortable engaging 
with the Iraqi soldiers, mainly due to having similar backgrounds, and possessing 
an understanding of each other. By this logic, including training about 
Orientalism and cultural heritage would help the troops become more 
knowledgeable about the local ancient past, which could result in similar levels of 
familiarity. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, Orientalism should be the training 
focus for personnel slated for deployment to Eastern countries, and the broader 
concept of ethnocentrism should be addressed for others. It would not be expected 
nor feasible for every soldier to become a subject matter expert. Rather, he or she 
could possess enough comprehension to effectively relate with a local 
archaeologist, just as he or she would a member of the local armed forces.    
As was demonstrated in the case studies, cooperative projects proved to be useful 
mechanisms for forming positive relations. Coalition personnel who devised and 
contributed to the success of them did so mainly on their own accord. Many had a 
personal interest in history and were self-taught, which sometimes resulted in 
unknowingly attributing hero status to some of the early twentieth century 
archaeologists who acted in an Orientalist manner. While such programming 
should be continued, emphasis should be on military personnel serving in support 
roles, rather than in a leadership capacity. The same advice applies to civilian 
organizations who have a vested interest in cultural heritage protection. 
Cooperative endeavours should function for the primary purpose of aiding the 
local community, rather than advancing personal agendas.  
Further, training institutions that establish stronger ties with international heritage 
communities, rather than solely relying on Westerners and expatriates to provide 
instruction during pre-deployment training courses, could benefit from more 
accurate first-person accounts. The information many of the interview participants 
had received proved useful for understanding what constituted a cultural faux pas. 
These included refraining from showing the soles of shoes to the local population, 
and ensuring that women were not touched during any type of contact or 
interaction. However, the importance of a site such as Ur or Babylon to the people 
of Iraq was not discussed. While such interactions would prove challenging, the 
overreaching advantages gained from the knowledge and expertise from local 
experts would compensate any anticipated difficulties.      
In order to maintain consistency throughout the ranks, all commanders need to be 
in agreement on how contact with a local population is approached and 
established. While individual thoughts and perceptions will exist, the military’s 
structure ensures that rules are followed. While there are bound to be distracters 
and dissidents who may be against it, according to the research presented in the 
case studies, the majority of personnel would accept and practice such changes. 
Therefore, one of the most likely approaches for adding material to the training 
doctrine would be though the practitioners who work for organizations that 
instruct deploying personnel. These include: the United States Committee of the 
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Blue Shield; the US Training and Doctrine Command; the Overseas Regional 
Cultural Heritage Integrated Data program; the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat 
course; and the Reserve Officers Training Corps. Additional educational 
programs that are offered at military posts could also incorporate similar 
instruction. 
Why it Matters   
Understanding why it is necessary to raise awareness about Orientalism as it 
relates to cultural heritage sites is important on several levels. While conflict 
situations are dictated by military operations, non-combatants also factor heavily 
into the equation. This was the case during WWI, as it was during the Iraq war. A 
comparison of the ideologies held by British troops and civilian Westerners in the 
early 1900s were echoed by some of the 2003 coalition personnel. Similar 
viewpoints and the mistakes that resulted from them demonstrated that over a 
span of more than a century, full understanding of the East was still absent. 
Twenty-first century attitudes should have evolved beyond the Orientalist biases, 
yet without proper guidance, remained stagnant.     
Occupying another country’s cultural property causes anger and suspicion, while 
also sending a message of callous disregard. In addition, it can give an appearance 
of ignorance about the local culture and what they deem important. While the 
majority of the interviewees acknowledged an understanding of this, they did not 
have the deeper context to connect it to the historically patronizing view of the 
East by the West. Therefore, possessing a more robust knowledge of past cultural 
misappropriations would give troops an advantage of how to positively interact 
with communities. This further manifests into the potential for non-combatants to 
regard troops more favourably, and conversely, for the non-combatants to be 
viewed as valuable assets by military troops.        
Some of the interviewees explained how their relations with the local population 
assisted them to track insurgent activity. Because military command seeks 
alternate ways in which to perform their duties more effectively, being viewed 
more favourably can result in amicable local input that helps their community as 
much as it assists the soldiers. In addition, this alleviates the controversy of 
Western archaeologists aiding armed forces personnel, rather, it stays within a 
military context. Overall, refraining from treating any given non-combatant 
population in the aggressive and controlling manners displayed in the past, is one 
of the most constructive uses of the lessons learned philosophy embraced by the 
military.   
The Present Situation  
Since the withdrawal of all coalition forces at the end of 2011, Iraq has suffered 
another wave of devastating violence. In mid-2014, the Sunni-jihadist group 
known in English as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seized large 
swathes of territory and imposed their nightmarishly cruel state. A key cause of 
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the emergence of ISIS were the sequence of dramatic mistakes made by the 
coalition forces and the Iraqi political elite after the 2003 war and the poorly 
planned and executed withdrawal that failed to achieve its intended goals of 
bringing democracy and security to Iraq. The ramifications to the general 
population were catastrophic. They have been subjected to continued sectarian 
warfare and a repressive regime. The fear of slaughter for non-Muslims, as well 
as Shia residents, has resulted in a refugee crisis as people flee from both Iraq and 
Syria (Adelman 2015; Al Tamimi 2014; Isakhan 2015c, 2015d). 
A 2014 Brookings Institute report delivered a set of strategies intended to provide 
guidance in stopping the continued advancement of ISIS. These included the need 
to stabilise the region, limit their social media outreach, neutralise their mobility, 
and counter their financial strength (Lister 2014, p. 3). At the time of writing this 
conclusion (December 2016), the fight against ISIS has had modest successes, 
including re-taking significant cities such as Ramadi and Tikrit. Nonetheless, they 
remain a credible threat and are likely to continue to play a destabilising role in 
Iraq and Syria into the foreseeable future. 
From the time they captured significant territory in both Syria and Iraq, ISIS have 
also undertaken an aggressive campaign against the rich historical and 
archaeological sites that litter the two countries. In February 2015, they destroyed 
artefacts on exhibit in the Mosul Museum (Danti 2015; Danti et al. 2015). 
Wholescale destruction of religious and archaeological sites soon followed, 
including severe damages at Nineveh, Nimrud and Hatra, which are all located in 
the north of Iraq (Al Quntar et al. 2015; Bauer 2015; Harmanşah 2015).  
Recent events attest to the fact that issues related to Orientalism and the 
occupation of archaeological ruins are still being committed. An example stems 
from reports in May 2016 that a Russian army unit was constructing a military 
base on the ruins of ancient Palmyra in Syria (Danti et al. 2016; Mroue 2016). 
Syria, just like Iraq, was subjugated to colonial rule in the early twentieth century 
(Kamrava 2013). However, while many journalists and scholars have lamented 
the Russian presence at Palmyra, the extent to which it invokes a legacy of 
colonial control of archaeological sites in the region has not been expressed. 
Scholars have discussed how the army’s presence is in violation of antiquities 
laws, and that ‘the site’s militarization exposes the fragile and poorly preserved 
archaeological remains in the Northern Necropolis to other threats’ (Danti et al. 
2016, p. 1).  
Yet dialogue has not yet been directed at the issues related to a Western military 
presence on the ruins and how it has revisited the Orientalism of the past. This 
demonstrates there is a vital need to raise awareness for military personnel, as 
well as cultural heritage specialists and academics across the globe. Focus needs 
to be on the importance of incorporating Orientalist dogma into discussions about 
heritage protection. As the conflict remains fluid and dangerous, uncertainty 
surrounds the fate of the people, the region, and the antiquities in Iraq and Syria. 
158	
	
Understanding as many aspects of the conflict as possible, including Orientalist 
biases and cultural property, could assist with future positive communication and 
partnerships.            
Future Research  
The data presented in this study could be utilised for future research. An 
interesting direction would be to use the data from the case studies to compare 
with the destruction caused by ISIS, specifically at the ruins of Nineveh, Nimrud, 
and Hatra. While the circumstances are not parallel, understanding different 
degrees of occupation would assist the overall scholarly record, which requires 
further researched accounts. The information learned from this thesis, including 
the successes and mistakes, would greatly contribute to any body of work that 
seeks to explore the narrative of foreign militaries and local archaeological sites. 
For example, it could serve as a catalyst for similar studies in other regions of the 
world, specifically, post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia that are 
experiencing current conflict, or where war has recently ended.  
Conclusion 
This thesis has provided innovative information from individuals who recounted 
front-line experiences that have not been previously recorded. Their voices have 
contributed to the existing and growing body of knowledge related to strategies to 
help protect cultural heritage venues in conflict and post-conflict situations. The 
literature review established that issues related to looting, site damages, 
international and domestic cultural heritage laws, cross-cultural relations, and pre-
deployment training schemes, were all well reported. Therefore the topic of 
Orientalism that has been discussed and analysed in this thesis, is a much needed 
layer that furthers efforts to assist military personnel with productive interactions 
while deployed overseas. The candid opinions conveyed by the interview 
participants revealed that while some soldiers were wary of Iraqis, as a whole, 
they did not feel it was acceptable to damage a site or a relationship. They too 
wanted positive contact with the local population.   
The case studies demonstrated that the sites were primarily coveted for their 
theological representations by Westerners when archaeology was in its infancy, 
and by the modern military because they offered a convenient spot to construct a 
base camp. The analysed data revealed that the relations with Muhsen, the curator 
at Ur, helped the soldiers to understand how an Iraqi might value the site. This 
was enlightening for many of the troops who did not initially consider how the 
local population related to the ancient ruins. Yet it was only by chance that he was 
allowed to live within the military fence-line, which proved beneficial for both the 
coalition and the site. It was interesting to note that the unintentional act of 
leaving Muhsen on the site resulted in some of the most productive and 
memorable interactions for the soldiers. Contrasting those interfaces with the lack 
of contact with archaeologists at Babylon and Kish illustrated that the personal 
contact was one of the most effective tools at bridging the cultural gap.  
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These real-life scenarios have therefore demonstrated their usefulness for the 
purposes of serving as valuable examples of best and worst practices. The US 
Army has recognized past mistakes, and have added new guidance to correct 
them. However, it must be complemented with an understanding of Orientalism 
and its effects on a local population. Command staff are the best and most useful 
instruments in military strategy planning, and if they display positive and friendly 
overtones to the locals, then troops will match their demeanour.      
A globalized world does not mean that the West should take the lead on decisions 
in other countries, rather shared responsibilities should be the focus. Conducting 
research about a country where soldiers are set to deploy, examining the history, 
and refraining from exhibiting notions of power and control over ancient sites, 
especially those with a colonial past, are a vital step in avoiding the mistakes that 
were made during previous conflicts. This alters the legacy that was established 
by early travellers with their disparaging descriptions about Mesopotamia and the 
local community, and which was executed well into the mid-1900s. The years of 
wars and sanctions resulted in minimal contact between Iraqis and Westerners, 
especially Americans, and accurate knowledge about local customs were lacking.  
Armed with proper awareness will have considerable influence with helping the 
legacy of Orientalism to become a relic of the past, and something that can be 
avoided in current and future conflicts. The case studies demonstrated that the 
troops were not dismissive of the bases on the sites, rather it was not something 
they deliberated over. This was because they were never schooled in how the 
occupation would be viewed by the locals, or the international cultural heritage 
community. Living on the sites did impact their ability to interact with the locals, 
yet it was also an issue that was overcome by several individuals who reached out 
and created positive relations, mainly on their own accord.   
This thesis has therefore assisted the reader to understand the past history of 
Orientalism associated with the archaeological sites in Iraq, and how some of the 
heroes of the past were, in retrospect, acting with self-interest. It also gave voice 
to members of the coalition who served during the war, and the few Iraqis who 
were able to contribute their opinions. An emphasis was placed on the importance 
of cooperative relations, and why it is vital to include training that addresses 
learning from the past colonial mistakes. The research has made an original 
contribution to the existing pool of knowledge, and it is hoped that the findings 
will be included in future training courses and classroom studies. 
Reflecting on the events that started the idea to embark on this journey seems like 
a lifetime ago. When first setting foot in Iraq, and all of the personal experiences 
and observations throughout the years that eventually led to this thesis, I am 
reminded of one of my fondest memories. In 2009, I was working in tandem with 
archaeologists from the SBAH, as we conducted surveys on several southern 
sites, documenting evidence of looting. My military transport included Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, which stand over 3 meters tall and 
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weigh more than 13 tonnes, while the Iraqis were in small white pickup trucks. A 
few of the sites we planned to visit were not accessible by roads, but one of the 
Iraqis had a map that showed nearby landmarks and potential routes.  
The summer temperature was over 40 degrees Celsius and everyone was outside 
looking at the map, trying to seek shade in the shadow of the colossal US military 
vehicle. Per military protocol when on the road, the soldiers were dressed in their 
full battle gear, while the archaeologists were in their jeans and t-shirts. Everyone 
was bent over the map, consulting each other on how to manoeuvre the convoy 
through the area, taking into account intelligence information on insurgent 
activity and the safest possible course to avoid damaging existing ruins. The 
remembered image of all the soldiers surrounding the archaeologists, giving them 
their full attention and listening to their advice, heartens me. It highlights that 
such cooperative and mutually respectful relationships are possible, and more 
importantly, can and will be encouraged in the future.  
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Appendix I 
 
 
 
 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT FOR US AND COALITION 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
TO: Participant   
 
Plain Language Statement  
Date: 07-04-14 
Full Project Title: Assessing Cross-Cultural Relationships between US and 
Coalition Military Forces and Iraqi Cultural Heritage Professionals at 
Archaeological Sites during the Iraq War 
Principal Researcher: Benjamin Isakhan 
Student Researcher: Diane Siebrandt   
Associate Researcher(s):  
 
 
1. Consent 
You are invited to take part in this research project. 
This Plain Language Statement contains detailed information about the research 
project. Its purpose is to explain to you as openly and clearly as possible all the 
procedures involved in this project so that you can make a fully informed decision 
whether you are going to participate or not. 
Please read this Plain Language Statement carefully. Feel free to ask questions 
about any information in the document. Once you understand what the project is 
about and if you agree to take part in it, you will be asked to sign the Consent 
Form. By signing the Consent Form, you indicate that you understand the 
information and that you give your consent to participate in the research project. 
You will be given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to 
keep as a record. 
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2. Purpose 
The purpose of this project is to investigate the relationships that did or did not 
exist between members of the US and coalition military forces, and Iraqi cultural 
heritage professionals during the Iraq War. Particular focus is on military bases 
and outposts that were constructed on and near archaeological sites, and what 
effect that had on establishing cross-cultural relationships. This project is 
conducted as part of a PhD degree being undertaken at Deakin University in 
Australia. 
3. Methods 
Information will be collected from active and retired US and coalition Iraq War 
Veterans. This will be done by interviewing male and female individuals for no 
more than one hour either in-person, or over a Skype phone conversation. Each 
interview will consist of a serious of open-ended questions, which will allow the 
participant to provide as long or as brief an answer as they wish to give. The 
questions will focus on discussing how cross-cultural relationships positively and 
negatively impacted cultural heritage protection efforts in different conflict and 
post-conflict zones of Iraq. You will be asked to reflect on your interactions with 
Iraqi cultural heritage specialists, and explain what you believed worked and did 
not work for forming ties and protecting archaeological sites. If projects were 
implemented, questions will focus on how responsibilities where divided when 
devising, implementing and managing projects. The interview will be audio 
recorded for data analysis purposes. A total of about 40 individuals will be 
interviewed for this project. 
4. Risks and Potential Benefits to Participants 
There are no anticipated risks. However participants are encouraged to convey 
any and all concerns of risk involved to the student researcher either verbally or in 
writing.  
The individuals participating in this research are contributing to enriching a field 
of study not widely published. Their contributions will provide the information 
necessary to form guidelines that are hoped to shape future policy towards 
establishing positive cross-cultural relationships at cultural heritage sites in 
conflict prone countries. 
Local participants will benefit from contributing to and enriching knowledge 
about Iraqi cultural heritage practices and ideological norms to non-Iraqis. This 
study also provides participants with the opportunity to reflect and discuss past 
events and how lessons can be learned from those events, both positive and 
negative.   
5. Expected Benefits to the Wider Community  
Forming cross-cultural relationships between foreign military powers and local 
heritage experts in order to protect heritage sites is rarely discussed in literature. 
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Therefore, this study fills these gaps in knowledge, resulting in a better 
understanding of the benefits of cross-cultural cooperation. This study is expected 
to assist in future academic research projects, in addition to providing guidance to 
governmental agencies and international public and private organizations with a 
vested interest in cultural heritage protection. 
6. Privacy and Confidentiality  
The data collected during this study will not be traceable to any individual. The 
data will be stored in a password protected laptop and desktop computer, and only 
accessible by the principle researcher and student researcher. All information will 
be stored for a minimum of 6 years after final publication, after which it will be 
destroyed. 
Information collected in relation to this study that could potentially identify you 
will remain strictly confidential. Information will only be disclosed with your 
permission, subject to legal requirements. By giving your permission by signing 
the Consent Form, we anticipate publishing the results in peer reviewed journals. 
You will not be identified in any published information.   
7. Dissemination of Research Results  
The results and information collected and analyzed from this study will be used as 
a PhD thesis and for publication in journal articles and conference papers. A 
report about the findings in this study will be provided to any participant upon 
request. 
8. Monitoring of the Research  
The student researcher will maintain regular contact with the principle researcher 
via emails and Skype telephone conversations while collecting data. While in 
Iraq, contact will be established and maintained with the Australian and American 
Embassies in Baghdad and the American Consulate in Erbil.  
9. Payments to Participants  
You will not be paid for your participation in this project. 
10. Sources of Funding for Project  
Funding for this research project has generously been provided by Deakin 
University. 
11. Conducting Research in Iraq 
The student researcher lived and worked in Iraq from January 2005 until January 
2013 and is fully familiar with Iraqi customs and traditions, as well as US and 
coalition military customs and traditions. Risks to participants will be minimized 
by allowing any participant to opt out of the interview at any time. In addition, 
confidentiality and anonymity of all collected data will be ensured to each 
participant. 
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12. Participation is Voluntary  
Participation in this research project is purely voluntary. You are not obliged to 
participate if you do not wish to do so. If you decide to participate in this project 
and decide at a later date to withdraw your consent, you are free to do so and any 
information obtained from you will not be used in the project and will be 
destroyed. Your decision whether to take part or not to take part, or to take part 
and then withdraw, will not affect your relationship with Deakin University. 
Before you make your decision, a member of the research team will be available 
to answer any questions you have about the research project.  
Sign the Consent Form only after you have had a chance to ask your questions 
and have received satisfactory answers. If you decide to withdraw from this 
project, please notify the student researcher or complete and return the 
Revocation of Consent Form attached to this form.  
13. Ethical Guidelines 
This project will be carried out according to the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Human Research (2007) produced by the National Health and Medical 
Research Council of Australia. This statement has been developed to protect the 
interests of people who agree to participate in human research studies. 
The ethics aspects of this research project have been approved by the Human 
Research Ethics Committee of Deakin University. 
Approval from the Deakin University Faculty of Arts and Education has been 
obtained. 
 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being 
conducted or any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you 
may contact:   
The Manager  
Research Integrity  
Deakin University  
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood Victoria 3125 
Australia 
Telephone: +61 9251 7129 
Email: research-ethics@deakin.edu.au 
 
Please quote project number 2014 – 011.  
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14. Further Information, Queries or Any Problems 
If you require further information, wish to withdraw your participation or if you 
have any concerns about this project you can contact the student researcher:  
Diane Siebrandt 
PhD Student 
Deakin University  
Centre for Citizenship and Globalization  
Faculty of Arts and Education 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood, Victoria 3125 
Australia 
Mobile: + 61 414 719 269  
Email: dsiebran@deakin.edu.au 
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Appendix II 
 
 
 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT FOR IRAQI HERITAGE 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
TO: Participant   
 
Plain Language Statement  
Date: 07-04-14 
Full Project Title: Assessing Cross-Cultural Relationships between US and 
Coalition Military Forces and Iraqi Cultural Heritage Professionals at 
Archaeological Sites during the Iraq War 
Principal Researcher: Benjamin Isakhan 
Student Researcher: Diane Siebrandt   
Associate Researcher(s):  
 
 
1. Consent 
You are invited to take part in this research project. 
This Plain Language Statement contains detailed information about the research 
project. Its purpose is to explain to you as openly and clearly as possible all the 
procedures involved in this project so that you can make a fully informed decision 
whether you are going to participate or not. 
Please read this Plain Language Statement carefully. Feel free to ask questions 
about any information in the document. Once you understand what the project is 
about and if you agree to take part in it, you will be asked to sign the Consent 
Form. By signing the Consent Form, you indicate that you understand the 
information and that you give your consent to participate in the research project. 
You will be given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to 
keep as a record. 
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2. Purpose 
The purpose of this project is to investigate the relationships that did or did not 
exist between members of the US and coalition military forces, and Iraqi cultural 
heritage professionals during the Iraq War. Particular focus is on military bases 
and outposts that were constructed on and near archaeological sites, and what 
effect that had on establishing cross-cultural relationships. This project is 
conducted as part of a PhD degree being undertaken at Deakin University in 
Australia. 
3. Methods  
Information will be collected from active and retired Iraqi cultural heritage 
specialists. This will be done by interviewing male and female individuals either 
in-person, or over a Skype phone conversation. Interviews conducted in English 
will last no more than one hour. Interviews requiring the use of a translator will 
last no more than two hours. Each interview will consist of a series of open-ended 
questions, which will allow you to provide as long or as brief an answer as you 
wish to provide. The questions will focus on discussing how cross-cultural 
relationships positively and negatively impacted cultural heritage protection 
efforts in different conflict and post-conflict zones of Iraq. You will be asked to 
reflect on your interactions with members of the US and coalition military forces, 
and explain what you believe worked and did not work for forming ties with 
them, and protecting archaeological sites. If there were any projects implemented, 
questions will focus on how responsibilities where divided when devising, 
implementing and managing projects. The interview will be audio recorded for 
data analysis purposes. A total of about 40 individuals will be interviewed for this 
project.  
4. Risks and Potential Benefits to Participants 
There are no anticipated risks. However participants are encouraged to convey 
any and all concerns of risk involved to the student researcher either verbally or in 
writing.  
The individuals participating in this research are contributing to enriching a field 
of study not widely published. Their contributions will provide the information 
necessary to form guidelines that are hoped to shape future policy towards 
establishing positive cross-cultural relationships at cultural heritage sites in 
conflict prone countries. 
Local participants will benefit from contributing to and enriching knowledge 
about Iraqi cultural heritage practices and ideological norms to non-Iraqis. This 
study also provides participants with the opportunity to reflect and discuss past 
events and how lessons can be learned from those events, both positive and 
negative.   
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5. Expected Benefits to the Wider Community  
Forming cross-cultural relationships between foreign military powers and local 
heritage experts in order to protect heritage sites is rarely discussed in literature. 
Therefore, this study fills these gaps in knowledge, resulting in a better 
understanding of the benefits of cross-cultural cooperation. This study is expected 
to assist in future academic research projects, in addition to providing guidance to 
governmental agencies and international public and private organizations with a 
vested interest in cultural heritage protection. 
6. Privacy and Confidentiality  
The data collected during this study will not be traceable to any individual. The 
data will be stored in a password protected laptop and desktop computer, and only 
accessible by the principle researcher and student researcher. All information will 
be stored for a minimum of 6 years after final publication, after which it will be 
destroyed. 
Information collected in relation to this study that could potentially identify you 
will remain strictly confidential. Information will only be disclosed with your 
permission, subject to legal requirements. By giving your permission by signing 
the Consent Form, we anticipate publishing the results in peer reviewed journals. 
You will not be identified in any published information.   
7. Dissemination of Research Results  
The results and information collected and analyzed from this study will be used as 
a PhD thesis and for publication in journal articles and conference papers. A 
report about the findings in this study will be provided to any participant upon 
request. 
8. Monitoring of the Research  
The student researcher will maintain regular contact with the principle researcher 
via emails and Skype telephone conversations while collecting data. While in 
Iraq, contact will be established and maintained with the Australian and American 
Embassies in Baghdad and the American Consulate in Erbil.  
9. Payments to Participants  
You will not be paid for your participation in this project. 
10. Sources of Funding for Project  
Funding for this research project has generously been provided by Deakin 
University. 
11. Conducting Research in Iraq 
The student researcher lived and worked in Iraq from January 2005 until January 
2013 and is fully familiar with Iraqi customs and traditions, as well as US and 
coalition military customs and traditions. Risks to participants will be minimized 
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by allowing any participant to opt out of the interview at any time. In addition, 
confidentiality and anonymity of all collected data will be ensured to each 
participant. 
12. Participation is Voluntary  
Participation in this research project is purely voluntary. You are not obliged to 
participate if you do not wish to do so. If you decide to participate in this project 
and decide at a later date to withdraw your consent, you are free to do so and any 
information obtained from you will not be used in the project and will be 
destroyed. Your decision whether to take part or not to take part, or to take part 
and then withdraw, will not affect your relationship with Deakin University. 
Before you make your decision, a member of the research team will be available 
to answer any questions you have about the research project.  
Sign the Consent Form only after you have had a chance to ask your questions 
and have received satisfactory answers. If you decide to withdraw from this 
project, please notify the student researcher or complete and return the 
Revocation of Consent Form attached to this form.  
13. Ethical Guidelines 
This project will be carried out according to the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Human Research (2007) produced by the National Health and Medical 
Research Council of Australia. This statement has been developed to protect the 
interests of people who agree to participate in human research studies. 
The ethics aspects of this research project have been approved by the Human 
Research Ethics Committee of Deakin University. 
Approval from the Deakin University Faculty of Arts and Education has been 
obtained. 
 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being 
conducted or any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you 
may contact:   
 
The Manager  
Research Integrity  
Deakin University  
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood Victoria 3125 
Australia 
Telephone: +61 9251 7129 
Email: research-ethics@deakin.edu.au 
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Please quote project number 2014 – 011.  
14. Further Information, Queries or Any Problems 
If you require further information, wish to withdraw your participation or if you 
have any concerns about this project you can contact the student researcher:  
Diane Siebrandt 
PhD Student 
Deakin University  
Centre for Citizenship and Globalization  
Faculty of Arts and Education 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood, Victoria 3125 
Australia 
Mobile: + 61 414 719 269  
Email: dsiebran@deakin.edu.au 
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  اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ:ﺑﯾﺎن واﺿﺢ ﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻻم و ﻧﻣوذج 
  																																																																																				إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣﺷﺎرك :  				
  ﺑﯾﺎن اﻟﻠﻐﺔ ﻋﺎدي
  4102ﯾوﻟﯾو / ﺗﻣوز  1اﻟﺗﺎرﯾﺦ: 
 
ﺑﯾن اﻟﻘوات اﻟﻌﺳﻛرﯾﺔ اﻷﻣرﯾﻛﯾﺔ  ﻛﺎﻣل ﻋﻧوان اﻟﻣﺷروع: ﺗﻘﯾﯾم اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت ﻋﺑر ﺗﺑﺎدل اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﺎت واﻟﺣﺿﺎرات
  وات اﻟﺗﺣﺎﻟف وﻣﮭﻧﯾﯾن اﻟﺗراث اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﻲ اﻟﻌراﻗﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣواﻗﻊ اﻷﺛرﯾﺔ ﺧﻼل ﺣرب اﻟﻌراق.وﻗ
  اﻟﺑﺎﺣث اﻟرﺋﯾﺳﻲ:  ﺑﻧﺟﺎﻣﯾن اﺳﺧﺎن
  اﻟطﺎﻟﺑﺔ اﻟﺑﺎﺣﺛﺔ: دﯾﺎن ﺳﯾﺑرﻧدت
  ﻣﺷﺎرك اﻟﺑﺎﺣث: 
     
  . اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ١
  أﻧت ﻣدﻋو ﻟﻠﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﻣﺷروع اﻟﺑﺣﺛﻲ.
ﻋن اﻟﻣﺷروع اﻟﺑﺣﺛﻲ. واﻟﻐرض ﻣﻧﮫ ھو أن أﺷرح ﻟﻛم  ھذا ﺑﯾﺎن ﻋﺎدي اﻟﻠﻐﺔ ﯾﺣﺗوي ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت ﻣﻔﺻﻠﺔ
وﺑﺻراﺣﺔ وﺑوﺿوح ﻣﻣﻛن ﻛل اﻹﺟراءات اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﻣﺷروع ﺑﺣﯾث ﯾﻣﻛﻧك اﺗﺧﺎذ ﻗرار ﺣول ﻣﺎ إذا 
  ﻛﺎن ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻠم ﺗﺎم ﻛﻧت ﺗﺳﯾر ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ أم ﻻ.
ﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت اﻟواردة ﻓﻲ ﯾرﺟﻰ ﻗراءة ھذا اﻟﺑﯾﺎن ﻋﺎدي اﻟﻠﻐﺔ ﺑﻌﻧﺎﯾﺔ. ﻻ ﺗﺗردد ﻓﻲ طرح اﻷﺳﺋﻠﺔ ﺣول أي ﻣن ا
اﻟوﺛﯾﻘﺔ. ﺑﻣﺟرد ﻓﮭم ﻣﺎ ھو اﻟﻣﺷروع ﺣول وإذا واﻓﻘت ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ذﻟك، وﺳوف ﯾطﻠب ﻣﻧك اﻟﺗوﻗﯾﻊ 
ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻣوذج اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ. ﻣن ﺧﻼل اﻟﺗوﻗﯾﻊ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻣوذج اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ، أﻧت ﺗﺷﯾر إﻟﻰ أﻧك ﻓﮭم اﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت واﻟﺗﻲ 
  ﺗﻌطﻲ ﻣواﻓﻘﺗك ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﺷروع اﻟﺑﺣﺛﻲ.
  ل ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﺳﺧﺔ ﻣن ﺑﯾﺎن ﻋﺎدي ﻓﻲ ﻟﻐﺔ اﻻم وﻧﻣوذج اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ ﻟﻠﺣﻔﺎظ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﺳﺟل.ﺳوف ﺗﺣﺻ
  . اﻟﻐرض٢
اﻟﻐرض ﻣن ھذا اﻟﻣﺷروع ھو دراﺳﺔ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت اﻟﺗﻲ ﻓﻌﻠت أو ﻟم ﺗﻛن ﻣوﺟودة ﺑﯾن أﻓراد اﻟﻘوات اﻷﻣرﯾﻛﯾﺔ 
ون وﻗوات اﻟﺗﺣﺎﻟف، واﻟﻣﮭﻧﯾﯾن اﻟﺗراث اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﻲ اﻟﻌراﻗﻲ ﺧﻼل ﺟﻣﯾﻊ ﻣراﺣل اﻟﺣرب اﻟﻌراق. وﺳوف ﯾﻛ
اﻟﺗرﻛﯾز ﺑﺷﻛل ﺧﺎص ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘواﻋد اﻟﻌﺳﻛرﯾﺔ واﻟﺑؤر اﻻﺳﺗﯾطﺎﻧﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺷﯾدت ﻋﻠﻰ وﺑﺎﻟﻘرب ﻣن اﻟﻣواﻗﻊ 
  اﻷﺛرﯾﺔ، وﻣﺎ اﻟﺗﺄﺛﯾر اﻟذي ﻛﺎن ﻋﻠﻰ إﻗﺎﻣﺔ ﻋﻼﻗﺎت ﺑﯾن اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﺎت.
وﯾﺟري ھذا اﻟﻣﺷروع ﻛﺟزء ﻣن ﺷﮭﺎدة اﻟدﻛﺗوراه اﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﺟري اﻻﺿطﻼع ﺑﮭﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ دﯾﻛﯾن ﻓﻲ 
(، ﻓﻲ وﻗت ﻣﺑﻛر CRAذا اﻟﻣﺷروع ھو ﺟزء ﻣن ﻣﺟﻠس ﺑﺣوث أﻛﺑر أﺳﺗراﻟﯾﺎ )ﻣﻠﺑورن، أﺳﺗراﻟﯾﺎ. ھ
( زﻣﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﻧﺣت ﻟﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ دﯾﻛن، ﺑﻌﻧوان: ﻗﯾﺎس ﺗدﻣﯾر اﻟﺗراث واﻟﻣﺳﺎﻣﯾر ARCEDاﻟوظﯾﻔﻲ ﺟﺎﺋزة اﻟﺑﺎﺣث )
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ﻣن أﻋﻣﺎل اﻟﻌﻧف ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌراق. وﯾﺗﻧﺎول اﻟﻣﺷروع اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﯾن ﺗدﻣﯾر اﻟﺗراث واﻟﻌﻧف ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌراق ﻣﻧذ ﻋﺎم 
ﻣﻘﺎرﺑﺔ ﻣﻧﮭﺟﯾﺔ ﻣﺑﺗﻛرة، ﻣن اﻟﻣﺗوﻗﻊ أن اﻟﻣﺷروع ﻟﺗوﻟﯾد ﻣﻔﺎھﯾم ﺟدﯾدة ﻟﻠﻣﺟﻣﻊ ﺑﯾن اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ  . ﺗوظﯾف3002
  اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗرﺑط ﺑﯾن ﺗدﻣﯾر اﻟﺗراث اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﻲ واﻟﻔورات اﻟﺣﺎدة ﻓﻲ اﻹرھﺎب واﻟﻌﻧف .
  . اﻷﺳﺎﻟﯾب٣
ن وﺳﯾﺗم ﺟﻣﻊ اﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت ﻣن اﻟﻣﺗﺧﺻﺻﯾن اﻟﺗراث اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﻲ اﻟﻌراﻗﻲ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﯾن واﻟﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋدﯾن. وﺳﯾﺗم ذﻟك ﻣ
ﺧﻼل ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ اﻷﻓراد ﻣن اﻟذﻛور واﻹﻧﺎث ﺳواء ﻓﻲ ﺷﺧص، أو ﻋﺑر اﻟﮭﺎﺗف اﻟﻣﺣﺎدﺛﺔ ﺳﻛﺎﯾب. واﻟﻣﻘﺎﺑﻼت 
اﻟﺗﻲ أﺟرﯾت ﺑﺎﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻹﻧﺟﻠﯾزﯾﺔ آﺧر ﻻ ﯾزﯾد ﻋن ﺳﺎﻋﺔ واﺣدة. واﻟﻣﻘﺎﺑﻼت اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺗطﻠب اﺳﺗﺧدام ﻣﺗرﺟم آﺧر 
واﻟﺗﻲ ﺳوف ﺗﺳﻣﺢ ﻟك ﻟﺗوﻓﯾر  ﻻ ﯾزﯾد ﻋن ﺳﺎﻋﺗﯾن. وﺳﯾﺗﺄﻟف ﻛل ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻣن ﺳﻠﺳﻠﺔ ﻣن اﻷﺳﺋﻠﺔ اﻟﻣﻔﺗوﺣﺔ،
طﺎﻟﻣﺎ أو ﻗﺻﯾرة ﻛﺈﺟﺎﺑﺔ ﻛﻣﺎ ﯾﺣﻠو ﻟك ﻟﺗوﻓﯾر. وﺳوف ﺗرﻛز اﻷﺳﺋﻠﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺔ ﻛﯾﻔﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت ﺑﯾن 
  مختلف مناﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﺎت أﺛرت ﺳﻠﺑﺎ وإﯾﺟﺎﺑﺎ ﺟﮭود ﺣﻣﺎﯾﺔ اﻟﺗراث اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻧﺎطق اﻟﻧزاع وﻣﺎ ﺑﻌد اﻟﻧزاع 
اﻟﻌراق. ﺳوف ﯾطﻠب ﻣﻧك ﻟﻠﺗﻔﻛﯾر ﻓﻲ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠك ﻣﻊ أﻋﺿﺎء اﻟﻘوات اﻷﻣرﯾﻛﯾﺔ وﻗوات اﻟﺗﺣﺎﻟف، وﺷرح ﻣﺎ 
، وﺣﻣﺎﯾﺔ اﻟﻣواﻗﻊ اﻷﺛرﯾﺔ. إذا ﻛﺎن ھﻧﺎك أي اﻟﻣﺷﺎرﯾﻊ معهماﻛﻧت ﺗﻌﺗﻘد ﻧﻔذت وﻟم ﯾﻌﻣل ﻟﺗﺷﻛﯾل اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت 
ﻟﻣﺷﺎرﯾﻊ وإدارﺗﮭﺎ. وﺳوف اﻟﻣﻧﻔذة، وﺳﺗرﻛز اﻷﺳﺋﻠﺔ ﺣول ﻛﯾﻔﯾﺔ ﺗﻘﺳﯾم اﻟﻣﺳؤوﻟﯾﺎت ﺣﯾث ﻋﻧد وﺿﻊ وﺗﻧﻔﯾذ ا
ﺷﺧﺻﺎ  04ﺗﻛون اﻟﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ اﻟﺻوﺗﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺳﺟﻠﺔ ﻷﻏراض ﺗﺣﻠﯾل اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت. ﺳﯾﺗم ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺗﮭم ﻣﺎ ﻣﺟﻣوﻋﮫ ﺣواﻟﻲ 
	 	ﻟﮭذا اﻟﻣﺷروع.
  . اﻟﻣﺧﺎطر واﻟﻔواﺋد اﻟﻣﺣﺗﻣﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﺷﺎرﻛﯾن.٤
ﮭﯾﺎ أو ﻟﻠﺑﺎﺣث اﻟطﺎﻟب إﻣﺎ ﺷﻔ ﻻ ﺗوﺟد ﻣﺧﺎطر اﻟﻣﺗوﻗﻌﺔ. وﻣﻊ ذﻟك ﻛﻧت ﻣدﻋوة ﻟﻧﻘل أي وﺟﻣﯾﻊ اﻻھﺗﻣﺎﻣﺎت
  ﺧطﯾﺎ.
وﺗﺳﺎھم ﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺗﻛم ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﺑﺣث ﻓﻲ إﺛراء ﺣﻘل اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﻟم ﺗﻧﺷر ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧطﺎق واﺳﻊ. ﺳوف ﻣﺳﺎھﻣﺎﺗﻛم 
ﺗوﻓﯾر اﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻟﺗﺷﻛﯾل اﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮭﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﺄﻣل ﻓﻲ ﺗﺷﻛﯾل اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﻣﺳﺗﻘﺑﻠﯾﺔ ﻧﺣو إﻗﺎﻣﺔ 
  ﻠدان اﻟﻣﻌرﺿﺔ اﻟﺻراع.ﻋﻼﻗﺎت إﯾﺟﺎﺑﯾﺔ ﺑﯾن اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻣواﻗﻊ اﻟﺗراث اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺑ
ھذه اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﯾوﻓر ﻟك ﻓرﺻﺔ ﻟﻠﺗﻔﻛﯾر وﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺔ اﻷﺣداث اﻟﻣﺎﺿﯾﺔ وﻛﯾف اﻟدروس اﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﻣﻛن اﺳﺗﺧﻼﺻﮭﺎ 
  ﻣن ﺗﻠك اﻷﺣداث.
  اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ اﻷوﺳﻊ ﻓﻲ. اﻟﻔواﺋد اﻟﻣﺗوﻗﻌﺔ ٥
اﻟﻣﺣﻠﻲ ﻣن ﻧﺎدرا ﻣﺎ ﯾﺗم ﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺗﮭﺎ ﺗﺷﻛﯾل ﻋﻼﻗﺎت ﺑﯾن اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﺎت ﺑﯾن اﻟﻘوى اﻟﻌﺳﻛرﯾﺔ اﻷﺟﻧﺑﯾﺔ وﺧﺑراء اﻟﺗراث 
أﺟل ﺣﻣﺎﯾﺔ اﻟﻣواﻗﻊ اﻟﺗراﺛﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻷدب. وﺑﺎﻟﺗﺎﻟﻲ، ﯾﻣﻸ ھذه اﻟدراﺳﺔ ھذه اﻟﻔﺟوات ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﻌرﻓﺔ، ﻣﻣﺎ أدى إﻟﻰ 
ﻓﮭم أﻓﺿل ﻟﻔواﺋد اﻟﺗﻌﺎون ﺑﯾن اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﺎت. وﻣن اﻟﻣﺗوﻗﻊ ھذه اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﺳﺎﻋدة ﻓﻲ ﻣﺷﺎرﯾﻊ اﻟﺑﺣوث اﻷﻛﺎدﯾﻣﯾﺔ 
ﻛﺎﻻت اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﯾﺔ واﻟﻣﻧظﻣﺎت اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ واﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ اﻟدوﻟﯾﺔ ﻣﻊ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﺳﺗﻘﺑل، ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ ﺗوﻓﯾر اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮫ إﻟﻰ اﻟو
  ﻣﺻﻠﺣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻣﺎﯾﺔ اﻟﺗراث اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﻲ.
  واﻟﺳرﯾﺔاﻟﺧﺻوﺻﯾﺔ . ٦
ﻓﺈن اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗم ﺟﻣﻌﮭﺎ ﺧﻼل ھذه اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﻻ ﯾﻣﻛن ﻋزوھﺎ ﺗﻛون ﻟك. ﺳﯾﺗم ﺗﺧزﯾن اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت ﻓﻲ 
دﯾﻛن، وﯾﻣﻛن اﻟوﺻول إﻟﯾﮭﺎ إﻻ  اﻟﻛﻣﺑﯾوﺗر اﻟﻣﺣﻣول وﻛﻣﺑﯾوﺗر ﺳطﺢ اﻟﻣﻛﺗب ﻛﻠﻣﺔ اﻟﺳر اﻟﻣﺣﻣﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ
ﺳﻧوات ﺑﻌد ﻧﺷر  6ﻣن ﻗﺑل اﻟﺑﺎﺣث واﻟﺑﺎﺣﺛﺔ ﻣﺑدأ اﻟطﺎﻟب. ﺳﯾﺗم ﺗﺧزﯾن ﺟﻣﯾﻊ اﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت ﻣدة ﻻ ﺗﻘل ﻋن 
  اﻟﻧﮭﺎﺋﻲ، وﺑﻌد ذﻟك ﺳوف ﯾﺗم ﺗدﻣﯾره. 
واﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗم ﺟﻣﻌﮭﺎ ﻓﻲ إطﺎر ھذه اﻟدراﺳﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﻣﻛن أن ﺗﺣدد ﻟك ﺗﺑﻘﻰ ﻓﻲ ﺳرﯾﺔ ﺗﺎﻣﺔ. ﻣن ﺧﻼل 
اﻹذن اﻟﺧﺎص ﻣن ﺧﻼل اﻟﺗوﻗﯾﻊ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻣوذج اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ، وﻧﺣن ﻧﺗوﻗﻊ ﻧﺷر اﻟﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﺟﻼت ﻧظﯾر إﻋطﺎء 
  ﻣراﺟﻌﺗﮭﺎ. ﻟن ﯾﺗم اﻟﺗﻌرف ﻋﻠﯾك ﻓﻲ أي اﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت اﻟﻣﻧﺷورة.
  . ﻧﺷر ﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﺑﺣوث٧
ﻠﻧﺷر ﺳﯾﺗم اﺳﺗﺧدام اﻟﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ واﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗم ﺟﻣﻌﮭﺎ وﺗﺣﻠﯾﻠﮭﺎ ﻣن ھذه اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﺑﻣﺛﺎﺑﺔ أطروﺣﺔ دﻛﺗوراه وﻟ
  ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﺟﻠﺔ ﻣﻘﺎﻻت وأوراق اﻟﻣؤﺗﻣر. وﺳﯾﺗم ﺗﻘدﯾم ﺗﻘرﯾر ﻋن اﻟﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ ﻓﻲ ھذه اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﻟك ﺑﻧﺎء ﻋﻠﻰ طﻠﺑك.
  . رﺻد اﻟﺑﺣوث٨
وطﺎﻟب اﻟﺑﺎﺣث ﻋﻠﻰ اﺗﺻﺎل ﻣﻧﺗظم ﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﺎﺣث اﻟﻣﺑدأ ﻋﺑر رﺳﺎﺋل اﻟﺑرﯾد اﻹﻟﻛﺗروﻧﻲ واﻟﻣﻛﺎﻟﻣﺎت اﻟﮭﺎﺗﻔﯾﺔ 
اﻟﻌراق، وﺳﯾﺗم إﻧﺷﺎء اﺗﺻﺎل واﻟﻣﺣﺎﻓظﺔ ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺳﻛﺎﯾب ﻓﻲ ﺣﯾن ﺟﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت. أﺛﻧﺎء وﺟوده ﻓﻲ 
  اﻟﺳﻔﺎرات اﻻﺳﺗراﻟﯾﺔ واﻷﻣرﯾﻛﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻐداد واﻟﻘﻧﺻﻠﯾﺔ اﻷﻣرﯾﻛﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ أرﺑﯾل.
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  . اﻟﻣدﻓوﻋﺎت ﻟﻠﻣﺷﺎرﻛﯾن٩
  ﻟن ﯾﺗم اﻟدﻓﻊ ﻟك ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺗﻛم ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﻣﺷروع.
  ﻣﺻﺎدر اﻟﺗﻣوﯾل ﻟﻠﻣﺷروع ٠١.
  ﻣن ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ دﯾﻛن. وﻗد ﺗم ﺗوﻓﯾر اﻟﺗﻣوﯾل ﺑﺳﺧﺎء ﻟﮭذا اﻟﻣﺷروع اﻟﺑﺣﺛﻲ
  . إﺟراء اﻟﺑﺣوث ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌراق١١
وﺣﺗﻰ ﻛﺎﻧون اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ/  5002ﻋﺎش اﻟﺑﺎﺣث اﻟطﺎﻟب وﻋﻣﻠت ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌراق ﺧﻼل اﻟﻔﺗرة ﻣن ﻛﺎﻧون اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ/ ﯾﻧﺎﯾر 
ودراﯾﺔ ﺗﺎﻣﺔ اﻟﻌﺎدات واﻟﺗﻘﺎﻟﯾد اﻟﻌراﻗﯾﺔ. وﺳوف ﯾﻛون اﻟﺣد اﻷدﻧﻰ ﻣن اﻟﻣﺧﺎطر ﻟك ﻣن ﻗﺑل  3102ﯾﻧﺎﯾر 
ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ أي وﻗت. ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ ذﻟك، ﺟﻣﯾﻊ اﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗم ﺟﻣﻌﮭﺎ ﻣن ﻣﻣﺎ ﯾﺗﯾﺢ ﻟك أن ﺗﺧﺗﺎر ﻣن اﻟ
  اﻟﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﺳرﯾﺔ، وﺳوف ﺗظل ﻣﺟﮭوﻟﺔ.
  . اﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ طوﻋﯾﺔ٢١
اﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﻣﺷروع اﻟﺑﺣﺛﻲ ھو طوﻋﻲ ﺑﺣت. أﻧت ﻏﯾر ﻣﻠزﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ إذا ﻛﻧت ﻻ ﺗرﻏب ﻓﻲ 
ﻓﻲ وﻗت ﻻﺣق ﻟﺳﺣب ﻣواﻓﻘﺗك، وأﻧت ﺣرة ﻓﻲ  اﻟﻘﯾﺎم ﺑذﻟك. إذا ﻗررت اﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﻣﺷروع وﺗﻘرر
أن ﺗﻔﻌل ذﻟك. ﺳﯾﻛون ﻗرارك ﺳواء ﺑﺎﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ أو ﻋدم اﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ، أو ﻟﻠﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ، ﺛم اﻻﻧﺳﺣﺎب، ﻟن ﯾؤﺛر 
ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻼﻗﺗك ﻣﻊ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ دﯾﻛن. ﻗﺑل اﺗﺧﺎذ اﻟﻘرار اﻟﺧﺎص ﺑك، وأﺣد أﻋﺿﺎء ﻓرﯾق اﻟﺑﺣث أن ﺗﻛون ﻣﺗﺎﺣﺔ 
  ﻟﺑﺣﺛﻲ.ﻟﻠرد ﻋﻠﻰ أﯾﺔ أﺳﺋﻠﺔ ﻟدﯾك ﺣول اﻟﻣﺷروع ا
اﻟﺗوﻗﯾﻊ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻣوذج اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ ﻓﻘط ﺑﻌد أن ﻛﻧت ﻗد ﻛﺎﻧت ﻟدﯾﮫ ﻓرﺻﺔ ﻟطرح اﻷﺳﺋﻠﺔ اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺑك وﺗﻠﻘت 
أﺟوﺑﺔ ﻣرﺿﯾﺔ. إذا ﻗررت اﻻﻧﺳﺣﺎب ﻣن ھذا اﻟﻣﺷروع، اﻟرﺟﺎء إﺑﻼغ اﻟﺑﺎﺣث اﻟطﺎﻟب أو ﻛﺎﻣﻠﺔ واﻟﻌودة 
  إﺑطﺎل ﻣن ﻧﻣوذج اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ ﺗﻌﻠق ﻋﻠﻰ ھذا اﻟﻧﻣوذج.
  ﻷﺧﻼﻗﯾﺔ. اﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﺗوﺟﯾﮭﯾﺔ ا٣١
( اﻟﺗﻲ 7002وﺳﯾﺗم ﺗﻧﻔﯾذ ھذا اﻟﻣﺷروع وﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﺑﯾﺎن اﻟوطﻧﯾﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺳﻠوك اﻷﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺑﺣوث اﻹﻧﺳﺎن )
ﺗﻧﺗﺟﮭﺎ اﻟﻣﺟﻠس اﻟوطﻧﻲ ﻟﻠﺑﺣوث اﻟﺻﺣﯾﺔ واﻟطﺑﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ أﺳﺗراﻟﯾﺎ. وﻗد ﺗم ﺗطوﯾر ھذا اﻟﺑﯾﺎن ﻟﺣﻣﺎﯾﺔ ﻣﺻﺎﻟﺢ 
  اﻟﻧﺎس اﻟذﯾن ﯾواﻓﻘون ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺑﺣوث واﻟدراﺳﺎت اﻟﺑﺷرﯾﺔ. 
اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺟواﻧب أﺧﻼﻗﯾﺎت ھذا اﻟﻣﺷروع اﻟﺑﺣﺛﻲ ﻣن ﻗﺑل ﻟﺟﻧﺔ أﺧﻼﻗﯾﺎت اﻟﺑﺣوث اﻟﺑﺷرﯾﺔ  وﻗد ﺗﻣت
  ﻣن ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ دﯾﻛن. 
  ﻟﻘد ﺗم اﻟﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣواﻓﻘﺔ ﻣن ﻛﻠﯾﺔ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ دﯾﻛﯾن اﻵداب واﻟﺗرﺑﯾﺔ واﻟﺗﻌﻠﯾم.
  اﻟﺷﻛﺎوى
ﺎ أو أي أﺳﺋﻠﺔ إذا ﻛﺎن ﻟدﯾك أي ﺷﻛﺎوى ﺣول أي ﺟﺎﻧب ﻣن ﺟواﻧب اﻟﻣﺷروع، واﻟطرﯾﻘﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ أﺟرﯾت ﺑﮭ
  ﺣول ﺣﻘوﻗك ﻛﻣﺷﺎرك اﻟﺑﺣوث، ﺛم ﯾﻣﻛﻧك اﻻﺗﺻﺎل:
 
  ﻣدﯾر 
  اﻟﻧزاھﺔ اﻟﺑﺣوث 
  ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ دﯾﻛن 
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  5213ﺑﯾروود ﻓﯾﻛﺗورﯾﺎ 
  أﺳﺗراﻟﯾﺎ 
  9217 1529 16اﻟﮭﺎﺗف: +
  hcraeser-teua.ude.nikaed@scihاﻟﺑرﯾد اﻹﻟﻛﺗروﻧﻲ: 
  .110- 4102ﯾرﺟﻰ اﻗﺗﺑﺎس اﻟﻣﺷروع رﻗم 
 
  . ﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت إﺿﺎﻓﯾﺔ، اﺳﺗﻌﻼﻣﺎت أو أي ﻣﺷﺎﻛل٤١
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إذا ﻛﻧت ﺗﺣﺗﺎج إﻟﻰ ﻣزﯾد ﻣن اﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت، ﺗرﻏب ﻓﻲ ﺳﺣب ﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺗﻛم أو إذا ﻛﺎن ﻟدﯾك أﯾﺔ ﻣﺧﺎوف ﺣول 
  ھذا اﻟﻣﺷروع ﯾﻣﻛﻧك اﻻﺗﺻﺎل اﻟﺑﺎﺣث اﻟطﺎﻟب:
 
  دﯾﺎن ﺳﯾﺑرﻧدت 
  دﻛﺗوراه  طﺎﻟﺑﺔ
  ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ دﯾﻛن 
  ﻣرﻛز اﻟﻣواطﻧﺔ واﻟﻌوﻟﻣﺔ 
  ﻛﻠﯾﺔ اﻵداب واﻟﺗرﺑﯾﺔ 
  ﺑﯾروود اﻟطرﯾق اﻟﺳرﯾﻊ  122
  5213ﺑﯾروود، ﻓﯾﻛﺗورﯾﺎ 
  اﺳﺗراﻟﯾﺎ
  962 917 414 16اﻟﺟوال: + 
 
  ua.ude.nikaed@narbeisdاﻟﺑرﯾد اﻻﻟﻛﺗروﻧﻲ: 
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Appendix IV 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
TO: Participant  
 
Consent Form 
Date: 07-04-14 
Full Project Title: Assessing Cross-Cultural Relationships between US and 
Coalition Military Forces and Iraqi Cultural Heritage Professionals at 
Archaeological Sites during the Iraq War 
Reference Number: 2014 - 011 
I have read, or have had read to me in my first language, and I understand the 
attached Plain Language Statement. 
I freely agree to participate in this project according to the conditions in the Plain 
Language Statement.  
I have been given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to 
keep.  
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, including 
where information about this project is published, or presented in any public 
form.   
Participant’s Name (printed) 
…………………………………………………………………… 
Signature…………………………………………Date  ……………………… 
Please mail or email to:  
Diane Siebrandt 
PhD Student 
Deakin University  
Centre for Citizenship and Globalization  
Faculty of Arts and Education 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood, Victoria 3125 
Australia 
Email: dsiebran@deakin.edu.au 
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WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT FORM FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS 
	
TO: Participant 
 
Withdrawal of Consent Form 
(To be used for participants who wish to withdraw from the project) 
Date: 07-04-14 
Full Project Title: Assessing Cross-Cultural Relationships between US and 
Coalition Military Forces and Iraqi Cultural Heritage Professionals at 
Archaeological Sites during the Iraq War 
Reference Number: 2014 -011 
 
 
I hereby wish to WITHDRAW my consent to participate in the above research 
project and understand that such withdrawal WILL NOT jeopardize my 
relationship with Deakin University. 
 
Participant’s Name (printed) ……………………………………………………. 
 
Signature…………………………………………………………Date …………… 
 
Please mail or email this form to: 
Diane Siebrandt 
PhD Student 
Deakin University  
Centre for Citizenship and Globalization  
Faculty of Arts and Education 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood, Victoria 3125 
Australia 
Email: dsiebran@deakin.edu.au 
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  ﺑﯾﺎن واﺿﺢ ﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻻم و ﻧﻣوذج اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ:
  																																																																																				إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣﺷﺎرك :  				
	
  ﺳﺣب ﻧﻣوذج اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ
  )ﺗﺳﺗﺧدم ﻟﻠﻣﺷﺎرﻛﯾن اﻟذﯾن ﯾرﻏﺑون ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺳﺣﺎب ﻣن اﻟﻣﺷروع( 
 
  4102ﯾوﻟﯾو / ﺗﻣوز  1اﻟﺗﺎرﯾﺦ: 
 
ﺑﯾن اﻟﻘوات اﻟﻌﺳﻛرﯾﺔ اﻷﻣرﯾﻛﯾﺔ  ﻛﺎﻣل ﻋﻧوان اﻟﻣﺷروع: ﺗﻘﯾﯾم اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت ﻋﺑر ﺗﺑﺎدل اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﺎت واﻟﺣﺿﺎرات
  وﻗوات اﻟﺗﺣﺎﻟف وﻣﮭﻧﯾﯾن اﻟﺗراث اﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﻲ اﻟﻌراﻗﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣواﻗﻊ اﻷﺛرﯾﺔ ﺧﻼل ﺣرب اﻟﻌراق.
 
ﻟن ﯾﮭدد  واود ھﻧﺎ ﻟﺳﺣب ﻣواﻓﻘﺗﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﺷروع اﻟﺑﺣﺛﻲ أﻋﻼه وﻧﻔﮭم أن ھذا اﻻﻧﺳﺣﺎب
  ﻋﻼﻗﺗﻲ ﻣﻊ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ دﯾﻛن.
	
  اﺳم اﻟﻣﺷﺎرك )اﻟﻣطﺑوع(..............................................
 
اﻟﺗﺎرﯾﺦ  ﺗوﻗﯾﻊ.................................................................................
  اﻟﯾوم:.............................
  اﻟﺑرﯾد اﻹﻟﻛﺗروﻧﻲ ﻣن ھذا اﻟﻧﻣوذج إﻟﻰ:ﯾرﺟﻰ ارﺳﺎل اﻟﺑرﯾد أو 
 
  دﯾﺎن ﺳﯾﺑرﻧدت 
  دﻛﺗوراه  طﺎﻟﺑﺔ
  ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ دﯾﻛن 
  ﻣرﻛز اﻟﻣواطﻧﺔ واﻟﻌوﻟﻣﺔ 
  ﻛﻠﯾﺔ اﻵداب واﻟﺗرﺑﯾﺔ 
  ﺑﯾروود اﻟطرﯾق اﻟﺳرﯾﻊ  122
  5213ﺑﯾروود، ﻓﯾﻛﺗورﯾﺎ 
  اﺳﺗراﻟﯾﺎ
  arbeisdua.ude.nikaed@nاﻟﺑرﯾد اﻻﻟﻛﺗروﻧﻲ: 
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Appendix VI 
  
Socioeconomic-demographic breakdown of participants 
Interview 
Number 
Nationality Gender Affiliation  Year(s) in 
Iraq 
Site(s) 
Visited  
01 Dutch Male Coalition 
Forces 
2003-2004 Uruk 
2007-2008 None 
02 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2003-2004 None 
2007-2008 Babylon 
Kish 
03 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2010-2011 Babylon 
Kish 
Ur 
04 American Female Civilian 
Archaeologist  
2009 
[April] 
Eridu 
Ghamni 
Larsa  
Ubaid 
Ur 
Uruk 
05 American Male Civilian 
Archaeologist  
2009 
[April] 
Eridu 
Ghamni 
Larsa  
Ubaid 
Ur 
Uruk 
06 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2009 Ur 
07 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2007-2008 Babylon  
Kish 
2009-2010 None 
08 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2006-2007 Hatra 
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Nimrud 
09 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2006 None 
10 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2008-2009 Agar Quf 
11 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2003-2004 Babylon 
2008-2009 None 
12 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2003 None 
2007-2008 Babylon 
Kish 
13 American Female Coalition 
Forces 
2003-2004 None 
14 American Male Civilian 
Archaeologist 
2003-2004 None 
2008 
[July] 
Babylon 
Borsippa 
Ur 
Uruk 
2009 
[June] 
Babylon 
15 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2008-2009 None 
16 Iraqi Male Civilian 
Archaeologist 
Native 
Resident 
All southern 
sites 
17 American Female Civilian 
Consultant 
2009-2012 Najaf 
[unpublished 
site at civilian 
airport] 
18 Iraqi Female Civilian 
Heritage 
Consultant 
Native 
Resident 
Agar Quf 
Babylon 
Samarra 
19 Iraqi Male Civilian 
Archaeologist 
Native 
Resident 
All southern 
sites 
20 American Male Coalition 2003 None 
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Forces 2005-2006 None 
21 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2010 None  
22 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2008 None 
2009-2010 None 
23 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2010 Ur 
24 Dutch Male Coalition 
Forces 
2004 Babylon 
Borsippa 
25 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2003 Hatra 
2005 Kirkuk 
[unpublished 
site at 
military 
airbase] 
26 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2003-2004 None 
2004-2005 None  
27 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2004-2005 None 
28 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2003-2004 None 
2005 None 
2008-2009 None 
29 American Female Coalition 
Forces 
2006 None 
2008 Ur 
30 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2003  Samarra 
2007 Ur 
31 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2005 Ur 
32 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2004 None 
33 American Male Coalition 
Forces 
2003 Babylon 
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Appendix VII 
 
Interview Questions for Western Participants 
• In what capacity did you serve in Iraq?  
• In what years did you serve?  
• What was your knowledge about Iraq and Iraqis before you deployed?  
• Were you based on or near an archaeological site? If so which site(s)?  
• Did you visit an archaeological site? If so which site(s) and for what 
purpose? Describe your encounter at the site(s). 
• Did you meet with Iraqis while in Iraq? If so in what capacity? Describe 
the interactions. 
• Did you work with Iraqis on any programs related to an archaeological 
site? Describe the interaction(s). 
• Describe the achievements you were involved in or witnessed during your 
time in Iraq. 
• Describe the disappointments you were involved in or witnessed during 
your time in Iraq. 
• Did you receive pre-deployment training about cultural heritage issues? If 
so describe the training.  
• Is there anything you would like to add?  
	
	
 
Interview Questions for Iraqi Participants 
• Did you live on or near an archaeological site? If so which site(s)?  
• What was your knowledge about the West and Westerners before the 2003 
Iraq War?   
• Did you meet any members of the coalition? If so in what capacity? 
Describe the interactions. 
• Did you work with any members of the coalition? If so in what capacity? 
Describe the interactions.  
• Did you work with any members of the coalition on any programs related 
to an archaeological site? Describe the interaction(s). 
• Describe the achievements you were involved in or witnessed during your 
time working with members of the coalition. . 
• Describe the disappointments you were involved in or witnessed during 
your time working with members of the coalition.  
• Is there anything you would like to add?  
	
 
	
	
